【新刊速递】第03期 | International Organization Vol.73, No.3, 2019
期刊简介
International Organization（《国际组织》），简称“IO”，是一份经过同行评议的季刊，涵盖国际事务的领域包括：外交政策、国际关系、国际与比较政治经济学、安全政策、环境争端与解决、欧洲一体化、联盟模式与战争、谈判与冲突解决、经济发展与调整、国际资本流动等。它成立于1947年，由剑桥大学出版社代表国际组织基金会出版，主编是乔治城大学的Erik Voeten。根据Journal Citation Reports显示，2018年IO杂志影响因子为4.508，在91个国际关系类期刊中排名第一（1/9），在176个政治科学类期刊中排名第一（1/176）。
本期编委
编译：雒景瑜（国政学人编译员，外交学院国际关系研究所）
审核：王国欣 施榕 兰星辰
排版：马璐
本期目录
1.Introduction: The Power of Global Performance Indicators
导论：全球绩效指标的力量
2.Blacklists, Market Enforcement, and the Global Regime to Combat Terrorist Financing
黑名单、市场监管和打击恐怖主义融资的全球机制
3.The Millennium Development Goals and Education: Accountability and Substitution in Global Assessment
千年发展目标和教育：全球评估中的政府责任感和替代效应
4.A Race to the Top? The Aid Transparency Index and the Social Power of Global Performance Indicators
一场登顶赛跑？援助透明度指数与全球绩效指标的社会影响力
5.The Power of Ranking: The Ease of Doing Business Indicator and Global Regulatory Behavior
排名的力量：世界银行的“营商便利指数”与全球监管行为
6.Ethnic Violence in Africa: Destructive Legacies of Pre-Colonial States
非洲的种族暴力：沦为殖民地前组成的政府的破坏性遗产
7. Secret but Constrained: The Impact of Elite Opposition on Covert Operations
秘密但受到约束：精英反对秘密行动所带来的影响
1.
导论：全球绩效指标的力量
【题目】Introduction: The Power of Global Performance Indicators
【作者】Judith G. Kelley, Beth A. Simmons
【摘要】近几十年来，政府间组织、非政府组织、私营公司甚至国家开始定期收集和发布国家相对绩效的信息。从世界银行的“营商便利指数”（World Bank's Ease of Doing Business Index）到金融行动特别工作组（Financial Action Task Force）的黑名单，全球绩效指标（GPIs）越来越多地被用于影响全球治理。我们认为，GPIs的影响力来自于它们框定议题、扩大创造者权威，以及最重要的一点——通过引起反复的比较来激发政府对自身和国家声誉的担忧的能力。它们对各国的公开和持续的评级和排名不仅吸引了政策精英，也吸引了其他国内和跨国行为体的注意。因此，GPIs为全球政治和治理的研究提出了新的问题。这种信息形式对话语、政策和行为有什么社会和政治影响？哪些类型的参与者以及在何种类型的问题上能够有效地使用GPIs？本文将根据本期专题的贡献性发现来界定GPIs、描述它们的兴起、以及对这些问题进行理论化和讨论。
In recent decades, IGOs, NGOs, private firms and even states have begun to regularly package and distribute information on the relative performance of states. From the World Bank's Ease of Doing Business Index to the Financial Action Task Force blacklist, global performance indicators (GPIs) are increasingly deployed to influence governance globally. We argue that GPIs derive influence from their ability to frame issues, extend the authority of the creator, and — most importantly — to invoke recurrent comparison that stimulates governments' concerns for their own and their country's reputation. Their public and ongoing ratings and rankings of states are particularly adept at capturing attention not only at elite policy levels but also among other domestic and transnational actors. GPIs thus raise new questions for research on politics and governance globally. What are the social and political effects of this form of information on discourse, policies and behavior? What types of actors can effectively wield GPIs and on what types of issues? In this symposium introduction, we define GPIs, describe their rise, and theorize and discuss these questions in light of the findings of the symposium contributions.
2.
黑名单、市场监管和打击恐怖主义融资的全球机制
【题目】Blacklists, Market Enforcement, and the Global Regime to Combat Terrorist Financing
【作者】Julia C. Morse
【摘要】本文着重介绍了国际组织如何利用全球绩效指标（GPIs）通过跨国市场压力来推动政策变化。当国际组织是国家政策的可信评估者以及被监督国为争夺市场资源而竞争时，GPIs能传递关于国家风险的信息并稳定市场预期。在这种情况下，银行和投资者可能会限制不合规的国家获取资本的机会，从而促使这些国家增加合规性。本文通过分析金融行动特别工作组（FATF）——一个通过非约束性建议来打击洗钱和恐怖主义融资行为的政府间机构——来阐释这个市场监管机制。FATF对不遵守司法规则国家的公开披露已经促使国际银行将资源从这些国家转移，并增加了上述国家持续不合规的成本，从而显著增加了将恐怖主义融资视为犯罪的国家数量。这一发现为国际组织影响国内政策提供了一条强有力的途径，也凸显了GPIs在一个信息即全球货币的时代的力量。
This paper highlights how international organizations can use global performance indicators (GPIs) to drive policy change through transnational market pressure. When international organizations are credible assessors of state policy, and when monitored countries compete for market resources, GPIs transmit information about country risk and stabilize market expectations. Under these conditions banks and investors may restrict access to capital in noncompliant states and incentivize increased compliance. I demonstrate this market-enforcement mechanism by analyzing the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an intergovernmental body that issues nonbinding recommendations to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism. The FATF's public listing of noncompliant jurisdictions has prompted international banks to move resources away from listed states and raised the costs of continued noncompliance, significantly increasing the number of states with laws criminalizing terrorist financing. This finding suggests a powerful pathway through which institutions influence domestic policy and highlights the power of GPIs in an age where information is a global currency.
3.
千年发展目标和教育：全球评估中的政府责任感和替代效应
【题目】The Millennium Development Goals and Education: Accountability and Substitution in Global Assessment
【作者】James H. Bisbee, James R. Hollyer, B. Peter Rosendorff and James Raymond Vreeland
【摘要】精确的国际指标和评估可能会促使各国政府改变政策，从而根据这些指标寻求更有利的评估。因此，本文探讨了全球绩效指标（GPIs）的二级效应。在政府拥有有限资源并不得不在不同的公共产品投资中进行权衡时，那么一个精确针对某一特定公共产品的GPI，可能会导致政府选择投资该指标针对的公共产品而替换掉了另一个相关的公共产品。本文认为GPI的主要作用（衡量公共利益）和替代效应是根据国内政治制度和目标国家的信息环境而系统地变化的。具体而言，本文认为GPIs的主要作用和替代效应对于最不负责任（不透明和非民主）的政府来说应该最大，而对于最负责任的政府来说应该最小。本文通过形式模型来说明这些论点的逻辑，并用114个国家的小学和中学入学率的数据予以检验。最后，本文发现，国家会用小学入学率（这是千年发展目标的一部分）的指标对中学入学率（这不是千年发展目标中的一部分）的指标进行替代，但是随着政府责任感上升，这种替代效应会减弱。
Precise international metrics and assessments may induce governments to alter policies in pursuit of more favorable assessments according to these metrics. In this paper, we explore a secondary effect of global performance indicators (GPIs). Insofar as governments have finite resources and make trade-offs in public goods investments, a GPI that precisely targets the provision of a particular public good may cause governments to substitute away from the provision of other, related, public goods. We argue that both the main effect of the GPI (on the measured public good) and this substitution effect vary systematically based on the domestic political institutions and informational environments of targeted states. Specifically, we contend that both the main and substitution effects of GPIs should be largest for governments that are least accountable (opaque and nondemocratic) and should be smallest for those that are most accountable. We illustrate the logic of these arguments using a formal model and test these claims using data on primary and secondary enrollment rates across 114 countries. We find that countries substitute toward primary education enrollment rates (which is targeted by the Millennium Development Goals) and away from secondary (which is not), and that these effects are mitigated as accountability rises.
4.
一场登顶赛跑？援助透明度指数与全球绩效指标的社会影响力
【题目】A Race to the Top? The Aid Transparency Index and the Social Power of Global Performance Indicators
【作者】Dan Hoing, Catherine Weaver
【摘要】最近对全球绩效指标（GPIs）的研究揭示了非国家行为体在世界政治中可以积累和使用的独特力量。这种力量是如何以及何时运作的？通过混合研究方法，我们研究了援助透明度指数（ATI）的影响，这是由一个在英国的小型非政府机构“公开你的资助”（Publish What You Fund）制作的年度评级和排名指数。ATI寻求塑造发展援助的捐助者在透明度方面的行为，即他们公开披露的信息的质量和种类。为了研究ATI的作用，本文构建了援助者在被ATI涵盖前后（2006～2013）的原始面板数据集，以检验捐献者是否（以及有哪些）受到ATI的影响进而改变了他们的行为。为了进一步探讨捐赠者行为变化的因果机制，本文使用2010至2017年间进行的超过150个关键信息提供者的访谈来进行定性研究。本文的分析揭示了ATI影响强大援助国的条件。与凯莉（Kelley）和西蒙斯（Simmons）的核心论点——GPIs通过社会压力施加影响相一致，本文发现，ATI主要通过直接影响精英来塑造援助者的行为：这种直接影响包括专业规范的扩散、组织式学习和同伴压力。
Recent studies on global performance indicators (GPIs) reveal the distinct power that nonstate actors can accrue and exercise in world politics. How and when does this happen? Using a mixed-methods approach, we examine the impact of the Aid Transparency Index (ATI), an annual rating and rankings index produced by the small UK-based NGO Publish What You Fund. The ATI seeks to shape development aid donors' behavior with respect to their transparency—the quality and kind of information they publicly disclose. To investigate the ATI's effect, we construct an original panel data set of donor transparency performance before and after ATI inclusion (2006–2013) to test whether (and which) donors alter their behavior in response to inclusion in the ATI. To further probe the causal mechanisms that explain variations in donor behavior we use qualitative research, including over 150 key informant interviews conducted between 2010 and 2017. Our analysis uncovers the conditions under which the ATI influences powerful aid donors. Our mixed-methods evidence reveals how this happens. Consistent with Kelley and Simmons's central argument that GPIs exercise influence via social pressure, we find that the ATI shapes donor behavior primarily via direct effects on elites: the diffusion of professional norms, organizational learning, and peer pressure.
5.
排名的力量：世界银行的“营商便利指数”与全球监管行为
【题目】The Power of Ranking: The Ease of Doing Business Indicator and Global Regulatory Behavior
【作者】Rush Doshi, Judith G. Kelley, and Beth A. Simmons
【摘要】本文认为，世界银行已经成功地整理了各国营商便利指数（EDB），从而在全球范围内对商业法规产生相当大的影响。营商便利指数是一个全球性的绩效指标（GPI），这些GPIs（尤其是那些对国家进行评级和排名的）旨在收集信息以影响那些对目标而言重要的受众，如外国投资者或选民，从而产生引导目标行为发生变化的压力。尽管世界银行在监管政策方面没有明确的授权，以及对EDB的准确性和所需的政策权衡仍然存在疑问，但世界银行还是成功地塑造了全球监管环境。本文首先阐明EDB在营商环境指标中的主导地位，然后使用媒体分析和观测数据说明EDB激发了国家监管的转变。各国对公开排名做出回应，其中一些国家相应地重组了官僚机构。接下来，本文探究了EDB通过排名施加合理影响的渠道，并在既有的经济学研究基础上进行一项涉及美国投资组合经理的实验，以及检测实验中的投资者是否会受到排名的影响。在对印度多年来跨部门努力提高在EDB上的排名以及建立次国家EDB排名的决定这一案例的研究的基础上，本文通过展示政治家对排名的态度如何影响国内政治、改变投资者情绪和提高官僚声誉从而将各种观点融合在一起。总的来说，各种各样的证据汇集在一起说明世界银行通过国家排名的压力来实现监管改革的愿景。
We argue that the World Bank has successfully marshaled the Ease of Doing Business (EDB) Index to amass considerable influence over business regulations worldwide. The Ease of Doing is a global performance indicator (GPI), and GPIs—especially those that rate and rank states against one another—are intended to package information to influence the views of an audience important to the target, such as foreign investors or voters, thus generating pressures that induce a change in the target's behavior. The World Bank has succeeded in shaping the global regulatory environment even though the bank has no explicit mandate over regulatory policy and despite questions about EDB accuracy and required policy tradeoffs. We show that the EDB has a dominating market share among business climate indicators. We then use media analyses and observational data to show that EDB has motivated state regulatory shifts. States respond to being publicly ranked and some restructure bureaucracies accordingly. Next we explore plausible influence channels for the EDB ranking and use an experiment involving US portfolio managers to build on existing economics research and examine whether the rankings influence investor sentiment within the experiment. Using a case study of India's multiyear interagency effort to rise in the EDB rankings, as well as its decision to create subnational EDB rankings, we bring the strands of the argument together by showing how politicians see the ranking as affecting domestic politics, altering investor sentiment, and engaging bureaucratic reputation. Overall, a wide variety of evidence converges to illustrate the pressures through which the World Bank has used state rankings to achieve its vision of regulatory reform.
6.
非洲的种族暴力：沦为殖民地前组成的政府的破坏性遗产
【题目】Ethnic Violence in Africa: Destructive Legacies of Pre-Colonial States
【作者】Jack Paine
【摘要】什么因素能够解释后殖民时期非洲种族暴力频率的差异？本文认为，一些种族群体在（该国）沦为殖民地前组成的政府（PSC）加剧了后殖民时期国内不同种族间的矛盾。这些国家中深感不安的领导人会在承受内部政变风险的包容性联盟，和以可能的外部叛乱风险为代价来排斥其他种族群体的行为之间进行权衡。本文的主要假设是，PCS群体应该与政变有联系，因为深植于历史的优势往往能使这些群体能获得中心权力，而由于受到种族政治的排斥，该国其他的种族群体会比那些没有PSC群体的国家中的种族群体更频繁地进行内战。对沦为殖民地之前的非洲国家的原始数据的分析为从独立到2013年的内战和政变提供了统计证据。令人吃惊的是，到1989年，32个种族群体间的主要内战中有30个发生在有PSC群体的国家。
What explains differential rates of ethnic violence in postcolonial Africa? I argue that ethnic groups organized as a precolonial state (PCS) exacerbated interethnic tensions in their postcolonial country. Insecure leaders in these countries traded off between inclusive coalitions that risked insider coups and excluding other ethnic groups at the possible expense of outsider rebellions. My main hypotheses posit that PCS groups should associate with coups because their historically rooted advantages often enabled accessing power at the center, whereas other ethnic groups in their countries—given strategic incentives for ethnopolitical exclusion—should fight civil wars more frequently than ethnic groups in countries without a PCS group. Analyzing originally compiled data on precolonial African states provides statistical evidence for these implications about civil wars and coups between independence and 2013 across various model specifications. Strikingly, through 1989, thirty of thirty-two ethnic group-level major civil war onsets occurred in countries with a PCS group.
7.
秘密但受到约束：精英反对秘密行动所带来的影响
【题目】Secret but Constrained: The Impact of Elite Opposition on Covert Operations
【作者】Gregory L. Smith
【摘要】最近的国际关系学者认为，政治精英通过民主限制了国家对武力的使用。尽管这项研究具有说服力，但学者们在很大程度上忽略了精英限制秘密行动的能力。这一疏漏是必然的，因为美国外交政策学者通常认为，秘密行动可以替代公开使用武力；保密性使得信息止步于国会精英，从而削弱他们的监督能力。精英政治会限制总统秘密行动的能力，还是只影响公开使用武力的能力？本文认为，精英政治的限制，特别是来自国会的反对，增强了总统发起秘密行动的能力。通过对美国在冷战期间的军事行动与中央情报局发起的秘密行动之间的分析，本文发现秘密行动的可能性在分治政府时期开始显著降低，秘密行动和公开军事力量之间没有明显的权衡。结果表明，在1975的国会监督改革减少了多数党和少数派之间的信息不对称之后，统一和分治的政府对秘密行动的约束变得更加统一。这些发现对那些关注秘密谈判和秘密信号的新研究有着重要的影响。由于民主国家领导人即使在秘密行动中也经常面临国内政治成本，秘密行动可以让领导人更可信地表达他们的决心。
Recent international relations scholarship has argued that political elites constrain the use of military force by democracies. Despite the persuasiveness of this research, scholars have largely ignored elite dynamics’ ability to constrain the initiation of covert operations. This omission is consequential because scholars of US foreign policy often assume that covert operations serve as a substitute for the overt use of force; secrecy allows leaders to limit information to congressional elites and thus weaken their oversight capabilities. Do elite political dynamics constrain presidents’ ability to act secretly or do they affect the overt use of force only? I argue that elite political constraints—particularly opposition from Congress—extend to the president's ability to initiate covert operations. By examining the trade-off between US military force and CIA-initiated covert operations during the Cold War, I find the likelihood that covert operations are initiated decreases significantly during periods of divided government and that there is no distinguishable trade-off between covert operations and overt military force. The results suggest that constraints on covert operations became more uniform across unified and divided government following congressional oversight reforms in 1975 that reduced the information asymmetry between the majority and minority party. These findings have important ramifications for the nascent literature on back-door bargaining and covert signalling. Because democratic leaders frequently face domestic political costs even when acting in secret, covert operations should allow leaders to credibly convey their resolve.