【新刊速递】第66期 | International Studies Quarterly, Vol.64,No.4,2020
期刊简介
《国际研究季刊》（International Studies Quarterly）是国际研究协会的旗舰期刊，由牛津大学出版社每年发行四期，旨在发表与国际研究中重要理论性、实证性、规范性主题相关的领先学术成果。根据Journal Citation Reports的数据，该期刊最新影响因子为2.146。
本期编委
【编译】崔宇涵、王川、扎西旺姆、赵雷
【审校】王泽尘
【排版】高思慧
本期目录
1. Restoring Legitimacy: Public Diplomacy Campaigns
恢复正当性：内战期间的公共外交运动
2. International Trade and Public Protest: Evidence from Russian Regions
国际贸易和公众抗议：来自俄罗斯地区的证据
3. Global Club Goods and the Fragmented Global Financial Safety Net
全球俱乐部产品与碎片化的全球金融安全网
4. Promises under Pressure: Statement of Reassurance in US Alliances
压力下的承诺：美国同盟中的安抚声明
5. Shaking Hands with the Internal Enemy: Democracy and Civil Conflict Settlement
与内部的敌人握手：民主政体与内部冲突解决
6. Emergency Powers and the Heterogeneity of Terror in Democratic States
紧急权力与民主国家恐怖活动的异质性
7. Politics of Aspiration
抱负的政治
8. Reserving Rights: Explaining Human Rights Treaty Reservations
保留权利：解释对人权条约的保留
01
恢复正当性：内战期间的公共外交运动
【题目】Restoring Legitimacy: Public Diplomacy Campaigns during Civil Wars
【作者】Eleonora Mattiacci，阿默斯特学院政治学助理教授；Benjamin T. Jones，密西西比大学政治科学系助理教授。
【摘要】卷入内战的政府经常通过故意杀害平民获得战略优势。然而，以平民为目标也可能损害国外对该政府正当性的看法，增加被外国行为者惩罚的风险。各国政府如何才能摆脱这种困境？聚焦冷战后最频繁干预内战的国家之一——美国，作者考察了政府可能采用的一种特殊战略：针对美国公众和精英的公共外交运动（public diplomacy campaigns，PDCs）。在攻击平民时，PDCs可以通过动员支持联盟和削弱批评人士的力量，帮助政府恢复其在国外对其正当性的看法。当政府能够对军队造成的平民死亡作出合理的推诿时，PDCs使政府能够减少国外对其正当性看法的损害。当反对派武装以平民为攻击目标时，PDCs使得政府有办法将这些行动公之于众。作者汇编了美国内战中政府的PDCs数据。本文的研究结果对目前理解内战时期的外交政策、外国干预、国际人权法律和规范有重要的影响。
Governments involved in civil wars often gain a strategic advantage from intentionally killing civilians. However, targeting civilians might also tarnish perceptions of the government’s legitimacy abroad, increasing the risk of foreign actors punishing the government. How can governments attempt to navigate this dilemma? Focusing on the United States as one of the most frequent interveners in civil wars after the Cold War, we examine one particular strategy governments might employ: public diplomacy campaigns (PDCs) targeting both the public and elites in the United States. PDCs can help governments restore perceptions of their legitimacy abroad in the face of civilian targeting by mobilizing coalitions of support and undermining critics. When governments can achieve plausible deniability for civilian deaths via militias, PDCs enable governments to reduce the damage to foreign perceptions of their legitimacy. When rebels engage in civilian targeting, PDCs allow governments to publicize these actions. We compile data PDCs in the United States by governments engaged in civil wars. Our results have important implications for current understandings of civil war combatant foreign policies, foreign interventions, and international human rights laws and norms.
【编译】崔宇涵
【校对】王泽尘
02
国际贸易和公众抗议：来自俄罗斯地区的证据
【题目】International Trade and Public Protest: Evidence from Russian Regions
【作者】Tabea Palmtag，苏黎世大学政治科学系国际关系和国际政治经济学教授席计划中博士后研究员；Tobias Rommel，慕尼黑工业大学政治学院高级研究员、讲师；Stefanie Walter，苏黎世大学政治科学系国际关系和政治经济学教授，比较与国际研究中心（CIS）主任。
【摘要】经济全球化如何影响国内政治稳定？在贸易理论创新的基础上，作者认为在贸易输家受损者集中的环境下，国际贸易会放大政治不满和增加抗议行为，但在自由贸易受益者占主导地位的环境下，自由贸易具有安抚作用。作者以俄罗斯地区的变化检验这一观点。通过对2007~2012年的数据进行负二项回归分析，作者发现地区教育水平决定了贸易强度对抗议频率的影响。同样高度暴露于贸易影响下时，平均教育水平较低的地区抗议活动更多，而在居民普遍受过良好教育的地区，抗议活动更少。作者发现，其根本机制在于贸易对区域经济福利的影响受教育水平的制约，受教育水平较低的俄罗斯人生活在受贸易影响的地区时面临更多的经济困难，由于个人经济受损，导致他们会更多地参与抗议。
How does economic globalization influence domestic political stability? Building on innovations in trade theory, we argue that international trade amplifies political discontent and protest in contexts in which trade losers concentrate, but has a pacifying effect in contexts dominated by beneficiaries of free trade. We examine this argument focusing on variation in Russian regions. Using negative binomial regression models on data from 2007 to 2012, we show that regional education levels condition the effect of trade intensity on protest frequency. High exposure to trade leads to more protests in regions with low average education levels, but fewer protests in regions in which residents are well-educated. Probing the underlying mechanism, we find that the effect of trade on regional economic welfare is conditioned by education levels, that poorly educated Russians face more economic difficulties when they live in regions exposed to trade, and that economically aggrieved individuals participate more in protests.
【编译】崔宇涵
【校对】王泽尘
03
全球俱乐部产品与碎片化的全球金融安全网
【题目】Global Club Goods and the Fragmented Global Financial Safety Net
【作者】Michael A Gavin，多伦多大学博士生。
【摘要】强大的全球金融安全网被普遍视为是一种全球公共产品。然而，解释全球金融安全网存在的公共产品模型无法解释为何该网络是高度碎片化且覆盖不平等的。本文表明，将全球金融安全网模型化为全球俱乐部产品，可以解释它的存在、碎片化与覆盖不平等。该模型的主要发现是，当一个国家垄断了一种非竞争性与排他性产品（即俱乐部产品）时，就会出现独立的多边和双边俱乐部治理结构，它们各自有其独特的结构与成本。对国际货币基金组织、美联储与国际清算银行提供的全球金融安全网开展的简要案例研究支持了该模型。
It is generally regarded that a robust global financial safety net is a global public good. Yet public goods models that explain the existence of the global financial safety net cannot also explain why it is highly fragmented and provisioned so inequitably. This study shows that the global financial safety net's existence, fragmentation, and inequitable coverage can be explained by modeling the global financial safety net as a global club good. The primary finding of the model is that when a state has a monopoly on the provision of a non-rival and excludable good (i.e., a club good), separate multilateral and bilateral club governance structures emerge, each with a unique structure and cost. Brief case studies of the global financial safety net provisioned by the International Monetary Fund, the Federal Reserve, and the Bank for International Settlements support the model.
【编译】王川
【校对】王泽尘
04
压力下的承诺：美国同盟中的安抚声明
【题目】Promises under Pressure: Statement of Reassurance in US Alliances
【作者】Brian Blankenship，迈阿密大学助理教授。
【摘要】美国经常通过海外驻军、访问盟友与发表公开声明等方式安抚盟友对保护的疑虑。然而，不对称同盟（大国庇护者与弱小盟友之间的同盟）中（大国）进行安抚的原因在既有学术文献中存在研究不足。事实上，很多学者认为，在明知已获得庇护国支持的情况下，安抚会招致盟友的搭便车行为或会激怒对手，因此它可能会适得其反。尽管存在这些缺陷，但本文认为美国可以利用安抚来阻止盟友寻求外部选择，阻止它们减少对同盟的依赖。因此，像美国这样的庇护国面临着两难困境，它们要在拒绝安抚以获得短期影响力和利用安抚来保持长期影响力之间作出取舍。作者利用一个新的1950年至2010年美国安抚声明的跨国数据集来检验这一理论，其结果为本文的假设提供了更有力的支撑，而非对威慑、绝望的力量与共同偏好这三种竞争性解释。这些观点对理解大国如何管理其同盟具有启发意义，并为弱国如何塑造大国的对外承诺提供了一条途径。
The United States frequently reassures allies of its protection by stationing troops abroad, visiting allied countries, and making public statements. Yet the causes of reassurance in asymmetric alliances—those between a great power patron and its weaker allies—are understudied in the academic literature. Indeed, many scholars argue that reassurance can be counterproductive as it invites allies to free ride or provoke their adversaries, knowing that they have their patron's support. Despite the drawbacks, I argue that the United States use reassurance to discourage their allies from seeking outside options and reducing their dependence on the alliance. Patrons such as the United States thus face a dilemma wherein they trade-off between withholding reassurance for short-term leverage and using reassurance to preserve their long-term influence. I test the theory using a new cross-national dataset of US. statements of reassurance from 1950 to 2010, and the results provide stronger support for my hypotheses than for the competing explanations of deterrence, strength from desperation, and shared preferences. The findings have implications for understanding how great powers manage their alliances, and suggest a pathway through which weaker states can shape great powers’ foreign commitments.
【编译】王川
【校对】王泽尘
05
与内部的敌人握手：民主政体与内部冲突解决
【题目】Shaking Hands with the Internal Enemy: Democracy and Civil Conflict Settlement
【作者】Omer Zarpli，匹兹堡大学政治系博士研究生，研究兴趣为国际关系和比较政治。
【摘要】政权类型如何影响通过谈判解决结束国内冲突的可能性？关于民主是正资产还是负债，之前为数不多的研究提出了不同的理论，并得出了不同的结论。作者将这些不同的研究结果汇总在一起，并提出了一个新的理论，即为什么完全民主和专制政权下的领导人在建立和平方面可能特别困难，而在无支配 (anocratic)（混合）政体下的领导人如何更有可能成功地达成谈判解决。因此，作者假设政权类型与冲突解决的可能性之间的相关性呈倒U型。作者利用1946年至2014年间所有内部冲突的数据对该假设进行了检验，并得到了实证支持。研究结果表明，即使如以往研究所提出的那样，无支配政体更容易爆发内战，但这一政体也更易于解决这些冲突。
How does regime type affect the likelihood of negotiated settlements that end civil conflicts? A limited number of previous studies have offered divergent theories and mixed findings about whether democracy is an asset or a liability. I draw these disparate findings together and present a novel theory on why leaders under fully democratic and autocratic regimes may have a particularly difficult time in peacemaking, and how leaders in anocratic (hybrid) regimes are more likely to be successful in reaching negotiated settlements. Thus, I hypothesize that the relationship between regime type and the likelihood of conflict-resolution is inverted U-shaped. I test this hypothesis using data on all internal conflicts between 1946 and 2014, and find empirical support. The findings suggest that even if anocracies are more prone to the outbreak of civil wars as has been proposed by previous studies, they are also better at settling these conflicts.
【编译】扎西旺姆
【校对】王泽尘
06
紧急权力与民主国家恐怖活动的异质性
【题目】Emergency Powers and the Heterogeneity of Terror in Democratic States.
【作者】Bryan A. Rooney是一位主要研究国际关系和政治方法的政治学者，研究兴趣包括国内政治和国际冲突，民主国家的紧急状态，专制化，国家能力（state capacities），联合国投票和定量方法。
【摘要】恐怖主义暴力最近导致一些国家授予行政部门特别权力。然而，学者们直至近期才开始研究提供这种紧急权力是否会影响未来恐怖袭击的可能性。作者认为，当民主国家授予行政部门紧急权力时，国内的激励因素（domestic incentives）会促使领导人采取过于激进的行动，而这些行动对减少未来的恐怖主义暴力事件会产生反作用。然而，这些国内的激励因素会因恐怖组织的内部组织或外部组织性质（in-group or out-group nature of the terrorist group）而变化。作者使用关于紧急权力强度、紧急状态和恐怖暴力频率的数据来检验这一假设。在涵盖众多民主国家的全球样本中，作者发现，虽然紧急权力会增加未来来自分裂主义团体的外部组织恐怖活动（out-group terror）的攻击，但它们对其所在政治秩序中占极端立场的团体的恐怖活动没有影响。这些结果表明了行政自由在打击恐怖主义方面具有条件性。
Terrorist violence has recently led several states to grant extraordinary powers to the executive. Yet scholars have only recently begun to examine whether the provision of such emergency powers influences the probability of future terrorist attacks. I argue that when democratic states grant emergency powers to the executive, domestic incentives can push leaders to take overly aggressive actions that are counterproductive for reducing future terrorist violence. However, these domestic incentives vary depending on the in-group or out-group nature of the terrorist group. I test this hypothesis using data on emergency power strength, states of emergency, and the frequency of terrorist violence. In a global sample of democratic states, I find that while emergency powers increase future attacks from out-group terror arising from separatist groups, they have no effect on terror from groups that reflect extreme positions within the political order. These results express the conditional nature of executive freedom in combatting terrorism.
【编译】扎西旺姆
【校对】王泽尘
07
抱负的政治
【题目】Politics of Aspiration
【作者】Martha Finnemore，乔治华盛顿大学政治学和国际事务教授；Michelle Jurkovich，马萨诸塞大学波士顿分校政治学副教授。
【摘要】“抱负”是政治的重要组成部分。它阐明目标，确认身份和价值，并在社会生活的所有层面上组织行动。然而，政治学者们却很少花时间来理论化“抱负”——它是什么，它与其他概念是如何联系的，以及它所产生的各种影响。在本文中，作者将这一概念理论化，并认为“抱负”创造了一种截然不同的“抱负政治”，它既不同于规范驱动社会行动的国际关系模式，也不同于利益驱动理性选择的国际关系模式。作者确定了“抱负”的三个核心特征以支撑其理论效用：崇高的目标、随时间的变化、通过想象的转变。在熟练的政客手中，抱负在促进协议达成和动员社会行动方面发挥了重要作用，这些行动创造了世界的变化。然而，“抱负”也有其阴暗的一面，它可以被操纵以逃避责任、推迟行动、服务于私人而非公共的目标。
Aspiration is an essential component of politics. It articulates goals, affirms identities and values, and structures action at all levels of social life. Yet political scientists have spent little time theorizing aspiration—what it is, how it relates to other concepts, and the kinds of effects it creates. In this article, we develop the concept theoretically and argue that aspiration creates a distinct “aspirational politics” that differs from our international relations models of both norm-driven social activism and interest-driven rational choice. We identify three core features of aspiration that undergird its theoretical utility: lofty goals, change over time, and transformation through imagination. In the hands of skilled political actors, aspiration does essential work in both facilitating agreement and mobilizing social action that create change in the world. However, aspiration also has a dark side and can be manipulated to dodge accountability, postpone action, and serve private, rather than public, goals.
【编译】赵雷
【校对】王泽尘
08
保留权利：解释对人权条约的保留
【题目】Reserving Rights: Explaining Human Rights Treaty Reservations
【作者】Kelebogile Zvobgo，南加州大学威廉玛丽学院副教授；Wayne Sandholtz，南加州大学达纳与大卫·多恩西夫文理学院教授；Suzie Mulesky，南加州大学博士候选人。
【摘要】国际关系学者在解释国家如何设计条约规定的义务和国家为什么接受条约方面取得了重大进展。然而，学者们很少关注可能影响各国通过保留来修改其条约义务的因素。作者从理论上认为，当条约义务增加遵守成本和政策调整成本时，各国更有可能对其保留。具体地说，作者认为苛刻的条款将增加国家使用保留的可能性，即对国内行为产生强有力，并且明确的义务规定。为了验证理论，作者利用了一个原始数据集，对十项核心国际人权条约中的保留条款进行了编码。作者发现各国更有可能对要求较高的条约条款提出保留意见。与以往的研究相比，本文的研究结果表明，保留并不纯粹是单纯由国家层面的特征（如政体类型或法律制度的性质）驱动的。相反，各国似乎在权衡各自的条约义务，并相应地调整其承诺。
International relations scholarship has made significant strides in explaining how states design treaty obligations and why they accept treaty commitments. However, far less attention has been paid to factors that may influence states’ modification of their treaty obligations via reservations. We theorize that states will be more likely to enter reservations when treaty obligations increase compliance costs and policy adjustment costs. More specifically, we expect that demanding provisions, i.e., provisions that create strong, precise obligations requiring domestic action, will enhance the likelihood of reservation. To test our theory, we exploit an original dataset that codes reservations at the provision (treaty–article–paragraph) level for the ten core international human rights treaties. Consistent with our expectations, we find that states are more likely to enter reservations on more demanding treaty provisions. In contrast to prior studies, our results indicate that reservations are not driven purely by state-level characteristics such as regime type or the nature of the legal system. Rather, it appears that states weigh individual treaty obligations and calibrate their commitments accordingly.
【编译】赵雷
【校对】王泽尘