政观快递 | American Political Science Review No.1, 2020（下）
期刊简介：《美国政治学评论》（American Political Science Review）是美国政治学会（American Political Science Association）旗下最知名的季刊。自1906年创刊并由剑桥大学出版社出版以来，逐步成为政治学最具权威性的期刊之一。内容涉及政治学理论、美国政治、公共政策、公共管理、比较政治、国际关系等。根据Journal Citation Reports显示，其2018年的影响因子为3.895，在176种政治科学类期刊中位列第7位（7/176）。
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期刊目录
12. 策略性立法补贴：信息游说与政策成本
13. 竞选献金中的种族与代表
14. 地方执法部门有多党派化？来自治安官与移民局合作的证据
15. 对噪音的回溯：政党控制对政策结果的影响
16. 移情关注如何助长政治极化？
17. 离开策略：国会里的职业生涯考虑和“旋转门”机制
策略性立法补贴：
信息游说与政策成本
题目：Strategic Legislative Subsidies: Informational Lobbying and the Cost of Policy
作者：Christopher J. Ellis，俄勒冈大学经济学系教授；Thomas Groll, 哥伦比亚大学国际与公共事务学院学科讲师
摘要：本文分析了立法补贴中固有的策略性考量，并建立了一个关于政策改革成本的信息游说模型。与其他信息游说模型不同的是，本文关注了资源限制对决策者和说客从事游说活动的影响。本文模型允许决策者和说客同时获取信息，并且每个人都可以获得资金或者决策补贴。本文的分析强调了无论立法补贴成为说客的策略性选择还是成为决策者的策略性诱导手段，都取决于环境的影响。这包括了那些影响决策者优先考量的资源约束、政策显著性以及决策者和说客在信息搜集中的专业性知识。本文的分析结果强调了信息游说的五大不同动机，并且证明了对于说客和决策者来说，他们可以从资源限制中获得策略性优势。
We analyze the strategic considerations inherent in legislative subsidies and develop an informational lobbying model with costly policy reforms. In contrast to other models of informational lobbying, we focus on the implications of a policymaker’s and a lobby’s resource constraints for lobbying activities. We allow both a policymaker and a lobby to gather information, and each can either fund or subsidize policymaking. Our analysis highlights that legislative subsidies are both chosen strategically by lobbyists and strategically induced by policymakers, dependent on the circumstances. These involve which resource constraints bind the policymaker’s prior beliefs, the salience of policy, and the policymaker’s and lobby’s expertise in information gathering. Our results highlight five distinct motives for informational lobbying and demonstrate that for both a lobby and policymaker, there can be strategic advantages arising from being resource-constrained.
竞选献金中的种族与代表
题目：Race and Representation in Campaign Finance
作者：Jacob M. Grumbach，华盛顿大学政治学系助理教授；Alexander Sahn,加州大学伯克利分校政治学系博士研究生
摘要：投票率上的种族不平等已经有据可查，但是我们对于竞选献金上的种族不平等知之甚少。利用2700多万捐赠者种族身份的新数据，本文发现了一个缺乏代表性的捐款人群体。黑人和拉丁裔的捐款份额要小于他们的人口、选民和参选人的占比。然而，本文发现少数族群的候选人的存在能够动员同族捐赠。基于断点回归和双重差分设计的结果显示，少数族群候选人的存在增加了少数族群在美国众议院选举的捐赠比例。白人选民对黑人民主党候选人、黑人和拉丁裔的共和党候选人的捐赠会减少，但候选人整体的筹款竞争性并没有变化。尽管本文没有完全排除与候选人种族身份共变的其他替代性机制，但是这一结果说明提名少数族裔候选人可以在不增加筹款成本的情况下提高竞选资金的种族代表性。
Racial inequality in voter turnout is well-documented, but we know less about racial inequality in campaign contributions. Using new data on the racial identities of over 27 million donors, we find an unrepresentative contributor class. Black and Latino shares of contributions are smaller than their shares of the population, electorate, and elected offices. However, we argue that the presence of ethnoracial minority candidates mobilizes coethnic donors. Results from regression discontinuity and difference-in-difference designs suggest that the presence of ethnoracial minority candidates increases the share of minority contributions in US House elections. We find a reduction in white contributions to black Democrats, and to black and Latino Republicans, but little difference in overall fundraising competitiveness. Although we cannot definitively rule out alternative mechanisms that covary with candidate ethnorace, the results suggest that the nomination of minority candidates can increase the ethnoracial representativeness of campaign finance without costs to fundraising.
地方执法部门有多党派化？
来自治安官与移民局合作的证据
题目：How Partisan Is Local Law Enforcement? Evidence from Sheriff Cooperation with Immigration Authorities
作者：Daniel M. Thompson，斯坦福大学政治学系博士研究生
摘要：地方执法部门会基于掌权的党派而有区别地管理吗？作者通过对一个执法经过选举产生，并拥有实际独立自由裁量权的案例——治安官根据联邦要求拘留非法移民——的关注，为此提供了一种解答。利用对包含超过3200次治安官党派选举的新数据集，以及治安官行为的行政数据的断点回归设计，作者发现民主党人和共和党人遵守联邦要求的几率是一样的。这些结果为正在进行的对党派在地方决策中所扮演角色的研究有所贡献，表明（地方）执法官员们即使掌握相当宽泛的权力，不同党派的他们所做出的选择也是相似的。作者还以证据表明，与普通民众相比，不同党派治安官们对移民执法的观点更为相似，这强调了候选人的等级和选择在决定党派分化程度方面的作用。
Is local law enforcement conducted differently based on the party in power? I offer an answer to this question by focusing on a case in which law enforcement is elected and has meaningful independent discretion: sheriff compliance with federal requests to detain unauthorized immigrants. Using a regression discontinuity design in a new dataset of over 3,200 partisan sheriff elections and administrative data on sheriff behavior, I find that Democrats and Republicans comply at nearly the same rate. These results contribute to ongoing research into the role that partisanship plays in local policy making, indicating that law enforcement officers make similar choices across party lines even when they have broad authority. I also present evidence that sheriffs hold more similar immigration enforcement views across party than the general public, highlighting the role of candidate entry and selection in determining the level of partisan polarization.
对噪音的回溯：
政党控制对政策结果的影响
题目：Noisy Retrospection: The Effect of Party Control on Policy Outcomes
作者：Adam M. Dynes, 杨百翰大学政治学系助理教授；Adam M. Dynes，弗吉尼亚大学领导与公共政策学院助理教授
摘要：回溯性投票对民主制至关重要。但是，诸如经济、刑事司法体系、教育等被认为与回溯相关的客观绩效指标，是否是评价政府绩效的有效指标？也就是说，政治联盟是否的确有能力影响选举时间表的回溯中使用的绩效指标？通过双重差分模型和断点回归技术，作者发现选举时间表中（大选后的2-4年）中，由民主党和共和党执政的美国各州在经济、教育、犯罪、家庭、社会、环境和健康方面的表现同样出色。本文表明，选民可能难以真正追究政治联盟的责任，因为客观的绩效指标似乎在很大程度上不受政治联盟的直接控制。
Retrospective voting is vital for democracy. But, are the objective performance metrics widely thought to be relevant for retrospection—such as the performance of the economy, criminal justice system, and schools, to name a few—valid criteria for evaluating government performance? That is, do political coalitions actually have the power to influence the performance metrics used for retrospection on the timeline introduced by elections? Using difference-in-difference and regression discontinuity techniques, we find that US states governed by Democrats and those by Republicans perform equally well on economic, education, crime, family, social, environmental, and health outcomes on the timeline introduced by elections (2–4 years downstream). Our results suggest that voters may struggle to truly hold government coalitions accountable, as objective performance metrics appear to be largely out of the immediate control of political coalitions.
移情关注如何助长政治极化？
题目：How Empathic Concern Fuels Political Polarization
作者：Elizabeth N. Sima，休斯顿大学政治学系副教授；Scott Clifford，休斯顿大学政治学系副教授；Justin H. Kirkland，维吉尼亚大学政治学系副教授。
摘要：在过去的二十年中，党派的社会两极分化现象明显增加，这使得学者们不得不寻找解决党派冲突的方案。群际关系心理学认为移情是降低群体间冲突的关键机制之一，并且有些学者认为移情的缺乏导致了党派极化。然而，移情的影响可能并不如预期。作者认为，在实践中，移情作用是偏向群体内某一派系的，实际上可能会加剧政治极化。首先，作者使用了庞大的全国性样本，证明更高水平的移情关注与更高水平的情感极化相关。其次，作者使用实验设计表明移情关注水平更高的个体在评价争议性政治事件时表现出了更大的党派偏见。总的来说，本文的结果与普遍观点相反，认为更高水平的移情作用实际上加剧了党派极化。
Over the past two decades, there has been a marked increase in partisan social polarization, leaving scholars in search of solutions to partisan conflict. The psychology of intergroup relations identifies empathy as one of the key mechanisms that reduces intergroup conflict, and some have suggested that a lack of empathy has contributed to partisan polarization. Yet, empathy may not always live up to this promise. We argue that, in practice, the experience of empathy is biased toward one’s ingroup and can actually exacerbate political polarization. First, using a large, national sample, we demonstrate that higher levels of dispositional empathic concern are associated with higher levels of affective polarization. Second, using an experimental design, we show that individuals high in empathic concern show greater partisan bias in evaluating contentious political events. Taken together, our results suggest that, contrary to popular views, higher levels of dispositional empathy actually facilitate partisan polarization.
离开策略：
国会里的职业生涯考虑和“旋转门”机制
题目：Exit Strategy: Career Concerns and Revolving Doors in Congress
作者：Michael E. Shepherd, 美国范德堡大学政治学系博士候选人；Hye Young You, 纽约大学政治学系助理教授。
摘要：虽然学界对“旋转门”机制下说客的研究大多集中于他们在离开政府后的职业生涯时期所发挥的影响，但很少注意到他们在政府工作期间对于未来职业的担忧是否会对其行为产生影响。本文认为，“旋转门”机制激励了国会员工通过影响国会的决策来向游说市场展示他们的立法技能。利用关于国会员工的综合数据，本文发现雇用后来成为说客的员工与国会议员更高的立法效率有关，特别是在员工在国会工作的最后任期里。它还与议员增加在卫生和商业领域的法案倡议有关，这些领域是游说行业的客户最常涉及的，并为游说公司提供了更多的机会。本文的研究结果为“旋转门”机制对国会员工离开（政府）之前的影响提供了系统性经验证据。
Although the majority of research on revolving-door lobbyists centers on the influence they exercise during their postgovernment careers, relatively little attention is given to whether future career concerns affect the behaviors of revolving-door lobbyists while they still work in government. We argue that the revolving-door incentivizes congressional staffers to showcase their legislative skills to the lobbying market in ways that affect policymaking in Congress. Using comprehensive data on congressional staffers, we find that employing staffers who later become lobbyists is associated with higher legislative productivity for members of Congress, especially in staffers’ final terms in Congress. It also is associated with increases in a member’s bill sponsorship in the areas of health and commerce, the topics most frequently addressed by clients in the lobbying industry, as well as granting more access to lobbying firms. These results provide the systematic empirical evidence of pre-exit effects of the revolving-door among congressional staff.
编译/校对：施榕、杨端程、康张城、殷昊、赵德昊、吴温泉
编辑：郭静远
【政文观止Poliview】系头条号签约作者
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