特别推荐 | 贾康：中国收入分配格局基本认知和代表性问题分析
本文英文版发表于： International Business & Economics Studies ISSN 2640-9852 (Print) ISSN 2640-9860 (Online) Vol. 2, No. 2, 2020. （中文版本附后）
Analysis on Basic Cognition and Representative Issues of the Income Distribution Pattern in China
Abstract
The analysis and recognition of China’s current income distribution pattern is a major practical issue that involves the idea and essentials of advancing modern state governance in the stage of economic and social transition, and also a controversial issue. In this paper, the author focused on two major points. First, the analysis on the basic situation of the proportion of resident income in the overall income distribution pattern in recent decade in China, which first went down and then rose slightly, is conducted. Then the paper emphasized that the key to solve the paradox formed by two mainstream views was to understand more deeply the institutional causes of the unfairness and non-standardization inherent in high Gini coefficient of income distribution in China, which was an essential real problem. Second, based on an examination of the significance of cultivating and developing the mid-income class in China, the serious shortcomings of official statistics about income quintile information must be pointed out. Thus, it is imperative to recognize the covered contradictions, face the anxiety state and related challenges that the mid-income class in China has been stuck in, and then seek to solve the contradiction and eliminate the anxiety in a targeted manner.
Keywords
income distribution, hidden off-the-books income, quintile of the income, anxiety of the mid-incomeclass
1. The Proportion of the Resident’s Income Has Risen Slightly after a Downturn, and SomeResidents Have Considerable off-the-Books Incomes. The Critical Issue Is to Focus on Unfairnessand Non-Standardization and Its Institutional Causes
Since the reform and opening up, there has been a series of changes in the overall pattern of nationalincome distribution with the economic and social development in China. From 2000 to 2014, comparedwith the growth rate of per capita GDP, the residents’ income experienced a process of falling first andthen rising. In the first 8 years (2000-2008), the actual average annual growth rate of per capita GDP inChina was 10%. The actual average annual growth rate of urban per capita disposable income was9.9%. The actual average annual growth rate of rural per capita net income was 6.4%. Both of themwere lower than the economic growth rate. In the following 6 years (2008-2014), the actual averageannual growth rate of per capita GDP was 8.1%, while the actual average annual growth rates of bothurban per capita disposable income and rural per capita net income were 8.2% and 10% respectively,which exceeded the economic growth rate. It can be seen that the proportion of household income innational income experienced a process of first falling and then rising.
According to the data of the National Bureau of Statistics, from 2000 to 2014, the proportion of thegovernment, enterprises and residents in the primary distribution and the secondary distribution of thenational income can be calculated and shown as follows. (Refer to Tables 1 and 2 respectively).
According to Tables 1 and 2, the proportion of the residents dropped firstly and then rose slightly afterexperiencing the low point in 2008. But overall, it has fallen by about 6 percentages during this period.The change in the division of the national income has once become a hotspot for many parties, whobelieved that it is closely related to the phenomenon of low consumption rate in China. Relevantresearch conducted by scholars such as Bai Chong’en calculated the declining proportion and hadinfluence on the mainstream views of the academic circle in China.
However, the influential view that has been directly confirmed by Tables 1 and 2 constitutes anincompatible paradox with another equally influential achievement. According to Wang Xiaolu’sresearch, there is a huge amount of off-the-books incomes in China’s national income distribution, which is not reflected in the data of the National Bureau of Statistics. It is a hidden income. In 2008, thetotal scale was about 4.6 trillion Yuan. According to another round of his estimation, the basicconclusion was that in 2011, the total scale of off-the-books income in China was 6.2 trillion Yuan,which was equivalent to 12.2% of GDP. The distribution of such hidden income was extremely uneven:63% of this income belonged to the top 10% high-income families and 80% of this income belonged tothe top 20% high-income families.Wang Xiaolu’s research results attracted great attention and had great influence on mainstreamopinions. However, scholars such as Bai Chong’en put forward their view according to the researchconclusion of the official statistics, which was precisely different from that of Wang Xiaolu. Taking thegreat influence into consideration, the proportion of the residents’ income did not decline, but shouldrise according to the basic logic. In the end, there will be discussions of different opinions. But limitedby various conditions, the quantitative results of various views cannot be very accurate. However, itshould be noted that the unique value of Wang Xiaolu’s research results is undeniable, that is, includingthe non-standard income problem that people have already felt in real life into the serious academicresearch framework. Although the quantitative analysis results cannot be precise in the specific value,we cannot deny its significant practical significance from the perspective of the nature of the problem.In other words, neither shall we be limited to understand the problems of the income distribution inChina only by the official figures of the Bureau of Statistics, nor shall we be limited to the decliningproportion of the residents’ income. We should explore the income distribution structure behind thehidden off-the-books income in depth, that is, the income gap, the property gap, the fairness andstandardization of income distribution, and their relevant institutional reasons in depth.Regarding to the issue of “large income gap” from the perspective of the resident income distributionstructure in China, it has long been concerned by all parties. According to the official data of the Ginicoefficient, it reached a historical high point of 0.491 in 2008, and then gradually decreased, but itremained at above 0.46 in 2016, which was still too high. China’s Gini coefficient calculated bynon-official research group was often significantly higher that the official value. For example, theresearch conclusion of the Ganli team of Southwestern University of Finance and economics was ashigh as 0.61. Corresponding, the Gini coefficient of the distribution of the residents’ property washigher. China People’s Livelihood Development Report 2015 formed by China Family Panel Studies(CFPS) of the Peking University was based on baseline samples of 14,960 households in 160 districtsand counties in 25 provinces and cities across the country. The result was that the Gini coefficient ofthe property of households across the country expanded from 0.45 in 1995 to 0.73 in 2012. The top 1%households occupied about one-third properties of the country, and the bottom 25% households had atotal of only 1 % properties (Refer to Table 3).
A particularly critical understanding is that the unfair and non-standard income distribution isinseparable from the widening gap of the residents’ income and wealth. A large amount of hiddenincome, including off-the-books incomes (involving various non-standard distributions that should notbe directly identified as illegal and disorderly) and black income (involving criminal acts such ascorruption), are considerable in quantity and cannot be ignored in the distribution pattern. Its causesshall be naturally focus on the lack in the effectiveness of relevant institutional supply, and shall becorrected with the reform.
If we take into account the non-standard off-the-books income estimated by Wang Xiaolu at the scaleof 5-6 trillion Yuan, the scale of the residents’ income has not been reduced in these years, but likely tohas increased. It is difficulty to identify the increased scale and thus unable to form authoritativeinterpretation. However, based on the logical relationship between common sense and relatedindicators, we should know that part of the hidden income alleged by Wang Xiaolu will be transferredfrom the non-resident sector to the resident sector in the financial and statistical information, which willnot affect the total GDP of China, but affects the structure of the income distribution. But the other partwill be used in the way of meeting expenses with cashes and will not enter the financial and statistical information. So it is logical to say that this part should be additive factors affecting the total amount ofChina’s GDP, that is, the contribution factors to the total income. But in fact, this addition willcertainly not be accepted by official statistics departments. We would like to emphasize in particularthat, under various constraints, based on Wang Xiaolu’s research results, quantitatively increasing thetotal scale of China’s GDP is considered to be non-operable, but it is appropriate and necessary toincrease the share of the resident sector from the perspective of China’s internal structure of GDP. Asfor the increase, it is indeed difficult to determine accurately, but at least this review has significantlydilute the need to focus on the declining proportion of residents’ income, and it has inspired us to paymore attention to the true problems of China’s national income distribution, unfairness,non-standardization and income gap. In particular, we should follow the logic of reform to deeplyunderstand the underlying institutional causes associated with it, and then explore effectivecountermeasures.
Liu He pointed out: “The income distribution gap is the biggest imbalance in China’s economy.”(Comments for Peng Wensheng’s monograph The Drifting Dividends-Seeking a New Balance in China(Social Sciences Academic Press, 2013)). The non-standardization and unfairness inherent in theincome distribution gap are mainly caused by inadequate practices, corruption, power and moneytransactions, turning public properties to private properties, and loss of state-owned assets, etc. due toinsufficient institutional supply in real life. It is the most serious problem. It is related to the basicwell-being of the people, the fairness and justice of the society, and the fate and future of the rulingparty and the country. It is one of the core and key issues that need to be resolved in order to ensureproper income distribution in China in contemporary.
2. Understanding and Judgment of the Significance of the Mle Class, and the Challenges ofCultivating the Middle Class
The recognition of the basic income distribution pattern in China requires special attention to thesituation of the Chinese middle class and their nutrition and strengthening.
China’s basic aspiration in implementing its modernization strategy is a peaceful rise based onhumanistic position, and maintaining and promoting the harmony between the internal and the external.The basic experience of linking income distribution to the harmonious state of society is that thecultivation and expansion of the mid-income class “middle class” is an important condition forpromoting and achieving social stability and harmony. The society in which the mid-income classbecomes the main body of society, and the higher-end rich and the lower-end poor are a minority,which can be visually called “olive” (“small at both ends and large at the middle” resembling an olive),is a society with the most stable and harmonious characteristics. There are a large number ofmid-income class people with “constant properties”, who tend to have the “perseverance” of dedicationand joy, and relatively small wealthy class above the middle class and lower-class below the middleclass. Objectively, it helps to alleviate the contradiction between the high and low ends. The empirical situation of many advanced economies is the basic basis of this judgment. The obvious differencebetween China and this type of society is considered to be the situation requiring efforts to change. Thisis the inner logic and necessity of cultivating and strengthening mid-income class.
Naturally, the middle class will increase when transiting from the excessive egalitarianism under thetraditional system to the situation of “some people and some regions getting rich first” in the reformand opening up. However, at present, there are stilling different understandings and many tangles abouthow to estimate the development of the middle class in China. In particular, the basic understanding onthe following two levels is explained.
First, in terms of related concepts, it should be emphasized that the mid-income class is a relative andqualitative concept. The so-called relative concept means that we should not care too much about theabsolute value of comparison with other economies, and we should mainly look at the up-downcontrast between the residents in the economy in which they reside. The so-called qualitative concept isto understand that the mid-income class should be such members of the society: they have constantproperties. Chinese people value the house and car (especially when they have a house, they should notbe a slave to the house in pain). In addition, there must be a certain amount of savings, matchinghigh-level living services in education and medical care, etc., and corresponding social security system.Besides, they should also have the ability to enjoy leisure life such as tourism. For such a mid-incomeclass, to understand it qualitatively, we should further explore how to eliminate some illusions and tryto get closer to the real situation with reference to the existing official statistics.
In 2016, according to the data from the National Bureau of Statistics, the national residents weredivided into quintile income groups. The basic situation was shown in Table 4 and Figure 1.
Official statistics showed that for the quintile income groups of the Chinese, it seemed intuitively thatthe two groups with the highest income together accounted for 69.86% of the total per capitadisposable income, of which the highest income group accounted for 45.37%. Seen from thedistribution of the income structure of social members, one-fifth households held nearly one-half of thetotal income, and another one-fifth households held about one-fourth of the total income. This wasanother statistical perspective different from the Gini coefficient, which showed the disparity in incomedistribution in China. It should be pointed out that the real income difference in Chinese societyreflected by this statistical result is still seriously inadequate. The very important reason is that this setof quintile statistics mainly comes from household surveys, which are reported by people voluntarily(involuntary surveyed households are skipped when selected). In real life, no wealthy one is reallywilling to report. Those who have off-the-books income and black income and have done in-depthresearch with Professor Wang Xiaolu generally do not report. Even when he did, he would not trulyreport his off-the-books income or black income. Therefore, when these household survey data are puttogether, we cannot say that it is meaningless, but it is quite far from the truth of Chinese society. Itcannot fully reveal the structural differences between the actual income, the inverted pyramid shape ofwealth possession, and the positive pyramid shape of the population from the perspective of incomedistribution of Chinese residents. It covers the true situation of the middle class income and makes therelevant judgments on the growth of China’s middle class tend to be optimistic.
Secondly, the existing middle class in China is suffering from more obvious anxiety, which reflects the outstanding challenges at this stage.
It should be pointed out that among the “new middle class” people in China that have formed, variousobjective causes have also contributed to a higher degree of “anxiety” in their subjective mental state,which is manifested by the obvious stability characteristics different from that of the middle class inother economies. In July 2016, the British The Economist stated in a special report that there were 225million middle class people in China, who were the most anxious group in the world. The reportdefined the Chinese middle class as people whose annual household income was between $ 11,500 and$ 43,000, which was about an annual household income from 80,000 to 300,000 Yuan. This range wasnot measured according to annual household income and was still questionable. The standard was low,but the size of the amount should not be too outrageous. The estimates that were similar to it were thesize estimates of McKinsey and Boston Consulting: in 2020, China’s mid-class population would reach300 million or even higher. In other words, among the nearly 1.4 billion people, with the exception of afew high-income members (certainly less than 100 million) and mid-class members of about 300million, the rest were all low-income members and lower mid-income members below the middle class.The anxiety of the middle class is mainly due to the rising price of housing, the obvious threat toenvironmental safety, and the increasing burden of children’s education, medical care and futurepensions, too much overwork and the tension brought by squeezed personal time, and so on. How toeliminate these anxieties and enable them to fully reflect the role of helping social stability is thespecific challenge China faces in nurturing and expanding the middle class. It is imperative to grasp thesubstantive disadvantages of China’s income distribution as a whole and the decisive institutionalreform issues associated with economic and social issues, and to targetedly find ways to properlyresolve conflicts and eliminate anxiety.
以下为中文版：
中国收入分配格局基本认知和代表性问题分析
贾康
摘要：关于中国现阶段收入分配格局的分析认识，是涉及经济社会转轨中推进现代国家治理思路与要领的重大现实问题，也是一个颇具争议的问题。作者于本文中聚焦两大重点：一是在勾画中国近些年整个收入分配格局中居民收入占比走低后又有所回升的基本情况后，强调破解两种相关主流观点形成的“悖论”的关键，是更深刻地把握中国收入分配在基尼系数居高不下图景中内含的“非公平，非规范”的制度性成因这一实质性真问题；二是对在中国培育发展中产阶层的重要意义加以考察的基础上，指出官方统计数字关于“收入五等份”信息的严重缺陷，因而亟需认清其所掩盖的矛盾问题，并正视中国已有的中产阶层陷入的焦虑状态及相关挑战，进而针对性地寻求破解矛盾、消除焦虑之道。
关键词：收入分配；隐形灰色收入；收入五等份；中产阶层焦虑
贾 康 介 绍
第十一届、十二届全国政协委员和政协经济委员会委员，华夏新供给经济学研究院首席经济学家，中国财政科学研究院研究员、博导，中国财政学会顾问，国家发改委PPP专家库专家委员会成员，中国一带一路PPP项目开发委员会委员，中关村公共资源竞争性配置促进中心首席经济学家，北京市、上海市等多地人民政府咨询委员，北京大学、中国人民大学等多家高校特聘教授。1995年享受政府特殊津贴。1997年被评为国家百千万人才工程高层次学术带头人。多次受朱镕基、温家宝、胡锦涛和李克强等中央领导同志之邀座谈经济工作（被媒体称之为“中南海问策”）。担任2010年1月8日中央政治局第十八次集体学习“财税体制改革”专题讲解人之一。孙冶方经济学奖、黄达—蒙代尔经济学奖和中国软科学大奖获得者。国家“十一五”、“十二五”和“十三五”规划专家委员会委员。曾长期担任财政部财政科学研究所所长。1988年曾入选亨氏基金项目，到美国匹兹堡大学做访问学者一年。2013年，主编《新供给：经济学理论的中国创新》，发起成立“华夏新供给经济学研究院”和“新供给经济学50人论坛”（任首任院长、首任秘书长），2015年-2016年与苏京春合著出版《新供给经济学》专著、《供给侧改革：新供给简明读本》、以及《中国的坎：如何跨越“中等收入陷阱”（获评中国图书评论学会和央视的“2016年度中国好书”）》，2016年出版的《供给侧改革十讲》被中组部、新闻出版广电总局和国家图书馆评为全国精品教材。根据《中国社会科学评估》公布的2006～2015年我国哲学社会科学6268种学术期刊700余万篇文献的大数据统计分析，贾康先生的发文量（398篇），总被引频次（4231次）和总下载频次（204115次）均列第一位，综合指数3429，遥居第一，是经济学核心作者中的代表性学者。