The humbling of India’s tycoons
Apr 19th 2018
FOR decades, personal connections have provided a well-trodden path to success in Indian business. State-owned banks provided cheap financing for firms whose success often rested on winning official approvals. If a venture soured, the taxpayer frequently ended up being left to shoulder losses. There are plenty of gifted businesspeople in India. But cronyism, not competition, has been the surest route to riches, even after the partial dismantling of the “licence raj” nearly three decades ago.
几十年来，人际关系一直是印度企业走向成功的必经之路。国有银行为那些依赖于所获得的官方批准的企业提供廉价融资。如果一项风险投资失败，纳税人往往要承担损失。在印度有很多有天赋的商人，但通过关系而非竞争，成为通往财富的最可靠途径，即使是在“牌照制度”部分接触的30年后。
A new era of Indian capitalism may be dawning. For the first time a large number of struggling tycoons face the prospect of having their businesses seized from them. The fate of 12 troubled large concerns is due to be settled within weeks; another 28 cases are set to be resolved by September. Between them, these firms account for about 40% of loans that banks themselves think are unlikely to be repaid. For enforcing a bankruptcy system that is usually skirted by those with connections, the government of Narendra Modi deserves much credit. Yet the job is far from done.
印度资本主义的新时代或许即将到来。大量身陷困境的大亨们第一次面临他们的企业将被他们抢走的命运。12个麻烦的大问题的命运将在数周内被决定；另外28个案件将于9月前解决。在他们中间，这些公司占据了银行认为无法偿还的不良贷款的40%。为了强制执行通常被那些有关系的人绕开的破产制度，纳伦德拉·莫迪政府应该得到更多的信任。然而，这项工作还有很远的路要走。
Consider first the system that is under assault. Industries such as power generation, mining, telecoms and infrastructure require large chunks of capital and lots of interactions with the government. That attracted plenty of entrepreneurs whose core competence was using their connections with officials, in order both to win the necessary permits and to secure financing from state-owned lenders. Many tycoons could count on ministers to put in a word with a recalcitrant banker. Some held political office themselves. If things went awry, bankers would frequently extend repayment periods indefinitely, if only to preserve their own blushes. Overburdened courts were unequal to the task of enforcing contracts.
首先要考虑的是体系正遭受攻击。发电、矿业、电信和基础设施等行业需要大量资金，并与政府有大量往来，这些行业吸引了大量的企业家，他们的核心竞争力是利用他们与官员的关系，以获得必要的许可，并获得国有银行的融资。许多企业大亨可以依靠部长对不听话的银行家指手画脚，一些人自己就担任了政治职务。如果情况不妙，银行家们经常会无限期延长还款期限，哪怕只是为了保全自己的颜面。负担过重的法院于强制执行合同的任务不对等。
The unscrupulous among the tycoons went further still. Some are thought to have padded cost estimates so that they got bigger bank loans than required, meaning that they could secure assets without putting any of their own money in. Whether a business was profitable was not always material, since it could enrich owners in other ways—by awarding lucrative contracts to firms controlled by family members, say.
这些大亨们的肆无忌惮愈演愈烈。一些人被认为虚报成本估算，他们因此获得比需求要多的银行贷款，这意味着他们可以不投入自己任何资金，就可以获得资产。企业是否有利可图不一定要拥有生产材料，因为它可以通过其他方式丰赚钱，比如将利润丰厚的合同授予家族成员控制的公司。
This system is under a three-pronged assault. The first is a reformed bankruptcy code that makes the seizure of businesses easier. A new set of dedicated courts, backed by a cadre of insolvency professionals, is on hand to help banks seize assets and sell them to fresh owners. To focus the minds of both bankers and borrowers, if no deal can be cut within nine months—a jiffy by Indian legal standards—the firm is shut down and its equipment sold for scrap. This is the point in the process now being reached by the first dozen defaulters.
这一制度受到三方面的攻击。第一个是改革后的破产法，使企业更容易被没收。一套新的专门法庭，由一群破产专业人士支持，帮助银行没收资产并将其出售给新的所有者。为了让银行家和借款人都能集中注意力，如果在9个月内不能达成交易——则是印度的法律标准规定的时间——公司将被关闭，其设备将被出售销毁。这是第一批违约者目前所达到的处境。
The second threat to the tycoons is the grievous state of the state-owned banks. Their losses have ballooned. The authorities, tired of recurring bail-outs, are forcing them to recognise which loans are unlikely to be repaid, and to initiate insolvency proceedings in double-quick time. Though their governance remains parlous, at least these banks are no longer able to hide the extent of their problems.
对这些大亨的第二大威胁是国有银行的严重状况。他们的损失激增。当局厌倦了反复的纾困，迫使他们识别哪些贷款是不太可能偿还的不良贷款，迅速的启动破产程序。尽管这些银行的管理难以对付，至少已经不能掩盖他们问题的严重程度了。
Third, most tycoons have lost influence in Delhi, as politicians from Mr Modi down realise the toxicity of being seen to be in cahoots with “bollygarchs”. Some of India’s grandest businessmen complain that they can no longer get in to meet the prime minister, who much prefers wooing foreign bosses instead. To increase transparency, some state assets are now auctioned online.
第三，多数大亨已在德里失去影响力，因为莫迪的政客们意识到，与“宝莱加斯”(bollygarchs)勾结在一起的危害。印度一些最重要的商人抱怨说，他们再也不能进去见首相了，首相更喜欢拉拢外国老板。为了提高透明度，一些国有资产现在在网上拍卖。
To ensure permanent change will require deeper reforms, however. If wholesale ministerial corruption is reportedly much reduced, there is still little clarity over how political parties are financed. They will spend something like $5bn between now and federal elections expected in spring 2019, little of which will be publicly accounted for. To loosen the political-crony nexus further, it would help to end the system whereby parties can raise funds through anonymous donations.
然而，要确保永久性的改革，就需要进行更深入的改革。如果大规模的部长腐败被报道大大减少，政治党派的资金来源仍不会清楚。他们将在现在和2019年春季的联邦选举之间花费50亿美元，其中只有很少一部分将被公开。为了进一步解除政治裙带关系，它将有助于结束政党通过匿名捐款筹集资金的制度。
Making India less bureaucratic would also be a boon. A certain brand of tycoon has thrived because getting things done often requires sharp elbows and sharper business practices. Magnates who are politically astute will still have an edge if knowing how to dodge a price cap imposed on a ministerial whim, for example, is a surer guide to success than knowing how to run a factory. Such shenanigans have not stopped.
减少印度的官僚主义也将是一个福音。某个品牌的大亨之所以兴旺发达，是因为要做的事情往往需要精明的手腕和更敏锐的商业实践。在政治上精明的巨头们，如果知道如何避免由心血来潮的部长强加的价格上限，就会有优势，比如，对于成功，这是比知道如何经营一家工厂更可靠的成功之道。这样的恶作剧并没有停止。
Rich pickings
Reforming the state-owned banks is the most important task of all. Their balance-sheets are where you find 70% of loans and nearly 100% of problems. Ensuring banks make commercial decisions can only realistically be achieved by privatising at least some of them. Privatised banks would also be free to pay salaries to attract talented staff. The bosses at state-owned banks currently earn under $50,000 a year, a pittance even by Indian executive standards—and it shows.
改革国有银行是最重要的任务。他们的资产负债表上有70%的贷款和几乎100%的问题。通过将至少他们中的一些私有化，才能实现银行做出商业决策。私有银行也可以自由支付工资以吸引有才能的员工。目前，国有银行的老板年薪不到5万美元，即使按印度执行标准来衡量，这也是微薄的收入。
A decent financial system is the best defence against cronyism. Sadly, this kind of reform still seems to be anathema to Mr Modi. He has made a start on tackling the tycoons. But if he is to entrench a revolution in Indian capitalism, he must do more.
一个正派的金融体系是对抗裙带关系的最好方法。遗憾的是，这种改革似乎仍是莫迪的梦魇，他已开始着手解决这些大亨们的问题，但如果他想巩固印度资本主义的革命，他必须做得更多。
This article appeared in the Leaders section of the print edition under the headline "The humbling of the tycoons"