【新刊速递】第04期 | World Politics, Vol.71, No.4, 2019
期刊简介
World Politics（《世界政治》）创刊于1948年，是国际著名的政治科学季刊，内容涵盖国际关系和政治学各个领域，由剑桥大学出版社代表普林斯顿国际和区域研究所出版，主编是德博拉·亚沙尔（Deborah J. Yashar）。该刊欢迎具有理论和实证贡献的研究类文章，以及有关国际关系和比较政治问题的评论性文章投稿。2018年该期刊的影响因子为3.368，在国际关系类别的91种期刊中位列第7名，在政治科学类别的176种期刊中位列第15名。
本期编委
编译：刘孝玉 朱文菡 邢 戎
校对：兰星辰 李雯珲 虞敷扬
审核：丁伟航
排版：吴俣
本期目录
1. Can Transitional Justice Improve the Quality of Representation in New Democracies?
转型正义能提高新兴民主国家的代表质量吗？
2. Laws in Conflict: Legacies of War, Gender, and Legal Pluralism in Chechnya
冲突中的法律: 车臣的战争遗产、性别与法律多元化
3. Vote Brokers, Clientelist Appeals, and Voter Turnout: Evidence from Russia and Venezuela
选票掮客、侍从吸引力和选民投票率：来自俄罗斯和委内瑞拉的证据
4. Voting for Victors：Why Violent Actors Win Postwar Elections
胜者胜选：为什么暴力行为者能赢得战后选举？
5. Imperial Rule, The Imposition of Bureaucratic Institutions, and Their Long-term Legacies
帝国统治、强加的官僚体制及其长期遗产
1.
转型正义能提高新兴民主国家的代表质量吗？
【题目】Can Transitional Justice Improve the Quality of Representation in New Democracies?
【作者】Milena Ang, Monika Nalepa
【摘要】转型正义能增强从威权统治中解脱出来的国家的民主代表性吗？作者认为，揭示了与威权政体秘密合作的“除垢政策”(lustration)，可以防止前威权精英向新政权中当选的曾经合作者索取让步政策。在“除垢政策”缺失的情况下，除非政要实施这些精英希望的政策，否则前精英可能会威胁披露有关过去合作的信息。因此，“除垢政策”能够使政要避免敲诈，并对选民做出回应，从而提高代表的质量。作者指出，“除垢政策”能否增强代表性取决于其严重性以及如果揭露了那些政要的秘密，他们会承受多大的痛苦。作者还发现，随着威权精英和政要之间意识形态差距的缩小，敲诈政要的可能性也在增加。他们用来自全球转型正义数据集的原始数据检验了这一理论，这一数据涵盖了自1946年以来向民主转型的84个国家。
Can transitional justice enhance democratic representation in countries recovering from authoritarian rule? The authors argue that lustration, a policy that reveals secret collaboration with the authoritarian regime, can prevent former authoritarian elites from extorting policy concessions from past collaborators who have been elected as politicians in the new regime. Absent lustration, former elites can threaten to reveal information about past collaboration unless the politicians' implement policies these elites desire. In this way, lustration policies enable politicians to avoid blackmail and to be responsive to their constituents, improving the quality of representation. The authors show that whether lustration enhances representation depends on its severity and the extent to which dissidents-turned-politicians would suffer if the skeletons in their closets were revealed. The authors also find that the potential to blackmail politicians increases as the ideological distance between authoritarian elites and politicians decreases. They test this theory with original data from the Global Transitional Justice Dataset, which spans eighty-four countries that transitioned to democracy since 1946.
【编译】刘孝玉
【校对】兰星辰
2.
冲突中的法律:车臣的战争遗产、性别与法律多元化
【题目】Laws in Conflict: Legacies of War, Gender, and Legal Pluralism in Chechnya
【作者】Egor Lazarev
【摘要】冲突遗产如何影响国家和非国家法律制度之间的选择？文章以国家法与伊斯兰教法和习惯法并存的车臣为案例研究了这一问题。作者着重讨论了冲突导致性别等级制度遭到破坏所产生的影响，因为对宗教和习俗规范的主要解释歧视女性。作者发现，车臣的女性比男性更有可能依赖国家法律并且这种法律偏好和行为上的性别差异在受害更多的社区尤其明显。作者由此推断，尽管存在阻力，但冲突也为车臣女性通过国家法律追求自己的利益创造了条件。女性的法律动员引起了试图恢复父权秩序的车臣政府的强烈反对。结论认为，冲突可能导致弱者的法律动员，性别可能成为冲突后国家建构过程中的核心分歧。
How do legacies of conflict affect choices between state and nonstate legal institutions? This article studies this question in Chechnya, where state law coexists with Sharia and customary law. The author focuses on the effect of conflict-induced disruption of gender hierarchies because the dominant interpretations of religious and customary norms are discriminatory against women. The author finds that women in Chechnya are more likely than men to rely on state law and that this gender gap in legal preferences and behavior is especially large in more-victimized communities. The author infers from this finding that the conflict created the conditions for women in Chechnya to pursue their interests through state law—albeit not without resistance. Women’s legal mobilization has generated a backlash from the Chechen government, which has attempted to reinstate a patriarchal order. The author concludes that conflict may induce legal mobilization among the weak and that gender may become a central cleavage during state-building processes in post conflict environments.
【编译】刘孝玉
【校对】兰星辰
3.
选票掮客、侍从吸引力和选民投票率：来自俄罗斯和委内瑞拉的证据
【题目】Vote Brokers, Clientelist Appeals, and Voter Turnout: Evidence from Russia and Venezuela
【作者】Timothy Frye, Ora John Reuter, and David Szakonyi
【摘要】现代侍从交易通常通过中间人进行，如政党活动家、企业雇主、地方势力、传统领袖等。政客们利用这些掮客来动员选民，但我们对其相对效果知之甚少。作者认为，掮客的有效性取决于他们对选民的影响力和监控能力。政党活动家和企业雇主是最常见的两类掮客，作者运用该理论来对比这两类掮客，发现后者在影响力和监控力上都享有许多优势。作者在委内瑞拉和俄罗斯进行了实地调查实验，发现选民对来自雇主的投票要求反应更为强烈。文章解释，这是因为选民担心失业和雇主对其工作场所社交网络的嵌入。这一研究结果揭示了最有利于侍从主义的条件，并强调掮客类型有助于理解侍从主义在某些国家盛行的原因。
Modern clientelist exchange is typically carried out by intermediaries—party activists, employers, local strongmen, traditional leaders, and the like. Politicians use such brokers to mobilize voters, yet little about their relative effectiveness is known. The authors argue that broker effectiveness depends on their leverage over clients and their ability to monitor voters. They apply their theoretical framework to compare two of the most common brokers worldwide, party activists and employers, arguing the latter enjoy numerous advantages along both dimensions. Using survey-based framing experiments in Venezuela and Russia, the authors find voters respond more strongly to turnout appeals from employers than from party activists. To demonstrate mechanisms, the article shows that vulnerability to job loss and embeddedness in workplace social networks make voters more responsive to clientelist mobilization by their bosses. The results shed light on the conditions most conducive to effective clientelism and highlight broker type as important for understanding why clientelism is prevalent in some countries but not others.
【编译】朱文菡
【校对】李雯珲
4.
胜者胜选：为什么暴力行为者能赢得战后选举？
【题目】Voting for Victories：Why Violent Actors Win Postwar Elections
【作者】Sarah Zukerman Daly
【摘要】为什么选民会投票给对平民使用暴力的政治人物？尽管采取暴行，参与战争的政党还是能够赢得战后民主选举。本文运用了1970-2010年全球战后选举的新的跨国数据，以及萨尔瓦多战后选举中的投票、调查、档案和采访数据。研究发现：交战方在战后选举中的胜利是由于冲突末期军事力量的分布，而不是战争中的暴力运用水平以及选举中的威胁作用。军事力量占优的交战方能够做出和平承诺，即被理解为有能力提供安全，从而拥有良好的声誉。这使其拥有“安全筹码”，更能吸引中间选民。军事力量占优的交战方提供安全的行为抵消并美化了过去的暴行，使他们的选举合理化。本文帮助人们认识暴力事件后的政治生活，这有助于理解为安全而进行的选举，也有助于理解人们看似违背直觉的投票行为。
Why do citizens elect political actors who have perpetrated violence against the civilian population? Despite their use of atrocities, political parties with deep roots in the belligerent organizations of the past win postwar democratic elections in countries around the world. This article uses new, cross-national data on postwar elections globally between 1970 and 2010, as well as voting, survey, archival, and interview data from El Salvador. It finds that belligerents’ varied electoral success after wars can be explained not by their wartime levels of violence or use of electoral coercion, but by the distribution of military power at the end of conflict. It argues that militarily stronger belligerents are able to claim credit for peace, which translates into a reputation for competence on the provision of security. This enables them to own the security valence issue, which tends to crosscut cleavages, and to appeal to swing voters. The stronger belligerents’ provision of security serves to offset and justify their use of atrocities, rendering their election rational. This article sheds light on political life after episodes of violence. It also contributes to understanding security voting and offers insights into why people vote in seemingly counterintuitive ways.
【编译】邢戎
【校对】李雯珲
5.
帝国统治、强加的官僚体制及其长期遗产
【题目】Imperial Rule, The Imposition of Bureaucratic Institutions, and Their Long-term Legacies
【作者】Jan P. Vogler
【摘要】该论文考察了世界各个国家和地区在公共官僚体制和效率上的显著差异。这些差异可以部分地解释公共政策落实效果、腐败水平和经济发展的差异。帝国主义统治的遗产是否导致了公共官僚体制的差异？历史上外国统治和殖民主义已经显示出在过去殖民控制区的法律体系、政治机制和贸易方面的长久影响。帝国主义统治的遗产也能解释公共管理表现中的显著差异。作者运用波兰的案例来研究外国统治对官僚体制的长期影响。历史上，波兰曾被三个不同势力统治：普鲁士、奥地利和沙俄，他们的公共管理体制完全不同。对波兰公共管理机构进行的调查原始数据显示，是帝国主义遗产造就了现在公共管理体制在组织和效率上的诸多差异。
Significant variation in the institutions and efficiency of public bureaucracies across countries and regions are observed. These differences could be partially responsible for divergence in the effectiveness of policy implementation, corruption levels, and economic development. Do imperial legacies contribute to the observed variation in the organization of public administrations? Historical foreign rule and colonization have been shown to have lasting effects on legal systems, political institutions, and trade in former controlled territories. Imperial legacies could also explain variations in the performance of public administrations. The author uses the case of Poland to investigate the long-term effects of foreign rule on bureaucratic systems. Historically, Poland was split between three imperial powers with very different public administrations: Prussia, Austria, and Russia. Statistical analyses of original data collected through a survey of more than 650 Polish public administrations suggest that some present-day differences in the organization and efficiency of bureaucracies are due to imperial legacies.
【编译】邢戎
【校对】虞敷扬