Continental philosophy
Habermas: discourse and democracy
As noted above, post-structuralists viewed the concepts of truth, knowledge, and reason as little more than the intellectual instruments of established power. Their supreme cynicism in this regard was perhaps most dramatically expressed by Foucault, who proclaimed in an interview that “all knowledge rests upon injustice,” that “the instinct for knowledge is malicious,” even “murderous,” and that “torture, c’est la raison” (“torture is reason”).
Beginning in the 1970s the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas (born 1929) developed a sophisticated alternative to the skepticism of the post-structuralists. As a philosophical descendant of the Frankfurt School—a movement of Marxist social analysis and criticism associated from the 1920s with the Frankfurt-based Institute for Social Research—Habermas was familiar with the notion of truth as a mask of power, which was, after all, one of the central tenets of Marx’s critique of culture and ideology. This notion, however, presupposes that, beyond the purely partisan interests and perspectives of economic classes, there exist genuinely nonpartisan interests and truly general perspectives. It is this assumption, along with the possibility of distinguishing between “true consciousness” (a defense of generalizable norms) and “false consciousness,” that post-structuralism had abandoned. Accordingly, Habermas maintained that the concepts of truth and knowledge, properly understood, were more complex and durable than the post-structuralists had allowed. In the same vein, he insisted that post-structuralist criticisms of the historical role of reason in the perpetuation of injustice and oppression did nothing to show that reason itself must be abandoned. Rather, he firmly believed in the maxim that the hand that inflicted the wound should cure the disease.
Habermas accepted the post-structuralists’ rejection of the traditional concept of truth as “absolute”—i.e., universal, unchanging, and eternal. In its place, he attempted to develop an understanding of truth rooted in a theory of the conditions of successful communication. Drawing on the tradition of American pragmatism and the speech-act theory of J.L. Austin (1911–60) and his American student John Searle (born 1932), he contended that communication aims at reaching agreement and mutual understanding rather than at successfully manipulating the physical world. Such understanding, however, is the result of a series of assumptions that must take for granted the “truth” or “validity” (in some sense of those terms) of most of the utterances they interpret. If this were not the case, the everyday capacity to coordinate action would be impossible.
The ethical notions of right and wrong also admit of rational adjudication, according to Habermas. His theory of “discourse ethics” attempted to identify the counterfactual conditions or presuppositions of uncoerced agreement. Toward this end, he reformulated Kant’s categorical imperative in “discourse theoretical” terms: an agreement is fair or uncoerced when all parties concerned have been afforded a maximum opportunity to give reasons or to state arguments before a final decision is reached. This practical ideal provides a means of conferring a kind of truth or validity on the ethical principles to which it may be applied. As Habermas observes in “Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Justification” (1990): “Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse.” Thus, whereas Kant’s ethics was confined to the standpoint of independently reasoning subjects, Habermas’s perspective was intersubjective and practical—it stressed the powers of reconciliation inherent in real, practical discourse. And whereas Kant emphasized what each person can will without contradiction to be a general law, Habermas stressed what all people can will in agreement to be a universal norm. In later work, such as Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (1992), Habermas explored the role that discourse ethics could play in justifying the ethical principles that underlay contemporary liberal democracy.
Conclusion
Since the time of Kant, continental philosophy traditionally has concerned itself with the most general philosophical questions—e.g., about the meaning of human existence and the ultimate nature of reality. Indeed, Kant made these questions the centrepiece of his philosophical enterprise when, in the three critiques, he inquired: “What can I know?” (Critique of Pure Reason), “What should I do?” (Critique of Practical Reason), and “What might I hope?” (Critique of Judgment). In respect of generality, therefore, continental philosophy has tended to differ from the Anglo-American, or analytic, tradition, which since the turn of the 20th century has been characterized by the intensive investigation of narrower or more-technical philosophical problems.
Reflecting the widespread influence of post-structuralist philosophy in the late 20th century, much of contemporary intellectual culture is skeptical, if not hostile, toward traditional, “absolutist” perspectives regarding the possibility of knowledge and consensus in ethics, politics, history, and even science. The question arises, therefore, as to what role continental philosophy should play. In view of the pressing challenges of a technological civilization in which values and norms are often determined by the drive to master nature technologically or by predominant social or economic interests, its role must be to hold the banner of reason aloft in the face of the allures of baser social trends.