【新刊速递】第31期 | Security Studies Vol.29, No.2, 2020 / 开普饭

期刊简介

SECURITY STUDIES《安全研究》收录出版创新性的学术稿件,包括理论研究、实践经验或两者兼有。安全研究包含广泛的议题，从核扩散、核威慑、军民关系、战略文化、种族冲突、流行病与国家安全、民主政治、外交决策到定性与多方法研究的发展。根据2018年的Journal Citation Reports显示，其2018年的影响因子为1.706，在91种国际关系类期刊中排名第30（30/91）。

本期编委

【编译】晋玉朱文菡赵柳希阮含含杨帆丁伟航

【校对】杨帆虞敷扬晋玉缪高意阮含含

【审核】丁伟航朱文菡兰星辰

【排版】贺奕

本期目录

1. 联盟中的威胁感知和隐藏的概况:以苏伊士为例

Threat Perceptions and Hidden Profiles in Alliances: Revisiting Suez

2. 钓鱼还是捕鲸：解析美国实施经济制裁的变化

Going Fishing versus Hunting Whales: Explaining Changes in How the US Enforces Economic Sanctions

3. 建立安全网:解析前军事网络的力量

Building a Safety Net: Explaining the Strength of Ex-Military Networks

4. 揭秘量子威胁：基础设施、机构和情报优势

Demystifying the Quantum Threat: Infrastructure, Institutions, and Intelligence Advantage

5. 逆势而动:阿联酋和阿拉伯世界军事能力的发展

Bucking the Trend: The UAE and the Development of Military Capabilities in the Arab World

6. 种族冲突与非暴力抵抗的局限

Ethnic Conflict and the Limits of Nonviolent Resistance

联盟中的威胁感知和隐藏的概况:以苏伊士为例

【题目】Threat Perceptions and Hidden Profiles in Alliances: Revisiting Suez

【作者】Aaron Rapport（剑桥大学）

【摘要】

什么因素可以用来评价盟友是否对威胁和对手有相同的理解?盟友们可能在没有解答此问题前就推定彼此之间拥有相同的看法，但如果这样就会产生不利后果。一系列的心理偏见会导致政策制定者忽视一个或多个盟友持有的有价值的信息，而去过度讨论各个参与威胁评估的盟友们已经知道的信息。心理学家把这种未（在盟友间）共享的评估（结论）称为“隐藏的概况”（Hidden Profiles）:一种并未刻意隐藏但却不为更广泛的群体所知的、对某个问题或威胁的关键特征进行假定的评估性描述。本文以1956年苏伊士运河危机为例，对隐藏侧写模型和其它威胁感知理论进行比较研究。

What factors influence whether allies have the same understandings of threats and adversaries? Allies may infer they share each other’s views without verifying if this is so, with harmful consequences. A set of psychological biases can cause policymakers to neglect valuable information held by one or more allies, and instead disproportionately discuss information that every allied contributor to a threat assessment already knows. Psychologists call the unshared assessments “hidden profiles”: an evaluative profile that postulates key features of a problem or threat, hidden in the sense that it is unintentionally withheld from the wider group. This manuscript compares the hidden-profiles model and alternative theories of threat perception using the 1956 Suez Crisis as a case study

【编译】晋玉

【校对】杨帆

【审核】丁伟航

钓鱼还是捕鲸：解析美国实施经济制裁的变化

【题目】Going Fishing versus Hunting Whales: Explaining Changes in How the US Enforces Economic Sanctions

【作者】Bryan R. Early（纽约州立大学奥尔巴尼分校）；Keith A. Preble（纽约州立大学奥尔巴尼分校）

【摘要】

经济制裁如何实施无疑影响着其实施效果。然而，政府究竟如何实施制裁，直至今日仍鲜为人知。为了解政府实施制裁的方式，本文就2003年至2018年间美国实施经济制裁的主导机构即美国财政部海外资产控制办公室（OFAC）如何实施制裁，开展了一项实证驱动的案例研究。本研究首先对OFAC如何开展制裁行为进行实证探究，即哪些因素和制裁行为紧密相关，以及哪些因素导致了采取罚款作为制裁行为的一部分。本研究发现OFAC在2003年至2018年间采取了两项截然不同的实施策略：“钓鱼”策略，即小布什执政期间采取大量制裁行为并施加小额罚款；“捕鲸”策略，即奥巴马执政期间采取少量制裁行为但施加巨额罚款。分析指出，小布什执政期间外交政策重心从古巴转移到伊朗，并且这种转移是如何促使新的立法加大对违反制裁的惩罚力度，以致成为奥巴马执政期间开创的“捕鲸”策略。本研究还就美国如何实施制裁产生了大量新的实证见解，以期助力未来的理论建设。

How economic sanctions are enforced undoubtedly affects their chances of success. Yet, to date, a lot remains unknown about how governments actually enforce their sanctions. To shed light on the ways governments enforce their sanctions, we conduct an empirically driven case study of how the lead agency for enforcing economic sanctions in the United States, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), has enforced US sanctions from 2003 to 2018. Our study begins with an empirical exploration of how OFAC’s enforcement actions originate, what factors correlate with enforcement actions being taken, and what factors contribute to the financial penalties imposed as part of enforcement actions. We find that OFAC engaged in two distinct enforcement strategies during our period of analysis: a “fishing” strategy that involved taking a lot of enforcement actions and imposing small fines during the administration of George W. Bush and a “whale-hunting” strategy that involved pursuing fewer cases but imposing enormous fines during Barack Obama’s administration. Our analysis indicates that the shift in foreign policy emphasis from Cuba to Iran during the Bush administration and how that motivated new legislation to enhance penalties for violating sanctions paved the way for the OFAC to adopt its innovative whale-hunting strategy during the Obama administration. Our study also yields a wealth of new empirical insights into how the United States enforces its sanctions that can contribute to future theory-building efforts.

【编译】朱文菡

【校对】杨帆

【审核】兰星辰

建立安全网:解析前军事网络的力量

【题目】Building a Safety Net: Explaining the Strength of Ex-Military Networks

【作者】Anders Themner（乌普萨拉大学）；Niklas Karlen(瑞典国防大学)

【摘要】

前战斗人员解除武装、复员和重返社会成为建设和平的一个组成部分。尽管这种干预的主要目的是解散武装集团的军事结构，但越来越多的证据表明，前战斗人员网络往往得以保持完整。本文研究为什么这样的结构会继续蓬勃发展。本文认为，当前指挥官与精英赞助系统的联系薄弱时，前军事网络会更强大。那些无法依靠前上级提供经济援助的前战斗人员，必须与彼此建立更紧密的联系，以获得社会安全网。为了评估此论点，本文对利比里亚的两个前军事网络进行了社会网络的比较分析(SNA)。这种创新的方法帮助我们发现以前被忽视的，但却十分重要的，有关前战斗组织的动态。因此，本研究认为SNA提供了一系列未充分利用的认识工具和准确的定义，以增加我们对前军事网络的认识。

The disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of excombatants has become an integral part of peacebuilding. Although the main purpose of such interventions is to dissolve the military structures of armed groups, there is growing evidence that ex-combatant networks often remain intact. We investigate why such structures continue to thrive. We argue that ex-military networks are stronger when ex-commanders have weak links to elite patronage systems. Ex-combatants who are unable to rely on their former superiors for economic assistance must instead build denser ties to each other to gain access to a social safety net. To assess our argument, we conduct a comparative social network analysis (SNA) of two ex-military networks in Liberia. This innovative approach helps us uncover previously overlooked, but central, dynamics related to ex-combatant groups. We thereby show that SNA provides a range of underutilized tools and exact definitions that can increase our understanding of ex-military networks.

【编译】赵柳希

【校对】虞敷扬

【审核】丁伟航

揭秘量子威胁：基础设施、机构和情报优势

【题目】Demystifying the Quantum Threat: Infrastructure, Institutions, and Intelligence Advantage

【作者】Jon R. Lindsay（多伦多大学）

【摘要】

从理论上来说，一台功能齐全的量子计算机能够破解为各地网络安全提供保障的加密协议，这对于国家安全、全球贸易以及公民社会可能会变成一场灾难。而相对应的，量子密码技术提供一种前所未有的安全级别，但这也伴随着一些危险：通信方式固若金汤的修正主义者可能会进行突袭或实施阴谋。在现实中，这些威胁情形都不太可能发生。在政治竞争中的情报优势取决于科技基础设施与组织性机构之间的相互作用。不当的组织协调可能会削弱密码系统的强度，而谨慎的安全策略可以弥补技术漏洞。量子技术的科学创新只会影响其中一个维度，而可能使其它维度复杂化。即使可以克服巨大的量子计算工程的挑战，但信号情报收集器仍需要进行大量解码分析，并及时向感兴趣的决策者传递相关的判断。同样，未来的量子网络也很难为运营安全实践薄弱的复杂组织提供什么保护。本研究认为，在情报工作中古典政治极有可能战胜量子计算。

In theory, a fully functional quantum computer could break the cryptographic protocols that underwrite cybersecurity everywhere, which would be disastrous for national security, global trade, and civil society. Quantum cryptography, conversely, promises an unprecedented level of security, yet this benefit comes with some danger: revisionist actors with impenetrable communications might be able to conduct surprise attacks and covert conspiracies. In reality, neither of these threat scenarios are likely. Intelligence advantage in political competition depends on the interaction of technological infrastructure with organizational institutions. Robust cryptosystems can be undermined by poor organizational coordination, and careful security policy can compensate for technical vulnerabilities. Scientific innovation in quantum technology only affects one of these dimensions while potentially complicating the other. Even if the formidable engineering challenges of quantum computing can be overcome, signals intelligence collectors will still have to analyze a vast number of decrypts and deliver timely and relevant judgments to interested decision makers. The quantum networks of tomorrow, similarly, will provide little protection for complex organizations that have weak operations security practices. In the practice of intelligence, we should expect classical politics to dominate quantum computing.

【编译】阮含含

【校对】晋玉

【审核】丁伟航

逆势而动:阿联酋和阿拉伯世界军事能力的发展

【题目】Bucking the Trend: The UAE and the Development of Military Capabilities in the Arab World

【作者】David B. Roberts（伦敦国王学院）

【摘要】

研究阿拉伯世界国家军队的文献几乎无一例外地描绘了他们能力的暗淡图景。一些人认为，根植于“阿拉伯文化”的问题，即所谓的本质主义理论，会致命地削弱军事效力；另一些人则断言，出于政权安全考量领导人会积极促进军队政治化、防止政变，以致最终削弱军事实力。本文通过证明阿联酋部队在敌对战役中反复展示了不同寻常的军事效率和复杂性，对这些文献提出了挑战。本文运用公共政策研究（倡导联盟框架）的方法调查阿联酋军方如何逆势而动。1990年伊拉克入侵科威特是一个“焦点事件”，促使人们重新思考现有方法。关键的“政策企业家”阿布扎比王储穆罕默德·本·扎耶德·阿勒纳哈扬（Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan）改变了训练方式，统一了联邦军队，并在具有挑战性的行动中检验了部队，最终催化了关于现有方法的反思。这些发现削弱了对阿拉伯军队挥之不去的本质主义批评，为其他国家提供了效仿的潜在途径，证明了有安全感和积极性的领导人能够克服对防止政变的担忧，并展示了从公共政策到安全研究的各种方法论成果。

The literature examining national militaries in the Arab world paints a near-universally bleak picture of their capabilities. Some argue issues rooted in “Arab culture”—so-called essentialist rationales—fatally undermine military effectiveness. Others assert that regime security concerns encourage leaders to actively politicize, coup-proof, and consequently weaken their military. This article challenges these literatures by demonstrating that United Arab Emirates (UAE) forces have repeatedly exemplified unusual levels of military effectiveness and sophistication in hostile campaigns. Using approaches from public policy studies (the Advocacy Coalition Framework), this paper investigates how the UAE military bucked the trend. The 1990 invasion of Kuwait was a “focusing event” that prompted a rethink of existing approaches. Catalyzed, a key “policy entrepreneur,” Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, changed approaches to training, unified federal militaries, and tested forces in challenging operations. Such findings undercut lingering essentialist critiques of Arab militaries, provide a potential pathway for other states to emulate, demonstrate that secure and motivated leaders can overcome coup-proofing concerns, and showcase the fruitful pollination of methodologies from public policy to security studies.

【编译】杨帆

【校对】缪高意

【审核】朱文菡

种族冲突与非暴力抵抗的局限

【题目】Ethnic Conflict and the Limits of Nonviolent Resistance

【作者】Costantino Pischedda（迈阿密大学）

【摘要】

最近的研究表明，非暴力抵抗运动比武装叛乱更能成功地产生根本性的政治变革。作者认为，对非暴力抵抗的研究没有充分重视成功的一个关键条件，即挑战者和政府间具有共同的种族认同。当挑战者和现任政府属于不同的种族群体时，运动成功的可能性将被大大削弱，因为这种“种族冲突”的局面抑制了非暴力抵抗取得成功的机制：大量挑战者的涌现，部分安全机构和政权核心集团的叛变，以及政府主要决策者对反对派的同情感增强。基于1945年至2006年间所有非暴力运动的统计分析支撑了作者的论点。与非族群运动相比，非暴力的种族运动在很大程度上不太可能取得成功，并且吸引的参与者和政府叛逃者也更少。

Recent research shows that campaigns of nonviolent resistance are much more successful in producing radical political change than armed rebellion. I argue that the study of nonviolent resistance has paid insufficient attention to a key condition for success—a shared ethnic identity between challengers and government.When challengers and incumbent belong to different ethnic groups, the prospects of campaign success are drastically curtailed, as this situation of“ethnic conflict”inhibits the mechanisms through which nonviolent resistance enables success: emergence of a critical mass of challengers, defection of segments of the security apparatus and the regime inner circle, and development of feelings of sympathy for the opposition cause among key government decision makers. Statistical analysis of all nonviolent campaigns from 1945 to 2006 supports my argument. Nonviolent ethnic campaigns are significantly and substantially less likely to succeed and draw both fewer participants and government defectors than their nonethnic counterparts.

【编译】丁伟航

【校对】阮含含

【审核】朱文菡

【新刊速递】 第31期 | Security Studies Vol.29, No.2, 2020

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【新刊速递】第31期 | Security Studies Vol.29, No.2, 2020