牛津大学公开课 | 康德的《纯粹理性批判》（五）：如何获得知识？

康德有多重要？在当代领先的物理学期刊中，有这样一段话：“物理学界过去30年来，怎样继续对物体的认知已变得十分清楚。令人惊奇的是，物理学用以认识物体的方法本质上讲正是康德创建的概念框架。但是大多数物理学家并没有意识到这一点。”

抑或说，当我们开始苦读康德的论证时，我们就会发现，施加于各种情况的独特认知原则可以保持我们对该情况下知识的客观性。即使对于独一无二的人类而言，也是如此。

牛津大学康德《纯粹理性批判》公开课一共8节，以下是第五节的内容，后续的内容将陆续整理出来~

Philosophy of Kant: Critique of Pure Reason

Professor Dan Robinson, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford

讲师：Professor Dan Robinson

牛津大学哲学教授，曾于普林斯顿大学、哥伦比亚大学等著名高校任教，研究领域广泛，包括心理哲学、法律哲学、精神哲学等，曾因对心理学哲学的奠基作用荣获美国心理协会颁发的终身成就奖。

这一集的主题是对唯心主义的驳斥。首先，既然康德决定…这其实是《纯粹理性批判》第二版新增的内容。许多人认为第一版和第二版事实上只是相继出现罢了，然而对唯心主义的驳斥却是新增内容。这不仅是新增内容，而且也是他在第二版的序言中，唯一加以注释的部分。这一点很重要。它是论证的重要部分。

Here the refutation of idealism. I want to begin by saying that since Kant saw…This is the really new contribution in the second edition. Many argue that the first and the second editions are really just tracking each other,but the refutation of idealism is a new edition. It's not only a new edition,but he takes time in a preface to the second edition to provide a gloss on just this section,which is pivotal.So it's a very important part of the argument.

既然他愿意在这上面花时间，我们可否从一开始就认为康德不是唯心主义者？因为二手文献中总是持续地指证他为某种唯心主义。当然他承认自己是先验唯心主义，但是有些学术专著暗示，康德自始至终都是贝克莱主义的，等等。所以如果非说他是唯心主义者，这仿佛又回到他生前。但是他是如何严厉拒绝将自己归类于或描述为此种类别。

Since he takes the time to do this,can we agree at the outset that Kant is not an idealist? Because this is secondary literature that continues to charge him with one or another species of idealism. He certainly owns up to transcendental idealism. But there are learned treatises to the effect that Kant never really stopped being a Berkeleyan, etcetera. So, if he's an idealist,it is as it were,over his dead body. And we'll get to the sternness with which he disabuses himself of attributions of that kind,descriptions of that kind.

康德纯粹理性批判的核心问题，即先天综合判断如何成为可能。如果不存在先天综合判断，那么就会直接引起怀疑论。它的大体内容为，我们能够得到各种感觉直观，所有的事物一起作用于感觉器官，引起我们的感觉进而产生表象。所有的表象，都代表某一事物。这就是我们的接受模式。这就是我们感性的基础。

Kant takes to be the central problem of pure reason,namely,how a priori synthetic judgements are possible at all. If there were not a priori synthetic judgements,the path to skepticism would be direct.It's only in virtue of an argument that works to the effect that we are able to take the manifold of sensuous intuitions,all these things that converge on the organs of sense and produce in us sensations out of which appearances take place. All these come to represent somethins come to represent something. This is our mode of receptivity. This is the basis upon which we have sensibility.

纯粹的直观，对我们来说时间和空间一定先天的。接受外部世界的事件，所以会引起我们的感性。但如果这些感觉直观被适当地加以分割、恰当地归入纯粹范畴下，就不会有知性。所以通过接受能力，我们能够感知事物。但只有通过范畴，我们才能思考事物。是它使得我们可以思考对象。

The pure intuitions,space and time must be there a priori for us to be receptive to events in the external world. So this is going to give rise to sensibility. But until these sensuous intuitions are partitioned properly,subsumed properly under the pure categories, there is not understanding. So by way of receptivity we are able to perceive things,but it's only by way of categories that we are able to think things. It's what renders objects thinkable.

那么如何将这些感官的资源正确地置于范畴之下呢？这就是自发性的作用了。这遵循一系列原则，康德最终只能将它们归类为天资。所以这一问题留给了我们来解答。既然大部分是由我们无法有意识地控制的先天原则来完成的，那么这不会引起怀疑论和主观性吗？

How about deploying these sensuous resources correctly under the categories? This is the task of spontaneity.It is guided by principles that he finally throw up his hands in and refers to generically as 'mother wit'. And so we are left with this problem. Since so much of this is done by way of a priori principles over which we certainly have no conscious control, does this not itself lead to a kind of skepticism and subjectivity?

后康德时代有很多专著，论述了康德第一批判所固有的主观主义。所以如果我们主张，所有认识的元素以及进行的综合，是完全由我们自身产生的，而且我们永远无法走出黑盒子，无法知道事物的真面目，我们又回到了《未来形而上学导论》中的观点，即哲学的尴尬之处在于，它仍然不能建立外部世界的存在。

And the post-Kantian period is littered with treatises on the subjectivism inherent in Kant's first critique. So,suppose we take the position that the elements of cognition and the synthesizing that takes place are entirely of our own making and that we can never get out of the box, we can never know things as they really are.And we're right back to that claim in the prolegomena that the embarrassment of philosophy is, it still can't establish the existence of an external world.

我们可以首先采用笛卡尔著名的怀疑方法。但谈到这一话题，我们马上想到的事实上是洛克。虽然康德直接提到过的是洛克和巴克莱两个人。在其《人类理解论》的第二卷第八章，洛克为我们区分了第一性质和第二性质，我想为大家朗读几段，因为康德熟知洛克的理论，经常引用他的话。这是来自第二卷第八章第八节的一段话：“我们的观念和物质的性质，心灵在其自身内所感觉到的任何东西，或是知觉思维或知性的直接对象都称为观念。在心中产生观念的那种能力，称为主体的性质。前面第七节的一句话，内心的观念只是那些不依赖我们而存在的外物的影像，就像它们的名字也只是我们观念的影像一样，只要一听到就会引起我们的反应。”

Now we can begin this with Descartes famous method of doubt, but Locke is actually the gray imminence behind much of this discussion, though Locke and Berkeley are the figures that Kant points to directly. In book two, chapter eight of Locke's Essay Concerning the Human Understanding，Locke treats us to his distinction  between primary and secondary qualities.I want to read you some passages from that because Kant knew his Locke and cites Locke frequently. This is from book two,chapter eight.We find this in section eight：'Our ideas and the qualities of bodies, whatsoever the mind perceives in itself or is the immediate object of perception,thought,or understanding,that call idea and the power to produce any idea in our mind, I call quality of the subject wherein that power is.' Just previously in seven,'Ideas in the mind are no more the likeness of something existing without us than the names that stand for them are the likeness of our ideas which yet upon hearing they are apt to excite in us.'

所以他力图说明，观念对于外物犹如名字对于物体，例如玻璃是名词、长成这样，你就会明白。第一性质与第二性质的另一区别在于，物体的第一性质无论在什么情形之下都是和物体完全不能分离的，或是无论经历了什么改变，无论加之多大的力量，都是维持不变的。这些是物体发生了千变万化之后仍然保有的属性。“以麦粒为例，”他说，“将之分为两部分，每一部分仍有其…”就在这里出现了第一性质的类别。每一部分仍有哪些性质呢？固体性外延轮廓和可动性。如果再分一次，它仍有这些性质。我将它们称为物体的最初性质或第一性质。我认为我们看到它们时，内心会产生简单的观念。即，对于什么的简单观念？“固体性外延轮廓运动静止和数目。”所以他的年轻朋友牛顿不必担心了。牛顿的信仰者们所探讨的轮廓外延运动等等，都是我们很难直接感受到来的。我们要观察事物，我们要体验它们的本质。

So he is declaring that the ideas have no more likeness to that of which they are ideas,than the names we have for things are than glass as a noun,is like this,you see. Another distinction between primary and secondary qualities 'Qualities thus considered in bodies are first,such as are utterly inseparable from the body' in what state so ever it be,and such as in all the alterations and changes it suffers all the force can be used upon it,it constantly keeps.' These are properties a body keeps under all conditions of alteration. 'Take a grain of wheat,'he says,'divide it into two parts,each part still has...'Here come the primary qualities. What does each part still have? Solidity,extension,figure and mobility，divide it again,it retains still the same qualities. These I call original or primary qualities of body, which I think we may observe to produce simple ideas in us. Namely, the simple ideas of what? 'solidity,extension,figure,motion or rest and number.' So his young friend Newton need not worry. What the Newtonian world talks about which is figure,extension,motion and so forth,those are things to which we have hardly direct access. We see those things,we experience those things as they are.

“物体的第二性质，事实上这些性质并非物体本身所固有的，而是凭借第一性质即其无法感知的微粒部分所具有的的体积、轮廓、质地和运动等，使我们产生各种感觉的能力。”在这种设定下会出现什么？颜色、声音、味道，等等。这些就是第二性质。顺便提一下，当托马斯·里德探究这一问题时，他谈到了洛克的观点、笛卡尔的观点和亚里士多德的观点、巴克莱的观点。每个人的观点，他说，“根据观念论，我们对外界的事物没有直接的接触，唯一的联系是通过某种心理表象，以至于我们有把握的谈论的仅仅是我们自己的观念内容，而非外部世界。”他说。，“在我的哲学研究早期， 我倾向于同意巴克莱这方面的观点，然而一开始就‘误入歧途’。”

导致我后来总是头撞“南墙”。最终我不情愿地得出结论，事实上外部世界中有些物体，与我所看到的几乎是一样的。里德说，“如果洛克和笛卡尔等创造的理论是真的，那么它就同里德理论同脉相承。如果观念论是真的，那么我就捂住嘴当一名怀疑论者。”所以里德拥护直接实在论，反对观念论。同样的康德也感到气愤。如此一来，你就会遇到《纯粹理性批判》最晦涩的部分。当里德感到气愤的时候，你会得到一些精彩的散文——

'Secondary qualities of bodies,such qualities which in truth are nothing in the objects themselves, but the power to produce various sensations in us,by their primary qualities.i.e. by the bulk,figure,texture and motion of their insensible parts their corpuscular parts.' And what comes under this setting? Color,sound,taste,etcetera. These are secondary qualities. By the way, when Thomas Reid looks at this, he refers to Locke's position and Descartes' position and Aristotle's position and Berkeley's position. Everybody's position as quote 'The Idea Theory is a theory according to which we have no contact with the objects in the external world directly.' Reid says,'but only by way of some mode of mental representation,such that the only thing we can talk about with any authority are the contents of our own minds and not the external world.' And Reid says,' Early on in my philosophical career, I tended to side with Berkeley on these matters.' Then,having stepped into a dirty kennel  and banged my head frequently against a signpost.I reluctantly came to the conclusion that there really are objects in the external world very much like what I see them to be. 'Locke and Descartes and company have generated something,'Reid says,'which, if true, is a wonderful Reidian line.If the idea theory is true, I lay my hands across my lips and become a skeptic.' So Reid is going to defend a direct realism against this account. Kant is comparably agitated,then you get the densest parts of the critique of pure reason. And Reid gets agistated,you get some wonderful prose,actually.

康德对传统观念理论有两种形式的怀疑，对笛卡尔的怀疑和对巴克莱的怀疑。他清楚地阐明了这两个方面，他说，“两者的共同之处在于断言外部世界物体的存在，是不能确定的，不能证明的，或是错误的、不可能的。”前者是笛卡尔的有问题的唯心主义，后者是巴克莱的教条的唯心主义。笛卡尔担心，一切可能只是一场梦。他无法确定，感到烦恼。巴克莱宣称，根本不可能有独立于人类心灵的物质世界。

Kant sees two forms of skepticism arising from this tradition.The skepticism espoused by Descartes and that espoused by Berkeley. He identifies each of these clearly,'What both have in common,'says Kant,quote 'is the theory which declares the existence of objects in space outside us to be merely doubtful and indemonstrable or to be false and impossible.' The former is the problematic idealism of Descartes,the latter is the dogmatic idealism of Berkeyley. Descartes worry that the whole damn thing might be a dream state. He is not sure,he frets. And Berkeley of course declares the whole notion of a mind-independent material world as simply,impossible.

当你敲打某一物体时，它会发出声音，它有气味、可见、黄色、正方形。你认为你已经穷尽了所有你认为可感知属性的物理现实，但还是会有遗漏。有些东西没有感官或心灵来感知，未曾被有意识的个体见到过。然而你还是准备了某种认知基础注意的论调说。就算在可想象的浩瀚宇宙中，没有任何心灵去理解这一物体的任何方面。我也不再辩论了，它就是存在。

Something makes a sound when you hit it. It has an odor,is visible,is yellow,is square. You think that if you were to strip what you regard as physical reality of all in principle，sensible properties,there'd be something left over. That is something to which there is no attending sense or mind,something beheld by no consciousness anywhere.And nonetheless you're prepared with a kind of epistemic fundamentalism notwithstanding to the contrary that no mind in the imaginable cosmos,apprehends any aspect of this entity. I declare without more,nonetheless it exists.

你应该为自己感到羞愧，所以巴克莱只是想在《海拉斯和菲洛诺斯的三篇对话》中，费德拉·米诺斯是理性之友，海拉斯是一无所知的唯物主义者。他只是想向他们阐明：看，不用我的论证，地毯、瓶子、电脑、手提箱等等仍会存在。不存在的是完全独立于心灵、独立存在的物质世界。相反，所有真正存在的事物都存在于人的心灵中。

You should be ashamed of yourself,so Berkerley simply wants to in the dialogue between Hylas and Philonous, Phaedra Minos the friend of reason,and Hylas is clueless and a materialist. He simply wants to make clear to that 'Look, don't worry about this ,this argument of mine,there are still carpets and bottles and computers and carrying cases and so forth.What there isn't is a mind independent, a totally mind independently existing material world.' Rather,everything with real existence subsists in some attending mind.

存在就是被感知。所以最高的山峰直到有人看到了它才存在？那么阿波罗计划之前，月球的背面是否存在呢？等等。巴克莱是一名非常有才干的哲学家，光学专家也是世界级的数学家。他能够理解此类问题。“对未能或不可能被有感知力的人类体验的事物的本体论地位是什么”这一常规问题，他的答案是如果某物有本体论地位，那一定是因为它被某一心灵感知到。

Esse,est percipi,to be is to be perceived.So the tallest mountain didn't exist until someone was there to perceive it? How about the back side of the moon before the Apollo program,etcetera? Now Berkeley is a very able philosopher, optic specialist,world-class mathematician. He understands the question of that sort. On the general question 'what is the ontological status of that which no human percipient has experienced or even could experience?' If it is to be granted ontological status, it must be because it is held in some mind.

巴克莱主教说道，“它永远存在于使之产生的心灵之中。” 关于这点很遗憾，这是小小的礼拜日布道还是免费的。他在晚年成为了克罗因的主教。他一直没能当上主教，按他的说法是因为他在与无神论者和唯物主义者作斗争。虽然我相信这也对他有帮助。

And what Bishop Berkeley says, of course,'It is eternally held in the mind that made it.' Sorry about that,that's your little Sunday sermon, no extra charge. He became a bishop fairly late in life, Bishop of Cloyne. And he wasn't made a bishop because he was doing battle with, as he said, atheists and materialists. Though I'm sure it helped.

巴克莱极好地解决了洛克第一性质和第二性质之间的区别。他的理论基础是：所有的体验都直接的。于是他得出结论，独立于心智的物质世界这一概念是不合逻辑的。因而存在就是被感知。这是巴克莱成功的座右铭。

Berkeley famously dissolved the distincion between Locke's primary and secondary qualities on the grounds that all experience is mediated. Accordingly, he reached the conclusion that the notion of a mind independent material world was simply incoherent. Thus, to be is to be perceived and that's the trumphant motto of Berkeley.

巴克莱认为，我们需要一种新型的大学。他来到美国筹资，打算在百慕大建立一所大学。他的第一个孩子就出生在罗德岛。他在那里还有一所房子。

Berkeley decided that what we needed was a new kind of university. He came to America to raise money.He was going to build a college in Bermuda. And his first child was actually born in Rhode Island. And Berkeley had a house there.

笛卡尔在《沉思录》里做出的结论？ 他根据经验得出，他感受到的效果并不受自己控制。在第三个沉思中他说，无论自己是否想要他都会感到热。他从中总结到他的感受和观念来源于自己以外的事物，所以他已经准备好接受这一点。

What Descartes reaches in his Mditations? He knows from experience that the effects he feels are not willed by him. He says in the third mediatation that he will feel heat whether he wants to or not. And he concludes from this that his sensations and ideas come to him from sources other than himself. So he is prepared to accept that much.

然而这来源于自己以外的事物。那么就会马上引起可怕的怀疑论。笛卡尔说，“虽然这些明显的外来观念并不取决于我的意志，但这并不意味着它们一定来源于我以外的事物。也许是我自己还不了解的某种机能产生了这些观念，而无需借助外物的帮助。就是因为这个原因，我总是想，也许在我做梦的时候内心也在产生各种观念。”

But this comes from a source other than himself. But then dread skepticism,promptly sets in as we hear Descartes say, quote, 'Although these apparently adventitous ideas do not depend on my will, it does not follow that they must come from things located outside me.There may be some other faculty not yet fully known to me which produces these ideas without any assistance from external things. This is, after all, just how I have always thought ideas are produced in me when I am dreaming.'

所以也许整个事情都是他的梦。或是恶魔的礼物钝化他的理解力，迷惑他，使他相信所有并非如此的事物。这就是我思的内容。他一直在尝试寻求与恶魔抗争的方式。因为即使受欺骗，即使你赋予恶魔使人产生错觉与幻想的能力。那么去欺骗笛卡尔吧，他一定是个正在思考着的事物，他称自己为延展事物的添加物。这是个正确的推论。我们不能证明它是锚的。毫无疑问他是个正在思考着的事物。如果不是，他就不可能考虑到延展事物存在的可能性。

So he might be dreaming the whole thing.Or they might be the gift of that evil demon,which is going to,which is going to corrupt his understandings and dulude him into believing all sorts of things that are not so. This is what the Cogito is all about. He is trying to find something to counter the evil demons efforts with. Because even to be deceived, even if you grant the evil demon the ability to perpetrate illusory and impose delusional states,etcetera. Just to deceive Descartes,he must be a thinking thing.He declares himself to be an addition to an extended thing which is an inference. Can's prove that wrong. But that is a thinking thing, there is no doubt.Were he not a thinking thing, he couldn't even cogitate the possibility of an extended thing.

我认为笛卡尔并不完全是像里德的评价那样，是一个不相信自己存在的人，与认为自己由玻璃构成的人一样不值得与之辩论。笛卡尔并没有用我思来解决一切问题，因为他并不相信自己的存在。他要达到的不是证明自己存在的本体论目标。而是认识论目标。什么样的知识形式能够击败所有的怀疑？能够击败所有怀疑的一种知识形式是我思。

Descartes didn't set out on the Cogito end of things. I think Reid was not entirely fair to Descartes' saying that a man who disbelieves his own existence is no more fit to be reasoned with than one who thinks he's made of glass, because he disbelieved his own existence. The aim was not an ontological aim of establishing that he existed, but an epistemological aim. What kind of knowledge claim defeats a total skepticism? And one knowledge claim that defeats a total skepticism is the cogito.

现在我们开始探讨休谟。休谟阐明了，面对可知世界人类理性的匮乏。他明确地说，不可能存在先天为真的综合命题。休谟是这样否定这一观点的：“如果一个人被赋予最好的推理与思考能力突然降生到这个世上，他也许能够马上观察到，不断呈现的事物和接连发生的事件，但是他不可能再有更多的发现。他不可能从一开始就通过推理得出事物的因果关系。”

Now, enter Hume. Hume will illustrate the improverishment of reason in relation to the knowledge world. And in so many words make clear that there can't be synthetic propositions known to be true a priori. Hume dismisses the whole thing this way:'Suppose a person,though endowed with the strongest faculties of reason and reflection to be brought on a sudden into this world,he would,indeed,immediately observe a continual succession of objects and one event following another,but he would not able to discover anything farther.He would not,at first, by any reasoning be able to reach the idea of cause and effect.'

因为人类似乎无法通过感官获悉促使大自然运作的能量。这样一个没有更多经验的人，不可能对任何事实都采用推测或推理，不可能确定任何未曾呈现于他的记忆与感官的事物。

since the particular powers, by which all natural operations are performed,never appear to the senses. Such a person,without more experience,could never employ his conjecture or reasoning concerning any matter of fact or be assumed of anything beyond what was immediately present to his memory and his senses.

什么论据能够证明，心灵的知觉一定是由外界事物引起，而非源自心灵本身具有的能量，或其他我们未知的原因？人们普遍认为，许多感知知觉事实上并非源自外界如梦幻疯癫或者其他疾病。感官的知觉是否由外界事物引起，这是个事实问题。然而在这个问题上，经验是而且必须是沉默的。心灵除了感知知觉之外，不会接受到任何事物，不可能得到任何关于感知和事物联系的经验。这些感知和事物的联系。因此对这种联系的假定是没有任何理性根基的。

'By what argument can it be proved that the perceptions of the mind must be caused by external objects and could not arise either from the energy of the mind itself or from some other cause still more unknown to us?' It is acknowledged that in fact many of these perceptions arise not from anything external as in dreams,madness and other diseases. It's a question of fact whether the perceptions of the senses be produced by external objects. But here,experience is and must be entirely silent. The mind has never anything present to it but perceptions and can not possibly reach any experience of their connection with objects. The supposition of such a connection is therefore,without any foundation in reasoning.

休谟非常了不起，当他去法国的时候，他是一名出色的演说者。尤其是法国沙龙的才女们，总是想和休谟聊天。虽然我不太同意休谟某些哲学观点，首先，我俩的侧面很像。这在哲学编年史上都是很罕见的。那些苗条的法国人都练击剑。很难想象休谟会练剑。但是那些苗条的法国人，由于嫉妒休谟所得到的关注，会站在角落里，指着女士们聊天的肥胖的休谟，说道：“话说多了会发胖的。”

Hume is marvelous.When he'd go to France,he was such a wonderful conversationalist.Particularly the brilliant women of the French salons would always want to chat up Hume. Not with standing my disagreement with his philosophy,first,we share a similar profile,relatively rare in the Annals of Philosophy.The svelte Frenchmen,they do all that swordplay.Can't imagine Hume doing anything like that. But the svelte Frenchmen,envious of the attention Hume would be getting would stand in the corner.And they'd point to corpulent Hume,chatting up all the ladies,and they would say,'and the word was made flesh.'

但你知道休谟对我们理性和体验的定位，它们同感知一样不能确定，引起它们的外部世界是否存在，这不是理性的范围，当然也不能通过经验来建立。因为经验就是那些感知。如果康德要对这样的挑战作出回应，那么他会发现自己也转向了某种唯心主义，因为毕竟在感官直觉层面，我们所谈论的是表象，没人能直接达到实体的现实。弄清实在之物在真面目。

But you see the state that Hume leaves our reasoning and our experiences in. They simply can't establish in addition to my perceptions the fact of an external world bringing these about.This is not within the ambit of reasons powers and of course can't be established by experience,because all experience is supplying are just those perceptions.If Kant is going to reply to challenges of this sort,he might find himself moving into a kind of idealism. Because,after all, at the level of the sensuous intuitions,we're talking about representations.,no one has access directly to noumenal reality to things as in themselves they really are.

所以康德明白，自己应当回应人们在第一批判第一版出版后对他的指责。人们认为他的论据本身是一种唯心主义。他说，瞧，有一个术语我能接受。我接受也认为自己适合被称为先验唯心论者。然而他说道：“先验唯心论是指视表象为全部的表征而非自在之物的学说。因而时间与空间只是我们直观的感觉形式，并不是那些被视为自在之物的物体的条件。”所以他再次区分了现象与本体。

So Kant understands that the charges after the first critiques,first edition the charege that his argument is itself a species of idealism has to be dealt with. He says,look,there's a term I do accept. I accept I qualify myself as a transcendental idealist.And he says,'by transcendental idealism, I mean the doctrine that appearances are to be regarded, as being one and all,representations only, not things in themselves. And that time and space are therefore only the sensible forms of our intuition,not the conditions of objects viewed as things in themselves.' So he's again making the distinction between phenomenon and noumenon.

为什么总是筑起这道墙，以免人们会认为我们能够达到自在之物？你们知道这将如何引起无法反驳的怀疑论吗？如果你声称自己意识的内容就是自在之物本身，那么你就将会生活在一个充斥着观点的世界，因为这就是意识的内容。这样真实的外部世界与这个世界的意识表征之间就不会有任何区别，因为在意识里它不会是一种表象，而是自在之物本身。

Now why this wall,constantly being built,lest anyone think we have access to things as in themselves they really are? Do you see how that will lead to an undefeatable skepticism? If you claim that the contents of your consciousness just are things as in themselves they really are，then you live in a world exhausted by ideas,because that's what the contents of consciousness are.So there would be no distinction whatever between an actual external world and the conscious representation of that world,because in consciousness it wouldn't be a representation.It would be things as in themselves they really are.

所以康德意识到一旦你争论到本体现实是可以达到的，那么很讽刺地，你就会引起怀疑。比如巴克莱、休谟和笛卡尔的理论更严重的怀疑。这是我的笔记：如果在本体与现象之间、自在之物与其表象之间不存在区别。那么巴克莱唯心主义可能就会成为最后的结论。

So Kant is aware of the fact that once you argue for access to noumenal reality,ironically you bought into a skepticism that probably is,more severe than even Berkeley's,Hume's and Descartes.This is my note: After all if there were no distinction possible between noumena and phenomena between an entity as in itself it really is and the representation of that entity，it would be Berkeley's idealism that probably would be the last word.

既然外部世界事实上得到了表象，这就引起了一个问题。首先，什么应当替代表象。因为所有的感觉表象都具有时空性，空间和时间都不是一系列的刺激物所赋予的。

Now that the external world is in fact represented rai-does raise a question as to what has to be in place for representations in the first instance.All that is, as all perceptual representations are spatio-temporal and as neither space nor time is given in the array of impinging stimuli.

我们回到先验感性论。我们知道感知本身一定是某种先天的体制。例如感官赋予我们感受能力，以特有的方式以刺激物本身无法传达的方式，将这些感觉组合在一起。时间不属于刺激物空间也不属于刺激物。

We get back to the transcendental aesthetic.So we know that for perception itself it must be a priori framework,such that the organs that grant us sensibility,package the input in a characteristic way,package it in a way that the stimuli themselves can't convey. Time is not the stimulus. Space is not the stimulus.

记住，知识是康德使用的专门术语。要有知识，就必须有感性和知性。所以原则上无法进入经验的事物，也就无法成为知识。他阐明了应该如何理解先验唯心主义中的先验二字。因为它的影响范围不断扩大。这是他的原话：“并不是每一种先天知识都能被成为先验的。而只有那些我们明确地知道表征能够被归类时，才有可能是纯粹的先天。”所以他想让人们将先验理解为保证其他事情发生的能动条件和必要状态。

Now remember,knowledge,in Kant,is technically used. For there to be knowldge, there must be both sensibility and understanding. So what cannot, in principle, enter into experience,cannot in principle be known. He states clearly how his use of transcendental is to be understood with respect to transcendental idealism as it extends its influence. This is a quote all that follows: 'Not every kind of knowledge a priori should he called transcendental,but only that by which we know that and know how certain representations can be employed or are possible purely a priori.' So again,he wants transcendental understood as an enabling condition a necessary state of affairs if something else is to take place.

如果要有经验，首先必须要有什么？必须有感性模式等等。如果要有知性，就必须有某种范畴结构。这样经验的产物才能得到适当的归类与组织。然而如果表象是知觉内容的唯一来源，我们就会欣然接受某种程度的巴克莱唯心主义。

If there is to be experience,necessarily there must be what? There must be a mode of sensibility,etcetera. If there is to be understanding, there must be a categorical framework in which the products of experience are properly deployed and organized. But of course if appearances are the only source of the contents perception, we find ourselves embracing some sort of Berkeleyian idealism.

在《未来形而上学导论》的第二部分，康德确实愿意接受这样的阐释。此处康德听起来很像一名唯心主义者。这里我不是指先验唯心主义者。他称，我们获得对物质自然的知识，是通过对感性的建构来完成的，建构的方式会受到我们不知道的某些物体的影响。这些物体与表象是完全不同的。

In part two of the Prolegomena,Kant does leave himself open to such an interpretation.Here is Kant sounding very much like an idealist and I don't mean a transcendental idealist. He declares that nature in the material sense is known,quote,'by means of the constitution of our sensibility,according to which it is in its own way affected by objects which are themselves unknown to us and totally distinct from the appearances.'

这里听起来有点巴克莱主义了。你现在明白为什么有些人批判他为唯心主义。批判他为某种心理主义，因为这开始听起来像心理主义。虽然它不像认知心理学那么绝对，我认为没有事情是那么绝对的。然而它开始听起来有点像，你知道，认知心理学101，现在我们已经掌握了感觉转化为短期记忆、长期记忆，进入扁桃体生成此类物质。若康德在世，他也许也会忍不住画出类似的原理图。因为他热爱将事物归类。

Well,this begins to sound somewhat Berkeleyian. You can see why his critics will charge him with idealism. And charge him with a kind of psychologist,since this begins to sound. It's not quite as arrogant as cognitive psychology ,I don't think anything is quite that arrogant.But it does begin to sound a bit like,you know,cognitive psychology 101. Now we've got schematic drawing of senses,leading to short-term memory,going to long-term memory,going to the amygdale and generating,that sort of thing. If he were alive today,he might be tempted tp draw things like that,because of his passion for categorizing.

康德对笛卡尔和巴克莱的唯心主义进行了驳斥，并表示先验唯心主义与两者完全不同。这就是对唯心主义进行驳斥的主要任务。这至少可以说是密集的辩论。它导致了大量二手文献的产生。文献数量非常多，甚至都包括我的。我尝试为康德辩护，改变人们认为他的论证存在漏洞的观点。

Kant's got to refute the idealisms of Descartes an Berkeley and show that transcendental idealism has nothing in common with those. And that's the task of the refutation of idealism.It's a dense argument,to say the least.It has given rise to a vast secondary literature. It's so vast that even I've contributed to. I try to save Kant from the charge that there are gaps in his argument.

我最近写了一篇文章，题为《康德对唯心主义天衣无缝地驳斥》，对于自己得出的结论我有多大把握？一点也没有。一个人如何获得知识？核心问题是如何做出最好的解释？康德明白这一点，我们如何解释有时被赋予的知觉的认知表象。同外界事物惊人的一致？或者像我在多个讲座中提到的，我们如何解释登陆月球并返回地球？这不仅是我们对外部世界的猜测，同外部世界的真面目之间的理性关联。这是一次从地球到月球再返回地球的非凡旅程。它以各种运算方程、火箭技术、雷达等为基础，所以可以用类似康德的话说，既然我们做到了，那么登陆月球并返回地球所依据的是什么先决条件、什么先验论证呢？先验的论证是，我们按范畴对感觉进行归类。这些范畴就是纯粹知性概念，它同外部世界表象的有效性之间，必须在根本上、客观上是一致的。如果无法达到一致，取得的成果就会是无法想象的。这意味着我们既然实现了它，那么就一定存在着让我们实现它的事物。然而我们如何在起初就确立外界事物的现实？假使整个太空计划都是某种梦幻，现在仍有人认为，这一切都是由好莱坞制作出来的。事实上没有人真的登陆月球。

I've a recent article, titled 'Kant's Seamless Refutation of Idealism.' How confident am I in the conclusion I've reached? Not a bit. How does one know? The core question is how best to explain? Kant sees this. How do we explain the startling agreement between the perceptual cognitive representations that are granted and the things external to ourselves? Or as I've said a couple of times in these lectures,how do we explain getting to the moon and Back? This is not just some sort of reasonable correlation between guesses we have as to the external world and what the external world maybe is somewhat like. This is an extradinary journey from earth to moon and back,based on calculations and equations, rocketry and radar and so forth. So you might say in quasi-Kantian terms,since we did that,what are the necessary preconditions what's the transcendental argument according to which you can go to the moon and come back? And the transcendental argument is there must be a fundamental and objective agreement between the pure concepts of the understanding as we have subsumed the data of sense under these categories and the validity of our representations of the external world. That match, if it weren't valid, the achievements would be unimaginable. That's saying that we've done it and that something must be there for us to have done it, But how do we establish the reality of things outside ourselves in the first instance? Suppose the whole space program is a kind of dream,there are still people who think that the whole thing was done on a Hollywood sound lot that nobody ever actually did go.

有人是这样想的。康德说，为了建立外部事物的现实，他会使所有的唯心主义倒戈相向，他开始建立自我意识的可能性。笛卡尔和巴克莱的心灵感知，要求意识到外部世界，这就是说只有通过我们之外的事物，只有通过我们主动接近外部世界，我们才能建立意识经验的内心世界。这就是为什么他说要使唯心主义倒戈相向。他说，内感官要求，通过外部事物获得的意识，随着论证的发展，康德说，“一个人能意识到在时间中所决定的自己的存在，你能意识到在时间中所决定的自己的存在。然而所有时间的决定以知觉中的某种永久事物为先决条件。”这里的“决定”由德语bestimmen翻译而来。该词在德语中有很广的延伸意义。可以用它指必然的确切的事物。可以指固定某物安装到合适的位置，使某物更稳固。

There are people who believe things like that. To establish the reality of things outside ourselves,Kant says he will turn idealisms, against themselves，and he sets out to establish that the very possibility of self-awareness.Descartes ' or Berkeley's own inner sense requires an awareness of the external world,that is to say, it is only by way of waht is ausser uns,it is only by way of our access to what is outside ourselves,that we are able to establish that inner life of conscious experience. That's what he means by turning idealisms against themselves. He says that the inner sense requires an awareness by way of outer sense.Now,the argument as it's developed finds Kant saying this:'One is conscious of one's existence as determined in time,you're conscious of your existence as determined in time.But all determination of time presupposes something permanent in perception.' Now, determined here is the translation of the German bestimmen. And bestimmen in German has a very wide extension. It includes, it is used to refer to establishing something is certain or is definite，to set something,to fit something in place.To render something firm,as in Hofich, aber bestimmt.

如果是我，我不会将它译为“决定”。我会说一个人会意识到固定于某一时刻的自我的存在。一个人意识到自我的存在，意识到固定于时间的自我存在，然而这以知觉中的某种永久事物为前提，也就是说，一系列连续的意识状态竟以某种静态事物为前提。与此有关的其他事物随着时间而变化。例如这个瓶子的静态性质、房间的静态性质、整个空间结构的静态性质，以此为背景，有些事物在时间中变化。

Determined probably wouldn't have been the word I would 've chosen. I would say one is conscious of one's existence as set or fixed in time. One is conscious of one's existence of one's existence as fixed in time,but all this presupposes something permanent in perception. That is a parade of successive states of consciousness presupposes something static in relation to which other items are lime varied. It is the stationary nature of this or of the room of the spatial framework against which things vary in time.

所以时间的变化是以一个静态背景或永恒背景为前提的。永恒背景是由空间的纯粹直观提供的。所以没有空间结构，你就不会对事物发生顺序，对意识到事物的发展进程产生内感。永恒不可能存在于有意识的感知体内部，因为感知本身若要以其连续的状态存在，需要外部世界的某种永恒作为背景。只有通过感知自身以外的某个客体，我才意识到一个存续状态的自我，充满着连续内在状态的自我。

So time variation presupposes a static background or a permanent background. That permanent background is provided by the pure intuition of space. So absent the spatial framework, you could not have that sequence of events in inner space which just is the match of conscious events. The permanent can't be within the conscious percipient for that very consciousness,for its own successive states to exist requires something permanent that is external to itself. Only through perception of an objective thing outside myself can I be conscious of an enduring self, possessed of successive inner states.

康德总结道，自我意识需要我们对外部事物具有知觉意识。这与唯心主义的观点是相反的。唯心主义认为，心灵可以直接体验到自己的内部状态和进程。如果唯心主义者认为一个人所有的知识都与心灵的一系列体验有关，那么康德努力确立的观点是，那一系列体验以及有意识的生活，那渴望拥有的一系列内在状态的经验不可能存在，除非有永恒的外部世界构成它的背景。

Kant concludes that self-consciousness requires perceptual awareness of objects external to ourselves. This is the counter to an idealist claim that the mind has direct access only to its own internal states and processes. If what the idealist is claiming is that all of my epistemic claims are tied to the parade of experiences in my own mind,Kant,as he pains to establish that very parade,that very conscious life, that very possessed set of inner state experiences cannot exist,except in so far as there is a permanent external world constituting the background for it.

原则上可能有存在理念化的心灵，但不可能任何人都拥有这样的心灵，因为它会缺少自我意识的必要条件。之所以这样是因为自我意识需要某些条件，凭借这些条件心灵运作才能在时间里得到决定。待我们讲到知觉的统一问题和康德对自我的观点时，你会更明白这一点。

There could,in principle, be an idealized mind,but it could not be anyone's for it would lack the conditions necessary for self-consciousness.And this is so because self-consciousness requires conditions whereby the mind's own operations can be determined in time.You'll see this much more clearly when we get to the question of unity of our perception and Kant on it.

关于这一点康德清楚地表明，“所以我们将灵魂即自我定位为内感的表象，一切都不断涌出，没有什么是永久不变的，除非我们将自我表达为‘我’。”他说：“但这个‘我’只是一个纯理性研究的学科术语，是某种索引。仅仅用于定位不断涌出的表象。”那么他得出什么结论？这是他驳斥唯心主义的部分。他说：“由经验决定的自我存在意识证明了空间上存在外在于我的对象。从我拥有具有意识的内心世界这一事实得知，一定存在一个外部世界来构成一个永恒背景。没有了这一背景就不会有存续的由时间决定的心灵世界。”

Kant is clear on this when he says, 'For in what we entitle soul namely myself as an appearance of inner sense,everything is in continual flux.And there is nothing abiding except if we may so express ourselves,the I.' He says,' But this I is but an intellectualized subject term,something of an indexical,that merely locates the place of the continuing flux.'So what does he conclude? This is the refutation of idealism section,he says,'The mere,but empirically determined consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me.It's from the fact that I have a conscious inner life that there must be an external reality that constitutes the framework of permanence, absent which it could not be the successive time-determined life of the mind.'

然而这里仍然有一点主观主义色彩。只有当我们回到康德对纯粹直观的看法时，这种不需要的主体性才会让位于先天的普遍的必要的事物。他说：“我们应该明白，所谓的先天知识，不是独立于某次经验的知识，而是绝对独立于所有经验的知识。与之相反的是经验知识。它也许只包括后天知识，也就是说只能通过经验获得。然而经验永远不会赋予其判断正确性或严格的普遍性。如果认为某一判断具有严格的普遍性，即不允许任何的例外，那么这就不再是来源于经验，而是绝对的先天真理。”他对唯心主义进行驳斥，来达到必要性和普遍性的高度。这种由时间决定的内部心灵世界，并不是某个人所独有的。它构成了持续的心灵状态的必要条件，因而它是必要的、普遍的，而不是经验的赋予。

But there is still a hint of subjectivism here and it's only when we return to Kant's treatment of the pure intuitions that this unwanted subjectivity gives way to what is a priori,universal and necessary.He says:'We shall understand by a priori knowledge not knowledge independent of this or that experience. Opposed to it is empirical knowledge which is knowledge possible only a posteriori.That is only by way of experience.But experience never confers on its judgements true or strict university. If then a judgement is thought with strict university that is, in such a manner that no exception is allowed as possible then it is not derived from experience but is valid absolutely a priori.' And he takes his argument against idealism to reach that degree of necessity and universality.This time-determined internal life of the mind is not unique to Jack or Jill. These constitute the necessary conditions for there to be successive states of mind as such necessary and universal,therefore not the gift of experience.

康德最后的总结有点唯心主义。这一问题促成了大量的二手文献，在我看来会有更多此类文献。也许以一系列的描述为基础，会有两三百篇论文是论证康德为唯心主义者的。如果说他是一名唯心主义者，就忽略了他明确的反驳。他努力地追溯能够找到的基础，最终发现，引用他的原话:“好一个巴克莱，将人体贬低为纯粹的幻象。”康德同里德一样，绝对不是唯心主义。

So in the end as Kant sums,sort of idealist,this is a question that has spawned a substantial secondary literature, no end in sight.Probably two or three hundred on Kant could be an idealist under a certain set of descriptions, etcetera. If he is an idealist,it's over his own explict objections. He was in pains to trace the rationale that would find as he put it,even quote,'Good Berkeley, degrading bodies to mere illusions' close quote. And Kant,like Reed,would have none of that.

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