强烈推荐：汤姆·彼得斯的真实忏悔（中英对照）

按：《追求卓越》是20世纪影响最大的管理学著作之一（曾长达三年位居《纽约时报》畅销书排行榜，在美国的总发行量超过300万册）。它也是在中国影响最大的西方管理学著作（其中译本多达五种，总发行量超过50万册）。汤姆·彼得斯（第一作者）也因为这本书，从麦肯锡公司的一个'无关紧要的人'，步入世界顶级管理学大师的行列。现在看来，《追求卓越》一书的败笔与其神来之笔同样明显，20年后，此书的作者汤姆·彼得斯亲自撰文对其原文中的观点进行了反省。他讲述了写这本书的初衷和过程，他的观点对在哪里，错在哪里，他公然说了什么谎话，以及接下来发生的事。对于试图为商界确定未来日程的精英来说，《追求》背后的故事提供了一系列不可多得的教训。此文既向我们展示了20年来商业世界急剧变化的生动图景，又让我们确切地感知到'后卓越时代'的商业脉搏本文原文发表在译自著名新经济杂志《Fast Company》2001年12月号第78~92页。国内《环球管理》2002年1月号翻译出版，现转载如下。（又：《环球管理》这本由胡泳、吴伯凡主编，非常优秀却有点阳春白雪的杂志出完这一期之后就寿终正寝，仅仅出版了7期，还是一个婴儿就早早夭折，实在是令人惋惜，大家可以在以下网址可以读到这7期精彩的内容，也向大家强烈推荐。）

汤姆·彼得斯的真实忏悔
作者：汤姆·彼得斯 梁光严 译

《追求卓越》是事后诸葛，是麦肯锡公司众多咨询产品中最不成熟的一个，当时根本没有人会认为它是一个事关重大的项目。这是我的第一个忏悔，而且这是事实。

'美国人当时正受到日本人的进攻，他们当时正在生产上乘汽车。因此，鲍勃·沃特曼和我着手寻找管理的真正秘诀。'当我讲这个故事的时候，通常利用我模仿上帝口吻的讲话方式来传达这样的印象：我们着手做的事情'很重要'。

这完全错了。事实是，早在1977年，当时麦肯锡公司常务董事荣·丹尼尔决定发起两个项目。在麦肯锡，凡是有生命的东西都是战略和组织两者中的一个。既然战略能稳固统治，大项目便是大生意，用大写B表示；大写S则表示战略项目（请注意这两个大写字母）。这个项目由丹尼尔的继任弗雷德·格卢克领导。这个BS项目设在公司总部，而且配备了很多顶级顾问。而正因为如此，该项目没能取得任何成果，人们后来也不再提它了。这件事告诉我们第一个教训：别总和小人物打赌，要打赌就找总部，因为总部的政纲总是不可避免地'淡化'并扼杀掉任何值得一做的项目。

与此同时，丹尼尔开始做另一个小项目。他要找一个人来观察组织（即结构和人）方面的事，而我当时恰好在那儿，完全是瞎猫碰上死耗子。我在斯坦福商学院呆了七年，弄到了组织行为学博士学位。当时，人们认为这个地方远不如哈佛。有趣的是，在我的斯坦福组织行为学博士班里只有四个人。更有趣的是，我们四个都做过工程师，隐约觉得仅有数字和统计还不够。我们怀疑，数字和统计并不能说明公司实际运作的全貌。更糟的是，它们甚至可能掩盖在万变的商界中竞争和获胜背后的真相。

这样，任务便落到那个叫汤姆·彼得斯的不起眼的笨家伙和他那不起眼的笨哥儿们鲍勃·沃特曼身上。在麦肯锡的世界里，他们都被看作是无关紧要的人。我们外放在旧金山事务所，远离麦肯锡总部，蜷缩在一间从不赚钱但却以神秘闻名的办公室里。事实上，麦肯锡的其他部门总是有人在遇到问题时试图让我们加入，因为他们想要我们做'旧金山那边的事情'。我们是麦肯锡公司中离嬉皮士--穿黑西服的嬉皮士--最近的一种人。

我们当时搞的是没用的项目，纽约那边的'商业战略'则是明星级项目。所以，让我们多注意一下这些没用的项目！它们的期待值较低，政治包袱也轻得多，管理上的监视也少得多！（而它们却更有可能取得成果。）

我的第二条忏悔是：当我写《追求》时，我并不知道自己在做什么。没有详尽的工作计划。没有需要论证的理论。我在外面和真正聪明有趣的一流人士交谈。我有充足的旅行预算，能够坐上头等舱，住上高级饭店，麦肯锡公司还允许我和尽可能多的杰出人士交谈。

我去见卡尔·韦克（Karl Weick），这个人对我的生活有着全面影响。我曾把他的书读过一千遍，可以前还未曾见过他本人。我去了奥斯陆，与恩纳尔·索斯鲁德（Einar Thorsrud）交谈，他曾研究过增强大型油船的动力问题。我去了伦敦塔维斯托克研究所（Tavistock Institute），在那里，研究组织发展的一流思想家们正在研究为什么人们在某些情况下能以团队形式有效工作。

我曾拍过道格拉斯·麦格雷戈（Douglas McGregor）的马屁。我心目中的另一位英雄沃伦·本尼斯（Warren Bennis）说，一切都是从道格拉斯开始的。他也许说得对。道格拉斯发明了X理论和Y理论，这些理论的大意是：人是商业中真正重要的部分，不能靠控制和霸道来推动他们。人们都知道他说得对，却仍然视自己的工人如草芥，然后又不断质问为什么公司的业绩没有提高。（读者请注意：嗯，是不是又到提出这些问题的时间了？我们的高层管理者大多数都已经知道了这些，对吗？）

情况大致如此。我在世界各地旅行，拜访有智慧的人，将会谈内容录下来，于是便有了这些访谈和这些手稿--成堆成堆的手稿。1979年，麦肯锡公司慕尼黑事务所让我去把我的发现展示给西门子公司高层管理者。西门子有世界上最棒的组织战略群，所以我不能只是露露面并把脑子里的东西倒给他们。在这种情况下，我作了700张幻灯片，演讲进行了两天。

话说回到美国麦肯锡公司后，我应邀向百事可乐公司高层管理者作了演讲，该公司当时由安迪·佩尔森领导（最近，《快速公司》发表了一篇关于佩尔森的文章，见本刊2001年9月号，发表时题为《安迪·佩尔森找到了爱》）。在那些日子里，安迪还没有找到爱。我们都知道，他看到700张幻灯片时火冒三丈。因此发生了以下的事：当离向百事公司演讲的时间越来越近时，某天清晨6点左右，我坐在桌前，从美州银行大楼的48层俯瞰旧金山湾。我闭上眼睛，然后伏案在拍纸簿上写下了8条。从那时起，这8条就没有改变过，它们是《追求》的8条基本原理。

这件事说明了什么？没有任何东西能比得上天真。我当时快40岁了，鲍勃更大一点。可我们做这项工作的时候都天真得难以置信。我们像小孩一样看着大公司--强大美国的领导者--的世界，我们问最简单的问题。为什么你们要这么做？为什么你们总是被自己的官僚政治所羁绊？为什么你们让别人那么费力地工作呢？

还有一个重要的'那又怎么样呢'。《追求》的部分之美正是我们能做到凡事不强求。该书具有某种近似禅宗的特性。事实上，它提出的观点是，在管理他人时，只有不强求才能成功。

《追求卓越》是20年前开火的一杆禅宗之枪。它讲述了从那一刻之后世界之更迭。这是一种不同的游戏，一个不同的世界，一个不同的时刻。一切都不复从前--想要成为现今世界的一分子，就必须读读这本书。你得依靠这些思想。我们也许是错的，但我们确信过去的做法是错的。那么现在就开始吧，你必须为自己而思考。你如何竞争？如何协作？如何利用思想？如何使用人？如何玩这种新规则的游戏？《追求》是一个转折点--一个标点，它标志着一个时代的终结和另一个时代的开始，所有这些现在仍是真切的--甚至更真切了。

第三条忏悔：这实在是一桩小事，但值得一提，好吧，我承认：我们曾伪造数据。很当时多人建议我们这样。当时（面临的）一个大问题是，为什么说这些公司是'卓越'的公司？不久后，当一批'卓越'公司开始连年下滑时，我们又面临一项严重指控：如果说这些公司很不错，那么彼得斯，现在它们怎么变成这样？依我看来，这个问题实在是不得要领。

《追求》开始是针对62家公司的一项研究。我们是怎样遇到这个课题的呢？我们到处接洽麦肯锡公司的合作对象，并联络别的深入参与商界并严肃对待工商业的聪明的人。我们问他们：谁酷？谁的工作做得好？哪里有伟大的人和事？哪些公司了解商业的真谛？这种非常直接的做法造就了一份62家公司的名单，接下来我们开始访问这些公司。然后，由于麦肯锡毕竟是麦肯锡，我们认为必须找一些衡量绩效的量化指标。这些指标将名单上的公司由62家减少到43家。例如，通用电气曾在这个名单上，但后来被撤下来了--这件事告诉我们，粗浅的见解有多'愚蠢'，讲究实际的指标有多'精明'。

回过头看，有本应被选中，但却不在这43家之列的公司吗？我只有一个词要说：阿塔里（Atari）。

从根本上说，我们的程序合理吗？绝对合理！如果想找那些正在做很酷的事--我们可以从中学到最有用、最先进的原则--的聪明人，那就像我们写《追求》时那样做吧：利用常识，相信自己的本能，征求'奇怪的'（就是说不因循守旧的）人的观点，由此入手。随后你便可以一直为证明那些事实而操心。

好了，下面是另一条忏悔。我说我写《追求》时不知道自己在做什么，我说的是实话。我没想打响标志着一场革命的一枪。不过我确实有一个日程。我的日程是这样的：我真地、深深地、诚实地、强烈地愤慨了！（我要说的是什么呢？那就是：几乎百分之百的创新--从商业到政治--并非从'市场分析'，而是从那些对事物的本来面目极端愤慨的人那里得到启示的。）

我讨厌谁呢？彼得·德鲁克就是一个。今天，大家都觉得德鲁克似乎总是属于明白人之列。让我们回到《公司的概念》并读一读它吧。德鲁克可能是奥地利人，但当谈到科层制、命令和控制、由上而下的商业运作时，他比德国人还要德国人。看一看据德鲁克所说的这部商业圣经，你就会看到，组织就是组织！你将无法越轨！这就是当时的风气。因此，在我心目中，德鲁克是敌人。一个好的敌人，但仍然是敌人。

其他人还有谁？我非常讨厌罗伯特·麦克纳马拉。麦克纳马拉曾任哈佛商学院的统计学助教。有人吹捧他，拿他和当时掌管美国空军的库蒂斯·勒梅（Curtis E. LeMay）将军相提并论。

我记得据说勒梅并不知道他有多少飞机或它们停在哪儿，因此统计员麦克纳马拉推算出有多少飞机和停在哪儿，他交给勒梅一份报告。麦克纳马拉突然间在没有任何系统的地方导入了系统。真了不起！这使得他成了五角大楼的德鲁克--因为德鲁克曾为大公司做同样的事。但是，当越战开始，麦克纳马拉成为国防部长时，系统完全接管了一切。人被排除出等式。麦克纳马拉引入了'帐房先生'（bean counters）的暴政。因此麦克纳马拉是敌人。

不过，我最讨厌的还是施乐公司。当时这个公司的CEO是戴维·科恩斯，我在那儿当咨询顾问。施乐被认为是那个世纪公司的代表，但我更了解情况。所有的问题都在这里：官僚制，从未得到执行的伟大战略，盲目地关注数字而不是关注人，对MBA的敬畏。如果有可能被做错的事，施乐就会做错。当然，还有一些美国大公司也一样糟糕：曼哈顿银行、西屋电气和大多数麦肯锡的典型客户。但施乐集中体现了这个问题。事实上，我在那儿时为之效命的家伙曾是麦肯锡从前的合伙人，名叫杰克·克劳利，后来成为施乐公司战略领袖。他做了一项称为'悬崖战?quot;的研究。意思是施乐之车正要开过悬崖边缘。戴维·科恩斯的难题是，作为CEO，他不能自己宣布自己的公司正要掉下悬崖。

因此，如果你想把《追求》简化成一个核心讯息，这个讯息就是：施乐让人失望。

下面是我的第五条忏悔：《追求》针对的是所有的'管理ABC'--1981年时曾控制美国商界的流行习惯思维。不过这不是忏悔。我的忏悔是走得不够远。

老一套的智慧，就是德鲁克卖给通用汽车的东西，是麦克纳马拉给五角大楼安装的东西和戴维·科恩斯在施乐固守的东西。它们都可以追溯到弗雷德里克·温斯洛·泰勒和科学管理法。泰勒设计的这种理论后来以'最佳方法'而闻名。实质上，泰勒主义说的是，每一种工作都可以简化为一系列简单、可重复、机械的活动，甚至最愚蠢、最不情愿的工人也可以做。在其1911年的书《科学管理的原则》中，泰勒写到了施密特，他的工作是铲煤。通过将施密特的工作分解为科学详细的步骤，泰勒说明了他如何提高生产率、减少错误，甚至可以使蠢笨如牛的人成为可靠的雇员。少见的一种关于提高效率或雇员社会文化道德水平的观点！

从泰勒主义出发，加上一层德鲁克主义和一剂麦克纳马拉主义，到了70年代后期，我们可以看到通用汽车这家伟大的美国公司正在使用帐房先生式的管理--或者说至少是用帐房先生的心态管理。一切都简化为数字和财务。通用汽车CEO宣布，通用不是在从事生产汽车的生意，而是在从事挣钱的生意。（这令通用的多数客户吃了一惊，他们正准备在市场上买车，或者说甚至购买一种生活方式，这下他们不准备花钱了。）而这可能是日本汽车制造商兴起的原因，他们最肯定的是他们在做生产汽车的生意，尤其是，生产客户肯定愿意买的汽车，因为它们成本低、质量好。在受欧佩克启示下实行石油禁运的时代，它们用同样一加仑汽油便能跑好多公里。
让我们回到施乐。施乐雇用了智商180以上的MBA人士，他们将所有时间和精力花在争论'需求的交叉弹性'之上。同时，他们满足于制造印出来绉绉巴巴的复印机（尽管是第一代复印机）。然而，他们并不关心产品，并不关心人或客户。一切都是数字。数字，数字，还是数字。我烦透了数字。

《追求》说，数字并不是全部。利润很酷，它让你能投资很酷的东西。可是必须有人流血。有人得表现出些许热情。我愿意这样说，《追求》使工商业重新有了气血。

下面是一个例子。我们最先进行的访谈是采访当时的惠普总裁约翰·荣格。现在惠普是计算机业内身价500亿美元的公司。而在1976年，它刚刚跨过10亿美元大关，当时大部分产品是医学装置和计量设备。1977年，10亿美元使惠普成为一家重要公司。

记住，我曾在施乐、曼哈顿银行和麦肯锡许多有着庞大官僚体制的大客户那里做过咨询。鲍勃和我来到惠普总部，那时它是位于帕洛阿图市佩奇·米尔路一幢极不起眼的建筑。我们来到办公室，要求见荣格。好，前台的人说。他在那儿。向右转。不用填什么卡片，不用佩带什么标志。往里走就行。我们走进去。约翰在那里，坐在与秘书共用的小屋里，屋子只有10英尺长，10英尺宽。他身穿衬衫，这在2001年的后.com时代的T恤世界里看上去似乎手头没有大生意，但在1977年，这种工作方式足以令人目瞪口呆。他正在宣讲MBWA--一种游荡式管理方法。它是人类学，而非统计分析！我记得自己想到，这看上去似乎不对，肯定不正常。访问荣格后，我去见3M公司的泰特·埃德尔和丹纳公司的勒内·麦克费尔森，他们是当时按完全不同的模式操作的商界领袖。

《追求》的全部内容可以归结为三个字：人、客户、行动。这就是你摆脱当时的普遍智慧之后能得到的最大收获，这种智慧你也可以归结为三个字：数字，官僚体制，控制。你也可以将《追求》归结为一个思想：软的就是硬的。直到当时，大家都认为硬的才是硬的。关于硬资产如工厂、机器、楼房等的交易情况，'硬'数字将你所需的一切告诉你。但是，《追求》却说一切软的都是硬的。人，顾客，关系，他（它）们构成了所有那些软的事物，决定着真正能够成就什么，决定着能做得多好。事实表明，这是一条革命性的讯息。

我们是怎样做了坏事而不被处分的？由于我和沃特曼穿着麦肯锡公司的黑西服，系着麦肯锡的小领带，讲着麦肯锡式商业咨询语言，因此没有受到处分。《追求》是一本麦肯锡式的书。它有一个印有保守的白色铅字的黑色封面。我们的讯息是革命性的，但我们的信任状和我们的外表是传统的。

《追求》出现的几年前，哈佛商学院的两位教授比尔·阿贝纳锡和鲍勃·海耶斯，曾在《哈佛商业评论》上写过一篇极好的文章，称为《走向经济衰退端赖我们的管理》。它是对哈佛商学院的整个世界观的攻击，而且只有两位哈佛商学院教授，才有可能写这样的文章并发表在《哈佛商业评论》上。只有两位麦肯锡的咨询员，才有可能向被数字压弯了腰、崇拜官僚制、嗜好制定战略的美国大公司发起攻击，而且不受处分。

（革命者请记好笔记！达尔文说过，当物种变化太快时，它们生存的机会很少。但很少数将成为领头羊，并且重新决定世界面貌。）

下面是一条忏悔，它只对70年代末'奥克兰袭击者' （Oakland Raiders）橄榄球队的球迷具有某种意义：我把这全归功于马克·凡厄根。（如果你不是奥克兰袭击者队的球迷，你永远也不会看见凡厄根打橄榄球，我的意思是，你不太走运。）

凡厄根是一位硕大、强壮、令人印象深刻的袭击者队'快三码扬尘回跑'（three-yards-and-a-cloud-of-dust running back）队员。我们的封面需要一张图片。我们一开始想从《体育画刊》上直接选一张，但最后一刻，我们决定不能用这种手段从《体育画刊》上盗用图片。因此，我们跨过旧金山湾来到袭击者队的办公室，翻遍了他们的档案，找到了完美的相片：一张凡厄根的特写。

从很多方面说，它都是完美的。照片显示的是三码和一缕飞扬的尘土，而我们的书讲述了同样的事：爱你的人、爱你的顾客、保持简朴。精练的团队，简单的组织。让官僚主义者远离这条血路。关注那些指甲肮脏?quot;真正的'人，这就是奥克兰袭击者队。他们是让印有白色骷髅的海盗旗飞扬的家伙。他们是海盗，是处于劣势的一方。阿尔·戴维斯，后来背叛了这支球队的老板，总是宣扬说：'宝贝，关键是赢'。 他公开承认的讯息是：'承诺达到追求'。

当我们说我们追求卓越时就已经理解这一点了。不是竞争优势，不是经济增长，不是市场主导或战略差异，不是股票价值的最大化，而是追求。今天依然如此。生意不是某种没有躯体、没有血肉的企业。利润是好的，是顾客对你做事价值的肯定。而'企业'（一个可爱的词）讲究的是心灵，是美，是艺术，是让自己进入状态。它意味着热情和对某种理想的无私追求。它意味着荣格坐在他那小小的办公室里，只穿着衬衫。这就是酷。甚至这本书的书名'追求卓越'就是在提醒人们，生意不是干巴巴的、沉闷的、烦人的，不是靠数字来做的。工作中的生活可以很酷，很酷的工作不限于橄榄球运动员。我们所有人，我们当中的任何一个人，都可以做到。

我的第七条忏悔：《追求》是完善的。其中没有什么错误。没有。我1980年5月在黄色拍纸簿上写下的、成为书中8大要素的8条基本原则是对的。它们在1982年是对的。它们当时是正确的，1982年它们一点也没错。

你可能要问，那你忏悔什么？因为这本书缺陷太多，而且我们撒了一个弥天大谎，虽属无意，但却是一个谎言。

以下我要说明为什么这本书是完善的：我们绝对抓住了……指导1982年的人们思考和工作的8个要点。对于这8点中的某些观点而言，我可能用自己的话说了些双关语，用词上有所选择，但它们是正确的8点。如果看一看1982年的商界，这8点正中要害。实际很重要。现在故事已经结束了。

尽管如此，当时这本书还是存有缺陷。Atari是其中一个。王安实验室是另一个。事后看来，我们直接面对的商业变化有很多类型，但我们完全回避了这个事实。它们当时只是不太重要，还没有登上舞台，或者说仍然太粗略而没有产生某种影响。比方说信息技术。我们含含糊糊地暗示它将会很重要。我们谈到了扁平和弹性的组织。但是，在组织内部和组织之间通过互联网进行沟通并以互联网的速度进行工作的观念有没有呢？我们把这一点给忽略掉了。

我们遗漏了速度的重要性，尽管我们确实讲到相对于无休止地一轮轮制定计划而言，行动才具有威力。我们忽视了全球经济。这是一本关于全美范围的书。（我们也患了'美国不适症'，记得吉米·卡特的事吧？）《追求》最远还没延伸到多伦多或提华纳（Tijuana，墨西哥北部城市，编者注），其他更远的地方就不用说了。书中没提到一个企业家，谈的都是大公司。毕竟，我们是麦肯锡公司中不起眼的助手，而此书却是世界的完美折射。我也怀疑书中没提及一位妇女。如果你读遍《追求》的全部人名索引而没找到单身妇女和有色人种的话，我也不会奇怪。这些都是缺陷。

接下来，是我们撒的一个大谎，尽管是无意的，还是一个谎言。《追求》的敌人是'一个最佳办法'。这是'科学管理论'一贯向管理者宣称的。'找到一个最佳办法，你就会赢'。本书试图一劳永逸地扫除这种'一个最佳办法'的心态。但在此过程中，我们不经意地用上帝给与我们自己的一套真理、我们自己的专有药方来取代了'最佳'本身。人们阅读《追求》，拿走这样的讯息：我们已经在药片上写下如何获胜的新真理--去做吧，上帝将向下朝你微笑。现在如此，永远如此。遵循这8条规则，荣耀将润泽你。

我们忘了贴一个警告标签。注意！没有永恒的东西。任何东西吃得太多都会有毒。请记住：商业中所有事情都是悖论。为达到追求，必须持之以恒。而当你持之以恒之时，你就容易受到攻击。你看，这就是悖论。面对它吧！

尽管如此，今天的我并没有错误。首先，我认为，任何一个人蠢到看到一本商业书籍全套照搬，他就的的确确是个白痴。其次，应将《追求》视为一种消极的担保，而不是积极的担保。积极的担保会说?quot;遵循这8条原则，你会赢，肯定会赢'。我永远也不会这样说--那时不，现在也不。但我会说，'忽视这8条原则，你会失败，肯定会失败'。如果不做这8条中的任何一条，我可以肯定你的公司将永远无法成为一家追求的公司。一会儿也不会，长久看来就更不用说了。无视这8条原则，你自己承担风险，因为你将失败。这不是撒谎，今天仍然如此。

我的第8条忏悔是什么？今天我绝不会写蹲非蟆贰Ｎ叶?quot;追求'之追求不再感兴趣。我对有趣的事物感兴趣。

《追求》中暗含着这种观念：我们可以为所有各时代开一个处方，它将告诉我们如何使公司变得追求--今天如此，明天如此，永远如此。事实是，我并不在乎公司是否追求，而且我肯定也不在乎它们是否能保持追求。我关心的是我们今天--现在--我们能学到什么，方法是通过观察那些正在做有趣的事情的公司和人。

有趣的东西在不断变化。你可以看看戴尔公司做计算机的方式：一家每天制造两万多台电脑的工厂只有100平方英尺的储存零部件的空间。这件事说明，所有那些让人们用世界上听起来最烦人的语言--企业资源计划、供应链管理--谈论的事情确实存在。做生意的方式天天在变，而且还会继续变下去，而且变的频率越来越快。商业的明天已经到来。它以今天公司、客户、供应商做生意的钟形曲线前端的方式存在在那里。

我今天会写的书是《追求怪异》、《追求好奇》、《追求探索的许可》。卓越只是一种过于静态的观念，而世界实在变化太快了。

现在我要说的是最后也是最终的一条忏悔。《追求卓越》首次面世以来已经过了20年。我回顾了组成书中追求部分的8条基本原则，我不会篡改其中任何一条，但我会加以补充。我会给它们安装机械装置，使它们适合这些更快、更怪异、更多变、更难以预测、更令人困惑的新时代。

下面这个指标能够衡量该书发表以来事物变化有多大，有多快：《追求》谈的是人、客户和行动。20年后要谈的是思想、自由和速度。我们已经把所有东西都提高了几个等级。它不再只是人，它是人关注人，它是自由代理商，它是热情、受到激励和充分参与的人想出的优秀思想的威力。客户呢？他们当然仍很重要。但今天，客户比以往任何时候都有更多的选择。他们已经被解放。这意味着公司也需要实现解放。今天，最重要的是尝试新事物的自由。是去试验，是在惯例之外甚至在新惯例之外迈出一步--不，实现一次飞跃。是去摆脱'我们这儿就是这么做的'这个禁锢。因为你可以绝对有把握地说，你的客户对你的习惯做法一点也不感兴趣，他们对最新、最快、最好的办法感兴趣。对现在为他们提供服务的新方式感兴趣。在《追求》出版的年代，行动是好的，因为当时的规范是分析麻痹症。因此，当时任何一种行动都比'预备！瞄准，瞄准，瞄准……'要好。今天，重要的是速度，是'开火，开火，开火'。如果你正在寻找最好的应用方法，记住，从今天往后，速度是关键。

我想补充两条新的原则，以满足写作《追求：20年后》的需要。第一条新原则是什么？是GAK!（God alone knows，即'天知道'）20年前，我们敢肯定'一个最佳方法'是错的。我们也曾认为，我们可以列出8条更能让你维持追求的原则。要是今天有人问我我会说：GAK! 没人知道，更不用说确信了。网络大篷车这个主意是好是坏？是铁定成功还是注定失败？GAK! 惠普与康柏的合并会变成一次漂亮的战略出击，还是两条倒霉恐龙的苟延残喘？GAK! 这全是重大试验，是还在进行中的工作，是一个变化着的盛宴，一个实时的进化故事。有人告诉你他知道会出现什么吗？别信他！当面大声地嘲笑他。

第二条原则是：SAV（screw around vigorously，即'大胆闯'）。今天最重要的速度是什么？是学习的速度。现在，很多人在担心如何清理这场由.com崩盘引起的过度混乱的局面。20年后我们再回想今天，将认为它完全无关紧要。这只不过是刚刚开始，需要一两年的清理时间，然后就完了，而信息技术和生物技术革命还处于婴儿期。

如果问了上一段话中的那个问题，那么不管这些.com公司让我们付出什么代价，都是低廉的。地上撒了多少红墨水并不重要。过去4年我们学到的东西比商业史上任何时间学到的都要多（或者说至少是自'轰鸣的80年代'――19世纪80年代――铁路建设成风带来的类似过度破坏以来，情况是如此）。你总是可以印更多的钞票，但没什么能替代让人更聪明和更快速。要想更聪明，只有'大胆闯'。一切都试试。看看什么可行，什么遭到惨败。要学习，洗干净，再来。

汤姆·彼得斯（[e-mail]）首先是《追求卓越》的作者之一，其他都在其次。

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追求简短

《追求卓越》位列《纽约时报》畅销书榜长达3年，印数达300万本。毫无疑问，有些人还没有读过它。没读过此书的商界人士可以看看下面这本书的概要。

关注该书的人大多注意最后8章，在这8章中，彼得斯和沃特曼列举了他们认为与追求公司相关的8个特征。不过，严谨的商界人士如果想了解该书的写作背景，想了解其对大型组织中人们工作方式的基本假设的考察程度，那么头4章是真正令人感兴趣的。在第一章，彼得斯和沃特曼叙述了该书背后的研究，即麦肯锡公司的7-S框架（其他的6个S比单纯的'战略'研究更反映真实情况）和他们用来衡量'卓越'公司的标准。

第二章由对'合理模式'（彼得斯和沃特曼在该书中着手推翻的以事实和数字为基础的管理方法）的有力批判构成。他们写道：'数字性的、理性主义的管理方法支配着各种商业学派'。'它告诉我们，受过良好训练的职业管理者可以管理一切。它寻求从分析上分别证明各种决策的合理性。它很正确，以致于犯危险的错误；可以证明，它已经让我们严重地误入歧途?quot;

在第三章《等待激发的人》中，彼得斯和沃特曼论证了一种新的管理风格，它首先强调组织中的人。这是一个令人印象深刻的论点，由于两位作者从商业、心理学、历史学、物理学和其他多个领域的大量学术文献和一些前沿学者的研究中吸取知识的能力，这一论点更能激发人们的兴趣。在这本令人吃惊地融合了学术研究和咨询智能的书中，这一章令人印象深刻。最后，在第四章，彼得斯和沃特曼开始对文化、适应以及学习和变化进行讨论。他们提醒读者，管理者的真正工作是把握模糊性和悖论。

接下来的是8个篇章列举了追求的基本要素：'行动的偏向'、'接近客户'、'自主性和企业家精神'、'通过人提高生产力'、'传递，由价值推动'、'持续编织'、'简单的形式，精简的人员'和'既松又紧的特征'。

附录：《环球管理》社论：在非理性的衰退中追求卓越
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新经济在经历了'非理性的繁荣'之后，出乎意料又在意中地陷入到'非理性的衰退'中。紧随理想主义和浪漫主义泛滥而来的，是落寞和萧条--这几乎是社会史和商业史的常态。'股东们向死气沉沉的公司下达诸如精简公司结构、充分利用资产、回归基本业务等命令一点也不奇怪。'早在新经济大潮来临之前（1994年），哈梅尔和普罗哈拉德在《哈佛商业评论》谈到当时的施乐公司的经营状况时这样写道。而这段话同样适用于今天的施乐，以及无数经历了'非理性繁荣'的公司。

彼得·德鲁克说我们正处在一个'非连续性时代'，汤姆·彼得斯认为我们正处在'一个颠倒的世界'，查尔斯·汉迪则把我们时代的这两大特征概括为'非理性'，我们只能在这个非理性的整体环境中成功，或者失败。要想成功，就不得不学会与这个'非理性'的环境相处；而失败，首先是因为不能接受'非理性'的环境因而从'非理性'的环境里出局。

那么商业的意义和商人的尊严何在？--难道商业就是一种在不可究诘不可把握的世界里混水摸鱼，侥幸摸到了鱼就是成功，不幸没摸到鱼就是失败？商人就是一些没心没肺在随波逐流中撞大运的白丁，或者是一些满腹狡诈一心投机其成功无足道其失败无足惜的的赌徒？

被称为'商业哲学家'（business philosopher）的查尔斯·汉迪关心的是，一个真正成功的商人，就是在这个非连续性时代使自己的行动保持内在连续性的人，一个在颠倒的世界里保持不被颠倒的人。促使他做出重大商业决策的，除了对企业内部和外部局势的审慎分析外，还有他的深厚的人格底蕴。在知识上的随机应变与情感和意志上的不为所动，是其领导力的两翼，这平衡的两翼避免他在风云变幻的商业世界里随风升扬和飘落。

在我看来，这种人格类型就是吉姆·柯林斯所说的堪称'伟大'的商人--'第五级领导'。第五级领导的特点是：A.谦逊为怀，躲避他人的奉承，从不自夸；B.行事沉稳而坚定，不仰仗个人魅力，藉由拉高标准来激发属下进步；C.不图个人，只为组织，挑选能够让企业在未来更加成功的继任者；D.企业表现失色时，望向镜中而不是窗外，从不将过失归因于其他人或外在因素，不会抱怨运气不佳；当公司评功论赏时，看着窗外而非镜子，从来都是把成功归因于其他人、外部因素，或者称运气不错。

简而言之，第五级领导特点就是'谦虚而执著 + 羞怯而无畏'，就是坦然地接受世界的非理性状态而在内心深处保持清醒的理性和坚强的意志。

汤姆·彼得斯在《追求卓越》出版20周年之际，坦陈它的缺失（《汤姆·彼得斯的真实忏悔》）。他关心的是，20年后的今天我们还需要追求卓越吗？答案是：今天的公司无需追求20年前他所标榜的'卓越'，因为那样的'卓越'在很大程度上是他有意无意编造的一个真实的谎言，'追求卓越'在很大程度上是一项不可能的使命。尽管他骨子里是一个追求解放，不循规蹈矩的嘻皮，但他仍然是一个'穿着黑西装的嘻皮'。他所说的卓越仍然让人想起'黑西装'--一本正经、装模作样式的'卓越'。他眼中的世界仍然是一个理性的世界--有现成的样板和目标（即'卓越'）的世界。尽管他不相信有永恒不变的'最佳办法'，但他'不经意地用上帝给予我们自己的一套真理、我们自己的专有药方来取代了最佳本身。……我们已经在药片上写下如何获胜的新真理--去做吧，上帝将倾身下顾朝你微笑。现在如此，永远如此。遵循这8条规则，荣耀将降临到你头上。'

20年后的汤姆·彼得斯终于清晰地意识到：我们处在一个非理性的时代，商业世界里没有现成的蓝图和路线图。商业世界里'全是重大的试验，是还在进行中的工作，是一个变化着的盛宴，一个实时的进化故事'。统治这个世界的第一条原则是--'天知道'（God Alone Knows）。

在这样一个最终的结果只有天知道的世界里，无所作为岂不是'最佳办法'？恰恰不是。因为如果你无所作为，那么你就是已经断定了最终的结果（即失败），把50%的概率谎称为100%。所以随'天知道'而来的，是第二条原则--'大胆闯'（screw around vigorously）。

'大胆闯'就是我们今天追求卓越的方式--追求不知是什么样子、不知在何处的卓越。新经济是什么样子？新经济失败了吗？--'天知道'。在一片低迷、衰退中如何追求卓越？--'大胆闯'。

在信心指数与股票指数一起暴跌的今天，一种虚无主义与保守主义交加的心态正在商界弥漫。一味地求助于压缩、削减成本，即哈梅尔所说的只关注分母而不关注分子的管理，亦即彼得斯所说的账房先生式的管理大行其道。'企业想象力'激剧萎缩，'全面回归传统'，算得上这个听不到也不再需要强劲呼声时期的一种无可奈何的'强劲呼声'。但新经济的基础--呈非连续性、突发性增长的知识决定了新经济的下一步只能是'天知道'，决定了我们惟一符合时宜的行动方式是'大胆闯'。而这就是非理性状态--无论是表现为非理性的繁荣还是非理性的衰退--的时代，成功的商业领袖唯一始终恪守的姿态。

附录原文：
Tom Peters's True Confessions

On the 20th anniversary of In 'Search of Excellence,' Peters admits, 'I had no idea what I was doing when I wrote 'Search.' '

by Tom Peters
from FC issue 53, page 78

Almost 20 years ago, In Search of Excellence, by Tom Peters and Bob Waterman, was published. No one much cared. At the time, the United States had more serious business problems to attend to: inflation: 10%. Prime interest rate: 20%. Unemployment: 10%. Japan was eating America's lunch.
Search slipped unnoticed into this realm of business darkness and competitive gloom. But it began to catch on. And catch on. And catch on. Until it became a fad. Then a cause. Then an industry. Search became a publishing event without precedent in the business world.

Twenty years later, Search can legitimately claim to have fired the starting gun in the race to the new economy. It marked an important inflection point in business history.

The 20th anniversary of the publication of Search comes at another inflection point in history. The September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States, arriving on the heels of a dramatic economic downturn, have combined to raise new questions about American business and leadership. Those factors make the 20th anniversary of Search a perfect time for a fresh look at a powerful set of ideas, their creation, and their implications.

For the first time in Search's 20-year history, Tom Peters comes clean about why and how he wrote the book in the first place. What he got right, what he got wrong -- and what he outright lied about. And what comes next. Because the story behind Search holds important lessons about the new big ideas that will set the agenda for what comes next in the world of business.

It's all part of 'Tom Peters's True Confessions.' -- The Editors

In Search of Excellence was an afterthought, the runt of the McKinsey consulting litter, a hip-pocket project that was never supposed to amount to much. That's my first confession, and it's the truth.

Of course, there's an official way that I tell the story now -- and it's total bullshit. The way I tell it now is, 'Americans were under attack by the Japanese, who were making good automobiles. So Bob Waterman and I set out to discover the real secrets of management.' Usually when I tell that version of the story, I try to use my imitation voice-of-God way of speaking to convey the impression that what we set out to do was Very Important.

Which is completely wrong. The truth is that back in 1977, Ron Daniel, who was then the managing director of McKinsey, decided to launch two projects. In McKinsey's world, all of life is one of two things: strategy or organization. Since the strategy guys rule, the big project was the capital B Business, capital S Strategy project. ( Please note the capital letters. ) It was headed by Fred Gluck, who later succeeded Daniel as managing director. The BS project was located at corporate headquarters, and it had a lot of top-notch consultants attached to it. And since all of those things were true about the project, nothing ever came of it, and it has never been heard of since. So here's lesson number one: Don't always bet on the little guy, but do always bet against headquarters. Because headquarters politics will invariably and inevitably 'bland up' and then kill any worthwhile project.

Meanwhile, Daniel had this other little dip-shit project that he wanted to mount. He was looking for someone to look at the organization side -- the structure-and-people side. And there I was, just through blind-ass luck. I had done seven years at Stanford Business School, which at the time was considered to be much cooler than Harvard, to get my PhD in organizational behavior. Interestingly, there had been only four people in my organizational-behavior doctoral class at Stanford. And even more interestingly, all four of us were ex-engineers who on some vague level had the notion that numbers and statistics weren't enough. We suspected that they didn't tell the whole story about how companies really worked -- or maybe even worse, that they obscured the real story behind what it took to compete and win in the then-evolving world of business.

So the assignment went to this silly little guy called Tom Peters and his silly little buddy called Bob Waterman, both of whom were considered kind of marginalia in the world of McKinsey. We were out in the San Francisco office, far, far away from McKinsey headquarters, tucked inside an office that never made any money but that was well-known for its weirdness. In fact, there were always people in other parts of McKinsey who would reach a point in their analyses where they would try to get us involved, because they wanted us to do our 'San Francisco thing.' We were the closest thing McKinsey had to hippies -- hippies in black suits.

We were the weak-sister project; the Business Strategy project back in New York was the star-studded project. So let's hear it for weak-sister projects! They involve lower expectations, far less political baggage, and much less management scrutiny! ( And they are more likely to produce results. )

My second confession is this: I had no idea what I was doing when I wrote Search. There was no carefully designed work plan. There was no theory that I was out to prove. I went out and talked to genuinely smart, remarkably interesting, first-rate people. I had an infinite travel budget that allowed me to fly first class and stay at top-notch hotels and a license from McKinsey to talk to as many cool people as I could all around the United States and the world.

I went to see Karl Weick, who had totally influenced my life. I had read his work a thousand times, and I'd never met him. I went to Oslo to talk with Einar Thorsrud, who had studied empowerment on oil tankers. I went to the Tavistock Institute in London, where the leading thinkers on organizational development were looking at why people work together effectively in team configurations under certain circumstances.

I was scratching the Douglas McGregor itch. Warren Bennis, another hero of mine, says that it all starts with Doug, and he's probably right. Doug was the guy who invented Theory X and Theory Y, which basically said that people are a really important part of business and that you can't motivate them by controlling and tyrannizing them. Everybody knew that what he said was true, and everybody continued to treat their workers like shit -- and then kept asking why companies didn't perform better. ( Note to reader: Hmm. Is it time for these questions again? Naw -- most of our top managers have already learned this stuff, right? )

That was basically it. I traveled the world, met smart people, and recorded the meetings. There were all of these conversations, all of these interviews, and all of these transcripts -- pounds and pounds of transcripts. Then in 1979, McKinsey's Munich office had me come over and give a presentation on my findings to the top managers at Siemens. Siemens had the most hyperorganized strategy group on earth, so I couldn't just show up and start talking to them off the top of my head. In that best of consulting traditions, I made up a 700-slide, two-day presentation.

Word of the meeting got back to McKinsey USA, and I was invited to give a presentation to the top management of PepsiCo, which was then headed by Andy Pearson. ( Andy was recently featured in a Fast Company article called Andy Pearson Finds Love [August 2001]. ) In those days, Andy had not found love. We all knew that he'd go ballistic at the sight of a 700-slide presentation. So here's what happened: The time was drawing near for the Pepsi presentation to take place. One morning at about 6, I sat down at my desk overlooking the San Francisco Bay from the 48th floor of the Bank of America Tower, and I closed my eyes. Then I leaned forward, and I wrote down eight things on a pad of paper. Those eight things haven't changed since that moment. They were the eight basic principles of Search.

What's the lesson here? There's nothing like being naive. I was almost 40 years old, and Bob was a little older. But we were both incredibly naive when we were doing this work. We were like little children looking at the world of big companies -- mighty U.S. leaders -- and we were asking the simplest questions. Why do you do it this way? Why do you keep tripping over your own bureaucratic feet? Why do you make it so hard for people to do their jobs?

There's another important 'so what.' Part of the beauty of Search is that we were able to do it because we weren't trying to do it. There's an almost Zen-like quality to the book. In fact, it makes the point that, when it comes to managing and controlling people, only by not trying do you succeed.

In Search of Excellence is a Zen gun that was fired 20 years ago. It said that from this point forward, the world changes. It's a different game, a different world, a different moment. It's never going to be the way it was -- and if you want to be a part of the way it's going to be, you have to read this book. You have to reckon with these ideas. We may not be right -- but we are fervently convinced that the old way is wrong. So starting now, you've got to think for yourselves. How do you compete, how do you collaborate, how do you use ideas, how do you use people, how do you play this new game where there are brand-new rules? Search was an inflection point -- a punctuation mark -- that signaled the end of one era and the beginning of another. And all of that is still true -- even truer.

Confession number three: This is pretty small beer, but for what it's worth, okay, I confess: We faked the data. A lot of people suggested it at the time. The big question was, How did you end up viewing these companies as 'excellent' companies? A little while later, when a bunch of the 'excellent' companies started to have some down years, that also became a huge accusation: If these companies are so excellent, Peters, then why are they doing so badly now? Which I'd say pretty much misses the point.

Search started out as a study of 62 companies. How did we come up with them? We went around to McKinsey's partners and to a bunch of other smart people who were deeply involved and seriously engaged in the world of business and asked, Who's cool? Who's doing cool work? Where is there great stuff going on? And which companies genuinely get it? That very direct approach generated a list of 62 companies, which led to interviews with the people at those companies. Then, because McKinsey is McKinsey, we felt that we had to come up with some quantitative measures of performance. Those measures dropped the list from 62 to 43 companies. General Electric, for example, was on the list of 62 companies but didn't make the cut to 43 -- which shows you how 'stupid' raw insight is and how 'smart' tough-minded metrics can be.

Were there companies that, in retrospect, didn't belong on the list of 43? I only have one word to say: Atari.

Was our process fundamentally sound? Absolutely! If you want to go find smart people who are doing cool stuff from which you can learn the most useful, cutting-edge principles, then do what we did with Search: Start by using common sense, by trusting your instincts, and by soliciting the views of 'strange' ( that is, nonconventional ) people. You can always worry about proving the facts later.

All right, here's another confession. When I said that I didn't know what I was doing when I wrote Search, I was telling the truth. I wasn't trying to fire a shot to signal a revolution. But I did have an agenda. My agenda was this: I was genuinely, deeply, sincerely, and passionately pissed off! ( So what's the point? Just this: Nearly 100% of innovation -- from business to politics -- is inspired not by 'market analysis' but by people who are supremely pissed off by the way things are. )

Who was I pissed off at? At Peter Drucker, for one. Today, everybody acts as if Peter Drucker has always been one of those who gets it. Go back and read Concept of the Corporation. Peter Drucker may be an Austrian, but he's more German than the Germans when it comes to hierarchy and command-and-control, top-down business operation. Take a look at the business bible according to Peter Drucker, and you'll see. Organizations are about organization! You vill be in your place! That was the received order of the day. So, in my mind, Peter Drucker was the enemy. A good enemy, but still the enemy.

Who else? I was supremely pissed off at Robert McNamara. McNamara had been an assistant accounting professor at Harvard Business School. Somebody hooked him up with General Curtis E. LeMay, who was running the U.S. Air Force. The way I remember the story, LeMay didn't know how many airplanes he had or where they were parked. So McNamara the accountant figured out how many planes there were and where they were parked, and he put together a report for LeMay. All of a sudden, where there had been no systems, McNamara introduced systems. Terrific. That makes McNamara the Peter Drucker of the Pentagon -- because Drucker had done the same thing for big companies. But by the time the Vietnam War came and McNamara was secretary of defense, the systems had completely taken over. People were driven out of the equation. McNamara introduced the tyranny of the bean counters. So Robert McNamara was the enemy.

But mostly I was pissed off at Xerox. David Kearns was the company's CEO at the time, and I had been a consultant there. Xerox was considered to be the company of the century, but I knew better. There it was, all in one place: the bureaucracy, the great strategy that never got implemented, the slavish attention to numbers rather than to people, the reverence for MBAs -- you name it. If it could be done wrong, Xerox was doing it wrong. Of course, there were other giant American companies that were just as bad: Chase Manhattan Bank, Western Electric, and most of McKinsey's typical clients. But Xerox epitomized the problem. In fact, when I was there, the guy I worked for, who was a former McKinsey partner named Jack Crowley, later went on to be head of corporate strategy for Xerox. He did a study called a 'cliff analysis.' What it showed was that Xerox was about to drive off the edge of a cliff. The problem for David Kearns was that, as CEO, he couldn't be the guy to announce that his own company was about to go over the cliff.

So here it is: If you want to reduce Search to a core message, that message would be this: Xerox sucks.

Here's my fifth confession: Search went against all of the Management 101 -- style conventional thinking that was running American business back in 1981. But that's not the confession. The confession is that I didn't go far enough.

The conventional wisdom was what Peter Drucker had sold to General Motors, what Robert McNamara had installed at the Pentagon, and what David Kearns was stuck with at Xerox. It all went back to Frederick Winslow Taylor and scientific management. The theory that Taylor devised came to be known as 'the one best way.' In essence, Taylorism said that every job could be reduced to a simple, repeatable, mechanical set of activities that even the stupidest, most unwilling worker could do. In his 1911 book, The Principles of Scientific Management, Taylor had written about Schmidt, whose job was to shovel coal. By breaking Schmidt's job down into scientifically detailed steps, Taylor showed how he could increase productivity, reduce mistakes, and make even the dumbest ox of a man a dependable employee. Hardly an uplifting view of work or your employees.

Start with Taylorism, add a layer of Druckerism and a dose of McNamaraism, and by the late 1970s, you had the great American corporation that was being run by bean counters -- or at least by the bean-counter mentality. Everything was reduced to numbers and finance. The CEO of General Motors announced that GM wasn't in the business of making cars, it was in the business of making money. ( This came as a shock to most of GM's customers, who were in the market to buy a car -- or even better, a way of life -- not to spend money. ) That may account for the rise of Japanese automakers, who most certainly were in the business of making cars -- and, in particular, cars that customers would definitely want to buy, since they were low in cost and high in quality, and they got plenty of miles to the gallon of gas in the age of OPEC-inspired oil embargoes.

Back to Xerox. Xerox hired MBAs with IQs of 180 or higher, and they spent all of their time and energy arguing about 'cross-elasticities of demand.' Meanwhile, they were content to make crappy copiers ( albeit the first copiers ). But they didn't care about the product or the people or the customers. It was all about the numbers. The numbers, the numbers, the numbers. I was fed up with the numbers.

Search said, It's not all about the numbers. Profits are cool. They give you room to invest in cool stuff. But somebody has to bleed. Somebody has to show some passion. Search, I like to think, put the blood back into business.

Here's an example. One of our interviews early on was with John Young, who was then president of Hewlett-Packard. Today, HP is a $50 billion company in the computer business. Back in 1976, it had just passed the $1 billion mark, and it was mostly making medical devices and measurement equipment. In 1977, $1 billion made HP a serious company.

Remember, I'd done consulting at Xerox, Chase Manhattan Bank, and lots of other big McKinsey clients with lots of big bureaucracy. Bob and I went to HP headquarters, which was then an astonishingly unimposing building on Page Mill Road in Palo Alto. When we arrived at the office, we asked to see John Young. Fine, said the person at the front desk. He's in there. Turn right. No cards to sign, no IDs to wear. Just go in there. We went in, and there was John, sitting in a cubicle that he shared with his secretary. It was all of 10 feet by 10 feet. He was in his shirtsleeves -- which may sound like no big deal in the post-dotcom, T-shirt world of 2001, but in 1977 was a stunning comment on how the place felt and worked. He was preaching MBWA: management by wandering around. It was anthropology, not statistical analysis! I remember thinking, This doesn't look right. It certainly doesn't look normal. After visiting John Young, I went to see Tait Elder at 3M and Rene McPherson at Dana Corp. These were business leaders who were operating from a fundamentally different playbook.

You could boil all of Search down to three words: People. Customers. Action. That was about as far as you could get from the prevailing wisdom of the time, which you could also boil down to three words: Numbers. Bureaucracy. Control. And you could boil all of Search down to one idea: Soft is hard. Up until then, everybody assumed that hard was hard. 'Hard' numbers told you everything that you needed to know about dealing with hard assets, such as factories, machinery, and buildings. But Search said that everything soft is hard. People, customers, and relationships -- they make up all of the soft stuff that determines what really gets accomplished and how well it gets done. It turned out to be a revolutionary message.

How did we get away with it? We got away with it because Bob Waterman and I wore dark McKinsey suits with skinny McKinsey ties and spoke proper McKinsey consulting business-speak. Search is a McKinsey-looking book. It has a black cover with a conservative white typeface. Our message was revolutionary, but our credentials and our look were traditional.

A few years before Search came out, two Harvard Business School professors, Bill Abernathy and Bob Hayes, had written a brilliant article in the Harvard Business Review called 'Managing Our Way to Economic Decline.' It was an attack on the whole HBS view of the world -- and only two HBS professors could have written it and gotten it published in HBR. Only two McKinsey consultants could have launched a wholesale attack on numbers-crunching, bureaucracy-worshipping, strategy-making big American companies and gotten away with it.

( Revolutionaries take note! Charles Darwin said that when species change too quickly, there will be little chance for their survival. But a very few will become the bellwethers -- and redefine the world. )

Here's a confession that will only mean something to the Oakland Raiders football fans of the late 1970s: I owe it all to Mark van Eeghen. ( And if you weren't an Oakland Raiders fan and you never saw Mark van Eeghen play football, all I can say is, that's your tough luck. )

Mark van Eeghen was a big, strong, in-your-face, three-yards-and-a-cloud-of-dust running back for the Raiders. We were about to run around 10,000 copies of our report, and we needed a picture for the cover. We had originally taken a picture right out of Sports Illustrated, but at the last minute, we decided that we couldn't steal from SI at that level. So we went across the bay to the Raiders' office and looked through their archive, and we found the perfect image: a photo featuring Mark van Eeghen.

It was perfect in a lot of ways. The photo said three yards and a cloud of dust, and our book said the same thing: Love thy people. Love thy customers. Keep it simple. Lean staff, simple organization. Get the bureaucrats out of the bloody way. Pay attention to the 'real' people with dirty fingernails. That was the Oakland Raiders. They were the guys flying the Jolly Roger. They were the pirates, the underdogs. Al Davis, their renegade owner, always preached, 'Just win, baby,' and his avowed message was . . . 'Commitment to excellence.'

We got it right when we said that we were in search of excellence. Not competitive advantage. Not economic growth. Not market dominance or strategic differentiation. Not maximized shareholder value. Excellence. It's just as true today. Business isn't some disembodied bloodless enterprise. Profit is fine -- a sign that the customer honors the value of what we do. But 'enterprise' ( a lovely word ) is about heart. About beauty. It's about art. About people throwing themselves on the line. It's about passion and the selfless pursuit of an ideal. It's about John Young sitting in his little cubicle working in his shirtsleeves. It's cool. In Search