牛津大学公开课 | 康德的《纯粹理性批判》（三）：进行传统经验主义批判的三种经验类比
康德有多重要？在当代领先的物理学期刊中，有这样一段话：“物理学界过去30年来，怎样继续对物体的认知已变得十分清楚。令人惊奇的是，物理学用以认识物体的方法本质上讲正是康德创建的概念框架。但是大多数物理学家并没有意识到这一点。”
抑或说，当我们开始苦读康德的论证时，我们就会发现，施加于各种情况的独特认知原则可以保持我们对该情况下知识的客观性。即使对于独一无二的人类而言，也是如此。
牛津大学康德《纯粹理性批判》公开课一共8节，以下是第三节的内容，后续的内容将陆续整理出来~
Philosophy of Kant: Critique of Pure Reason
Professor Dan Robinson, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford
讲师：Professor Dan Robinson
牛津大学哲学教授，曾于普林斯顿大学、哥伦比亚大学等著名高校任教，研究领域广泛，包括心理哲学、法律哲学、精神哲学等，曾因对心理学哲学的奠基作用荣获美国心理协会颁发的终身成就奖。
狗能看见树吗？你们知道，这是一个有趣的问题不是吗？毫无疑问，顺便说一下，就我本人而言，我毫不怀疑狗能看见树。而且事实上，它们的知觉常常会留下记录。
Does a dog see a tree? You know,it's an interesting quesion,isn't it? There's no doubt that it,by the way,just speaking personally,I have no doubt that dogs see trees，and indeed even that they leave a record or their perception behind them very often.
但是看见树并不完全等同于仅仅在看。任何给定的一棵树，是具有特殊性的。但是看见某物体是一棵树，是将特殊性归入一般性范畴。
But to see a tree is quite different from just seeing. Any given tree is a particular but to see something as a tree is to subsume that particular under a general category.
特殊的树有各种各样的，大小形状和颜色。因此为了在“正在看一棵树”里看见一棵树，看来除了要具有感受能力之外，还需要拥有将被感知到的对象归入某些范畴并提出概念的能力。
After all particular trees come in a great variety of size and shapes and colors. And so,in order to see a tree,as in seeing a tree，it seems that what is needed in addition to some capacity for sensation，also a capacity for subsuming sensed objects under categories in such a way as to have a concept.
在本次讲座中，我想要强调康德自己是如何强调，需要将被感知的对象纳入一个概念框架之中。惟其如此才能理解对象。实际上也没有一个经验将会成为由感知与……毫无疑问所有的狗及其他生物能感知到树的存在。看见树的经验所造成的一个重要的区别。
And during the course of this lecture,I want to emphasize how Kant himself emphasizes the need for a perceived object to be incorporated into a conceptual framework absent which there is no understanding of what the object is. There really isn't an experiance either that's going to be an important distinction made between a perception……no question at all that the dogs and lots of other creatures perceive trees.And the experience of seeing a tree.
而康德将证明经验的一个必要的因素，就是在形成“概念”的一般性范畴内认知的小前提。这是康德所认可的诸多问题之一。
And Kant is going to argue that a necessary ingredient experience is just this subsumption of percepts under general categaories forming concepts. Now this is one of the many problems that Kant recognizes.
经验主义至少在其最简单的形式之上，总得应付一些棘手的问题。如果你持有如下观点：形成概念只需要是成为发生于外部世界事件的被动观察者，你首先要搁置如何会有一个外部世界。但是如果你持有如此观点：形成复杂概念需要的是运用一些简单的概念而获得简单的概念所需要的，则是将一定数量的感知联系起来。你采用洛克的方式，康德称之为洛克将这一过程生理学化的企图。
Empiricism at least in its simplest form will always have trouble handling.If you take the position that all that is required to form concepts is to be the passive observer of events taking place in the external world and put on hold how there is an external world to begin with an external world to begin with. But if you take the position that all that's required to form complex ideas is to parley simple ideas and all it takes to get simple ideas is to associate a number of sensations. You take that Lockian,what Kant refers to as Lock's attempt to physiologize the process.
我们并不完全清楚：一种生物会否长寿到足以将红树林中的高达树木和高出地面6英寸的小树苗归入同一范畴。或者是任何孩子都会开始逐渐明白，斑猫和美洲狮都属于猫科。
But it's not entirely clear that a creature would live long enough to be able to put under the same category gigantic trees in a redwood forest and little saplings six inches off the ground. Or that any child would understand---ever come to understand that tabbies and mountain lions are cats.
更加普遍的意义上讲，任何一组特殊事项都可以归入一个概念框架之中。如此一来一个人真正明白他正在看着的对象。而他并非只是看着该对象。所需要的要远远超出这一点。
More generally that any set of particulars can enter into a conceptual framework,such that one actually understands what one is looking at and one is not merely looking at it.More than this is required.
在第一讲中我谈到了大量的刺激。接二连三的物理事件冲击着感觉器官，在其外部我们必须创设某些有序的世界、合法的世界。在其外部我们创设了…用康德的术语来讲…自然本身。设想一下，这个房间里面每个人都有一个不同的单词，如果你能以某种方法将所有的单词填入所有的卡片中，会得到…这么说吧，鲁遒夫饭店的菜单或者诸如此类的什么东西。
In the first lecture I talked about this shower of stimulation, this incessant barrage of physical events impinging on sense organs out of which we have to create some orderly world,some lawful world out of which we create in Kant's terms,nature itself. Imagine everyone in the room had a different word that if somehow you could put all the words on all of the cards together，you would have the,let's say the menu at the Randolph or something.
这些单词何以放到一起的？是如何将这庞杂的感觉以这样的方式拼凑到一起的？毕竟构成这个的庞杂的刺激，是形形色色变化多端的。随着我改变它的方位和方向，它也随之改变。你在侧面观察它会改变，是不断变化的。而且它又许多与众不同的属性。从某种程度上，这些均以正确的方式拼凑到一起。
How did these words get put together? How did we put together this storm of sensations in such a way as to make this? After all, the manifold of stimuli constitute of this is diverse,it's changing.It changes as I change its direction and its orientation. It changes as you look sideways at it.It's constantly changing and it has many different properties. Somehow these have to pull together in the right way.
正如音符必须以正确的方式拼凑在一起而形成一首曲目一样，康德想要证明，经验主义是不会告知这些如何发生的。那么我们现在正在进入问题的实质。他实际上正要试图解释经验主义无法解释的事物。而且他对这一点很满意。这就是说，经验以及我们认知事物并将其归入一个概念性框架中的能力的有序的本质，出乎意料是客观的。
Just as the notes would have to be pulled together in the right way，Kant wants to argue that there's nothing in empiricism that tells us how this happens.So we're getting into the project now , where he's actually going to attempt to explain things that he is satisfied empiricism cannot explain，which is to say,the ordered nature of experience and our capacity to recognize things and place them in a conceptual framework,that surprise,is objective.
好吧，山盟海誓。所以纯批被分为…这是一个不均匀的划分…一个篇幅很长的部分，题目为先验要素论，和一个篇幅相对较短但是却起决定性的部分，即先验方法论。我们将会在以后的讲座中谈到。
Ok,promises.So the critique is divided into,this is quite an uneven division,into a very long secton,which he titles The Transcendental Doctrine of the Elements，and a relatively short,but quite decisive section on the transcendental doctrine of method,which we will get to in later lectures.
正是在该标题下，我们引入纯粹理性的谬误推理，当理性试图超出其适当的任务与能力范围，惹上麻烦的所有方式。
It's under that heading that we lead up,with the paralogisms of pure reason.All of the ways that reason gets in trouble when it tries to range beyond the ambit of its proper mission and its powers.
那么当康德提到先验要素论，他所想到的要素是什么？要素即认识要素。有人可能会说，这样的理智对于事实施加影响的要素。于是这又进一步划分成三个主要部分：先验感性论。康德借此创建感觉本身的必要条件。
Well what elements does Kant have in mind, when he refers to the transcendental doctrine of the elements? The elements are the elements of cognition. One might say the elements that mind,as such,brings to bear on,on reality.And this is further divided in 3 main sections.The Transcendental aesthetic,by which Kant attempts to establish the conditions necessary for sensibility itself.
先天的条件。倘若没有此条件，经验本身是不可能的。也就是说，因为有了视觉经验，其他东西…而不是有关受体细胞…成像色素的视网膜以及微小的视网膜神经细胞末梢形成的视神经…比这更多的东西才是必要的。某些事物必须处于适当的地方，恰逢其时，最终方能达成知觉。那么什么是必须先天的处于其适当位置？
The apriori conditions,absent which experience itself would be impossible，which is to say for there to be a visual experience，something other than a retina,with receptor cells and photo pigments and a little dangling retinal ganglion cell tail forming an optic nerve…Something more than that is necessary. Something must be in place for any of that finally to amount to a perception.And what is it,a priori,that must be in place?
然后是先验分析论。建立知性本身得以存在的、先天的、必然而普遍的条件，以及随后的反思，支配理性资源配置的规则，以此种方式来呈现结果是客观的而非主观的。必要的而非普遍，并非相对的（或者）不确定的，而（应当）有利于怀疑论者。加必多？它很简单，如果你思考一下。
And then the transcendental analytic,which establishes the a priori a necessary and universal conditions for there to be understanding itself. And then reflections on the rules that govern the deployment of our rational resources，in such way as to render the outcome objective and not subjectinve,necessary and universal and not relative (or)iffy and (it should be) conductive to skepticism.Capito? It's all quite simple when you think about it.
现在，康德是希望人们如何理解“先验”一词？首先，这对康德而言，它在某种意义上是一个新词。而他正是很刻意地使用它，来将他理智中的想法与超验区分开来。先验是指那些“超越”经验的东西。
Now,how does Kant want the term 'transcendental' to be understood? First,with Kant it is something of a neologism.And he's using it quite deliberately to distinguish what he has in mind from the transcendent.'The Transcendent' refers to that which transcends experience.
它超出了我们知觉资源的权限。这就是传统理性主义所说的，对于我们来说可以作为认知的非感官模式。康德说，“那是禁区”。我们不那样做，因为我们不能那样做。忘记寻找超验作为知识的要素。
It's beyond the ambit of our perceptual resources.It's what traditonal rationalism says is available to us as non-sensory modes of knowing.Kant says 'That's off limits'.We don't do that because we can't do that. Forget looking for the transcendent as an element of knowledge.
超验可以通过信仰、信念、想象、通过希望、通过掷硬币……来达成。需要我继续举例下去吗？但并非作为知识的要素，因为如果有知识则必然要有感官基础，必然要有一个一切知识基于其上的经验基础。
The transcendent can be reached by faith,by belief,by imagination,by hope,by coin flipping…Need I go on? But not as an element of knowledge, because for there to be knowledge there must be a sensory basis. There must be an experiential basis on which any knowledge claim is based.
因此创建“超越经验领域”，某些事物。而你所创建不管它到底是什么，你所得到的不是知识。所以现在他想要在超验的领域，从认识论角度看是禁区，与他所谓的先验条件之间做个区别。康德告诉我们他对方法论的设想。
So,establish something as 'transcending' the realm of experience, and you have established that whatever it is,you have achieved is not knowledge. So he wants to make a distinction now between this realm of the transcendent which is off-limits,epistemologically and what he refers to as transcendental conditions where he tells us what he has in mind with the Doctrine of Methods.
康德说，“方法论是对于纯粹理性的完整系统的所有形式条件的决定”。所以他将要开发一种（我讨厌这个词）方法论，开发一种 当理性超越其合法领域时、可以被创建的论证和分析模式。
He says 'It's the determination of all formal conditions of a complete system of pure reason'. So he is going to develop a -I hate the word- methodology,he's going to develop a mode of argument and analysis that establishes when reason goes beyond its legitimate grounds,legitimate terrain.
至于先验的，他很有帮助，给我们下了一个定义：“我将先验定义为所有知识，这些知识与其说是关于对象的，不如说是关于认知对象的模式。在此范围内这一认识模式可能会成为先天的。”
With respect to the transcendental,he's helpful again,in giving us a definition：'I entitle transcendental all knowledge which is occupied,not so much with objects,but as with the mode of our knowledge of objects in,so far as this mode of knowledge is to be possible a priori.'
先验意味着诱发性条件,意味着促使某些事物可能发生的条件。所以先验分析，对于我们成就的分析，而成就是创设的。我们看到树之后，问题就来了：“什么必须先验地处在适当位置上，使我们确立树的概念。，使我们能够将一棵特殊的树归入普遍性概念之中？”
Transcendental refers to the enabling conditions,the conditions that render something possible.So transcendental analysis is an analysis of some achievement of ours and the achievement is established. We see trees -and then the question is 'What must be in place a priori and necessarily for us to have the concept of a tree,for us to be able to subsume a particular tree under that general concept?
现在我们将做先验分析。而必要条件是要具备先验条件。所以这个术语意指使某些事物成为可能的条件或力量。
Now that would be a transcendental analysis.And the conditions necessary for that would be transcendental conditions.So the term refers to the conditions or powers that render something possible.
可以使其可能的先天条件，他们不是作为经验的结果而产生，却是经验的必要条件。康德给休谟的扣人心弦的答案，让我们进入到今天的第二个类比。我将多花时间进行探究，如果休谟想要他面前的台球移动，也就是说，如果他想要事件在时间内孤立出来，也理解它们就在那里，他需要调和基于以下事实的主张：没有体验“外在”的感知器官、没有体验运行时间的感知器官。
The apriori conditions that are enabling. They don't come about as a result of experience,but are understood to be necessary for there to be experience.Kant's answer to Hume when we get to today to the second analogy. I'll spend some more time on but if Hume wants balls moving,that is to say that if he then wants events separated in time,and understood to be somewhere out there,he's got to reconcile those claims to the fact that there are no sense organs for 'out there',there is no sense organ for elapsed time.
那么这个时空范围来自何方？而康德先验感知论的观点认为，它来自我们自身。事实上我们参与外部世界的特有模式即是存在于时空的。而这就是先验感性论的主旨，存在一个“外在”的必要的条件。
So where does this spatiotemporal domain come from? And it's going to be Kant's argument in the transcendental aesthetic that it comes from us.That in fact our very mode of engaging the external world is spatiotemporal.And that's what the transcendental aesthectic is all about,the necessary conditions for there to be an 'out there'.
那为什么这必须是先天的呢？而你明白你试图所要达成的目标，你试图采取有正常知觉能力的人的立场，也许在发怒，或许还有着年轻人不耐烦的特性.那位希腊老人关于修辞论的观点是什么呢？“年轻人有着强烈的冲动，他们会任意妄为来满足自己。他们爱太多恨也太多，做任何事情都是有过之而无不及。”
Now,why must this be the case a priori? And you know what you're tempted to do.You're tempted to take a position of the ordinary percipient,and maybe in a huff，or with characteristic youthful impatience.What did that old Greek say when rthetoric? 'Young men have strong passions,which they tend to gratify indiscriminately.They love too much and hate too much,and in all things do things to excess.'
对于年轻的冲动，你们可能会说“看在上帝的份上快摆脱它。”并用手势驳回，一切事物是如何成为“外在”这一形而上学问题。
Well, in that youthful impetuosity,you might be inclined to say 'out there for goodness sake.' And use some sort of hand movement to dismiss the metaphysical question of how anything comes to be 'out there'.
让我们进入笛卡尔的王国稍作停留。假设你会接受这一命题，你可以直接获取的唯一事物是你自己的经验，你自己的意识的内容。那么你究竟如何从你的意识的当中，可以直接获取的事件中得出以下结论：有某些与那些事件相关的外在的事物。这就是感官提示。借此你明白，你意识到的某些事物是“外在的”，而其他事物则不是。这是对康德学派对这一问题作出的解答的回答。你不能这样做。这就是为什么他在一开始就告诉我们，形而上学的窘境之一就是哲学仍然不能创立外部世界的真实性。
Well, enter that Cartesian realm for a moment.Suppose you want to accept the proposition，that the only thing you have direct access to are your own experiences,the contents of your own consciousness.How on earth could you ever reach the conclusion from events to which you have direct access now,in consciousness that there's something out there bringing those events about. That's what would be the sensory cue by which you understood,that some things of which you are conscious are 'out there'，and other things aren't.Here's the answer to the Kantian answer to the question.You couldn't do it.This is why he tells us at the outset,that one of the embarrassments of metaphysics is that philosophy still cannot establish the reality of an external world.
你明白吗？如果你接受，作为一个经验主义者的论点的论据则据此，你的所有的知识都是以感知能力为中介的，以致你所能获取的唯一事物就是你自己意识的内容。那么你何以证明，除了你意识的内容之外，还有某些与那些事件相关的外在的事物。这就是唯我论的观点。
Do you see,if you accept as an argument,an empiricist's thesis according to which all of your knowledge is mediated by sensory perceptual resources,so that the only thing to which you have access are the contents of your own mind.Then how could you ever have a warrant for concluding that in addition to the contents of your own mind.There is an external world bringing them about.How well it solipsism.
而对此有各种不同的反对观点，它们诸如此类。康德对于这种急切的常识观点则显得没有耐心。他说，“噢，看在上帝的份上，我们知道就是这样，让我们继续吧。从未做的一件事就是继续下去。”
And there are various counters to it,they are sort of...Kant was quite impatient with the impatient common-sense alternative.It says 'for goodness sake we just know,Get on with it'.The one thing Kant never does is 'get on with it.'
因此针对经验主义者，康德拒绝了这一理论。无论是我们对外部世界的理解也好，由基本感知构建的也好，还有时间和空间在某种程度上，通过外部事件植入我们的意识当中。均不属于此种情况。他说，根本不是这样。
So against the empiricists,Kant rejects the theory that whatever our understanding of the external world,constructed out of elementary sensations,and that somehow time and space get imported into our consciousness,by way of these external events,can't be the case.He says it just isn't.
所以，我们必须引入一个特殊的时间框架。我们把一个特殊的先验的时间框架，作为感知的适当条件。我们的某种条件，他说，最根本的是可以称为接受能力。我们有一种器官，它至少能够被刺激。它不会走得太远。某种程度上，这一刺激模式必须是前后连贯的。
So, we have to bring a special temporal framework.We carry a special temporal framework a priori,as the in-place conditions of sensibility.We have a capacity,he says,which most fundamentally,can be called the capacity of receptivity.We've got an apparatus that at least is capable of being stimulated.That isn't going to get us very far.Somehow that pattern of sitmulation has to become coherent.
它必须能够打包成一个综合体。而这综合体的外包装即是时空。并非通过经验，而是通过经验的必要先决条件。所以会怎么样？非经验的因而是纯粹的。时间和空间的纯粹直观。究竟为什么我们要将“Anschauen”翻译成直觉给初次接触康德这个德国人的学生们带来长久的烦恼呢？让我从语言学的角度进行解释吧。如果你是一位土生土长的德国人，你与另一位土生土长的德国人谈论一些关于宇宙的问题。你想知道另一位的世界观，他们认为世界怎样？你可能会说，喝到第四杯咖啡，在烟雾弥漫的房间里。
It has to be packaged and the packaging is spatiotemporal.Not by way of experience，but the necessary precondition for experience. Therefore what? Non-empirical,Therefore pure.The pure intuitions of time and space. Why on Earth we chose to translate 'Anschauen intuition' to the eternal frustration of students first encountering Kant the German ？Well,let me now become a philogist. If you're a native German speaker，and you're talking to another native German speaker about some cosmic issue. You want to know that person's world view. How they consider the world? You might say,over the fourth cup of coffee, in a smoke-filled room.“was ich kan in der welt anschauen”.
你的世界观怎样？“Anschauen”是指展示或者观察什么，“Anschauen” 是直觉给初次接触。但是我希望你们明白“Anschauen”，直观是作为一种理解的方式，一种观察外部世界的模式。在古德语中，“Anschauen”的动词是指“观察”。而在“当我注视夜晚的星空”句中，没有人这样说“当我抬头观望繁星点点的夜空”，“高空浪漫大片模糊的象征”。能想象到会有诗人说“当我观察夜空……”那样哲学意味太浓了。
What is your world view? “Anschauen”, which is to show or to observe something. But I would have you understand 'Anschauen' ituition as a mode of apprehension,a mode of beholding the external world.In the older German,'Anschauen' verb is 'to behold'. 'And when I behold upon a night's starr'd face' in German，no one would say 'and when I intuit upon a night's starr'd face','huge cloudy symbols of a high romance'.Can you imagine any poet saying 'and when I intuit upon a night's...'That's too much philosophy.
所以时间和空间的纯粹直观则成为非经验必要的、普遍的框架。伴随着我们对于可感知的世界的每一次观察，我们对于外在的某些事物的每次理解，而实际上空间就是纯粹直观，是康德所说的“外感官”的必要条件。
So the pure intuitions of time and space then become the non empirical necessary,universal framework, that goes with every beholding we have of the sensible world,every apprehension we have of something out there,and in fact space is that pure intuition，that is the necessary condition for,Kant says 'out-of-sense'.
正是基于此，我将自我与外部世界的对象区别开来。根据空间的纯粹直观，可能会有“我你”关系或者“我它”关系。而时间的纯粹直观，是内感官的框架。“我的思维互相接替”，即指他们在时间上是有序的，我的感觉在时间上是有序的。那是我现在可能投射在外部世界的事物。而收获的是什么？连续性。所以现在休谟的台球可以按顺序移动，一个接一个地移动。基于以下事实，时间的纯粹直观从时间上组织我的内在状态，它们在经验上具有连续性。
It is in virtue of it that I can distinguish myself from the objects of the external world.There can be an 'I,thou' relationship,or 'I,it' relationship. And it is the pure intuitions of time,that is the framework for inner sense. 'My thoughts succeed each other'.That is to say they are ordered in time，my feelings are ordered in time. That's something I can now project onto the external world.Thereby gaining what? Succession. So now Hume's billiard balls can move in sequence，first one then the other. They are successive in experience in virtue of the fact,that the pure intuition of time temporally organizes my inner states.
当然，如果有bon-a-fide知识，还需要比这更多的。康德确认了产生知识本身的两种基本能力。我来引述康德 原话——其一是接受表象的能力。
Now of course,much more than this is required,if there is to be bon-a-fide knowledge. Kant identifies two fundamental powers of the mind,from which knowledge itself arises. I quote Kant.'The first is the capacity of receiving representations.'
其二是通过这些表象，认知某个对象的能力。因此这里又有区别，接受能力及与其截然不同的认知能力的区别。如果我们接受了它，就像我说“经验不仅仅是空洞的感觉。当经验与纯粹知性概念，恰当地整合就产生了知识。”这就是说，经验必须恰当地归入正确的范畴。第二种能力，康德称之为自发性。自发能力。这种能力可以自如地运用。它允许构想甚至是不可能的事物，或者扩展超出可能经验范畴的概念。
The second is the power to know an object through these representations.So again there's distincion now between a capacity of receptivity and a quite different capacity for given we were received it,knowing it. As I say 'experience is not merely a bare sensation, knowledge arises when experience and the pure concepts of the understanding are properly merged.' That is to say the experiences have to be subsumed properly under the right categories. This second power is the one Kant dubs spontanetiy. The power of spontaneity.'It is the freedom with which this power operates that permits，conceiving of that which is even impopssible or extending concepts beyond the range of possible experience.'
例如，他关于上帝的概念就是这样的例证。康德这样总结了这一进程。这是一段很值得的引述:“如果每一表象对其他的来说都是完全陌生的孤立的隔绝的，无论如何都不会产生知识。因为知识在本质上是一个整体，其中各种表述进行对比与联系。接受力只有当与自发性相结合的时候，方可使知识成为可能。”所以，这些事物必须以正确的方式拼凑在一起。
For example,the concept of God. Kant summarizes the process this way. This is a worthy quote.'If each representation were completely foreign to every other standing apart and in isolation,no such thing is knowledge whatever arise.For knowledge is essentially a whole in which representations stand compared and connected. Receptivity can make knowlede possible only when combined with spontaneity.' So these things have to be pulled together in the right way.
这种自发性源自何处？如果你听不见回音背后的吱吱声，那个邋遢的苏格兰人的哼哼声。自发性源自天赋智力。康德这样说，Mutterwitz.如果那不是常识的法则，我不知道它是什么天赋智力吗？是所有哲学经典中最棘手的、最晦涩难懂的形而上学著作。在此关键及必要的能力之上，由此通过正确的方式将所有表述拼凑在一起，自发性的力量。其源自天赋智力。
What is the source of this spontaneity? If you don't hear the echo,the back squeak,the mm-hm of that dowdy Scotsmana deptly the source of spontaneity,say Kant is mother wit,'Mutterwitz'. If that isn't a principle of common sense. I don't know what is,Mother wit? This is the most intractable，the most byzantine treatise in metaphysics in the entire philosophical canon. And on this key and necessary power, by which representations are pulled together in just the right way,the power of spontaneity, the source of it is mother wit.
还有什么？来自经验。我上周是在拿皮埃尔·塞尔，对于激进的经验主义者的评论。他认为一系列的正整数，是一个一个被发现的。假设你在除了反复接触的事物没有其他资源的情况下，试图构建一个连贯的、有序的、自然的世界，除了反复接触的事物，形成某些联想结合，你如何将你的初次接触与这样相联系？如果第二次是这样？或者这样？每一个这类事物都会是另一个毫不相关的……我应该用神经学给你们解答，你们不会活得太长久。
What else? Doth from experience. I was kidding with you last week with about Pierre Serre's comment about the radical empiricist,who believes the series of possible integers was discovered one at a time. Suppose you try to construct a coherent ordered, natural world with no resource，other than repeated exposure to things. Repeated exposure to things and the formation of certain associative bonds. First of all how could you associate your first encounter with this，if your second encouner is this? Or this? Every one of these things would be another disconnected...I shall give you the neurological answer, you won't live long enough.
也许在97岁的时候你会说，“这是一只玻璃杯吗？”然后他们会对你说“它易碎吗？”现在康德开始通过他所称之为形而上学的阐述和先验的阐述，对时间和空间先天直观进行辩护。康德对于形而上学的理解，它是各种相互竞争的理论，在其中决一雌雄的竞技场，它是连续不断的辩论，它是“探索与认知”。它生动活泼，有时甚至无法无天，而这就是你为什么最终得到的是科学界的冷漠主义、哲学界的怀疑论。因为这类形而上学的争论永无止境，大奖赛等等，莫不如此。康德就要进行一项形而上学的阐释。确实没有任何时间及空间经验来源。经验主义的映射不起什么作用。这就是形而上学的阐释。这一形而上学的阐释大意是说，你不能由“彼”及“此”。
Maybe at 97 you'll say,'Is it a glass?' And then they'll say to you 'Is it breakable?' Now Kant develops a defense of the intuitive a priori of time and space by way of what he refers to as a metaphysical exposition and a transcendental exposition. Kant's understanding of metaphysics is that it's the arena in which competing theories have it out.It's the incessant argument.It's the 'seek and know'.It's lively and sometimes unruly, and that is why you end up with indifferentism on the part of the scientific community，skepicism on the part of the philosophical community.Because these metaphysical disputes never seem to come to an end,so the prize competition et cetera. Kant is going to engage in a metaphysical exposition. There really aren't any experiential sources for time and space. That the empiricist's project just won't do. So that is the metaphysical exposition. The metaphysical exposition is to the effect that you cannot get here 'from there'.
先验的阐释如同“先验”所包含的，是论证的建设性部分，表明必要的普遍的条件。由此你确实由“此”及“彼”，所以你确实获得了连续性，你确实获得了外在感觉。
The transcendental exposition,as in transcendental，now is the constructive part of the argument,showing the necessary and universal conditions，such that you do get from here to there.So you do get succession,you do get outer sense.
你确实获得了外部世界生动客观表象等等。形而上学阐述与先验阐述的区别。那么，莱布尼茨及理性主义传统呢？毕竟那场碰巧发生在18世纪早期的事实上起到一锤定音作用的辩论，是牛顿-莱布尼茨之间的论战。它通过克拉克与莱布尼茨之间的通信，而为后人所知。
You do get a valid and objective representation of the external world et cetera. The different between metaphysical exposition and transcendental exposition. Now what about Leibnitz and the rationalist tradition? After all the debate that was the show-stopper actually for the luckily the early decades of the 18th century was the Newton-Leibnitz controversy,which shows up in the Clarke-Leibnitz correspondence.
而整个问题的中心在于“空间”。牛顿的理论需要绝对空间，就像是什么？就像所有的物质对象都容纳其中的宇宙的容器。而它就在那里。一切真实的事物均被倾注其中。而莱布尼茨的立场，通过充分理由律表达出来。空间概念作为一个空白的物体，可以将其他物质容纳其中。要求虚无的空间、空荡荡的空间，某种程度上是虚无理性的结果。而这是矛盾的。
And central to that whole issue was 'space'.Newton's theory requiring absolute space as what? As that cosmic container into which all material objects are located. And it's really there into which everything real has been poured. And Leibnitz's position,by way of the law of sufficient reason that the idea of space as an empty thing into which you might pour other things，requires that space as a nothing,space as an empty,somehow comes about as a result of a reason for having nothing.And that's contradictory.
所以这场争论就这样你来我往唇枪舌战，而康德选择站在自然科学一方，因为他在自然科学方面，他将成为信仰牛顿学说的人。但是他也明白，空间问题是个难题。你不能简单地把牛顿的学说拿来就能解决。他需要弄清楚的是，在理性主义传统里面找不到可以推导关于空间起源答案的机制。而他尝试了许多方法但极为聪明的方法之一，与我们今天所称的手性对象有关。
So that debate is going back and forth, and Kant is going to take sides on the science of the thing,because he is going to be Newtonian in his natural science.But he does understand that the issue of space is a problem, and that you cannot get it by having Newton simply put it there. What he does have to make clear is that no device within the rationalist tradition can deduce answers to the question about the source of space.And he does this in a number of ways but one of the very clever ways has to do with what today we call chiral objects.
什么是手性对象？如果你看你镜子中的右手，记住，那是镜像的右手。所有构成这只手的内部关系，全部都保持在镜像中。但是你不能把一只左手手套戴在右手上。不存在一只左手的手套通过扭曲变形，可以正确映射到你的右手上。
What is a chiral object? If you look at your right hand in a mirror,remember now,it's a mirror image.All of the internal relations that constitute this hand are fully preserved in the mirror image.But you cannot put a left glove on your right hand. There is no contortion of a left-handed glove that will map it correctly onto your right hand.
这就称作“手性对象”。有充分的证据表明手性自身的概念。假设你有诸多手段，可以与另一个星系上的生命联络，就说是智能生命吧，这就引出各种各样的问题，不是吗？而这就是你发送给他们的问题，你发送给他们这个信息，在你开发出一些与他们沟通的方法之后，我们现在是在称作地球的地方。我们的心脏在我们身体稍稍偏左边的部分，你们的心脏是在左边吗？你意识到他们没法回答这个问题，你如何确定左还是右？
These are called 'chiral objects'. There's good evidence that the concept of handedness itself.Suppose you had some means of contacting life in another galaxy,let's say intelligent life，which begs all sorts of questions,doesn't it? And here's the question you sent them.You sent them this message,after you have developed some means of communicating with them, we here in a place called Earth have hearts that are slightly displaced to the left. Are your hearts displaced to the left? You realize they have no way of answering that question. How do you get left and right?
按照康德的计划，既然理解的模式在于其自身“空间”，正是基于这样的事实，我们的经验在空间上是有序的，正是基于这样的手段，我们得以构建。我的手掌是否朝上我是否面对北方，我的拇指指向东方等等。
On the Kantian scheme,since the mode of apprehension is itself special,it is in virtue of the fact that our experiences are spatially ordered and that gives us the means by which to let's say establish that if my palm is up and I'm facing North and my thumb is facing east,et cetera.
因为我已经得到了必要的空间的内置建构，但是你们知道，如果宇宙中只有一只手，比如说某些智能生命，一个智能人也没有办法确定，这只手究竟是左手还是右手。这个问题就这样悬着，直到1958年感谢吴博士，在获得诺贝尔物理学奖的过程中，她做了一些精心设计的物理学实验，确立了上帝。你们研究宗教体系，应当了解这个细节。
Because I've already got the necessary special structuring built in. But you realize that in a universe containing only one hand and let's say some intelligent being,there's no way an intelligent being could determine whether that hand was left or right. Now that matter stood that way until think it was 1958,thanks to Doctor Wu,when she in the process of winning a Nobel Prize,did some elaborat experiments in physics,establishing that God-those of you doing theology should know this.
上帝是弱左撇子，这有关宇宙的非对称性。正是在这一年，1958年，我获得学士学位，一个终生的左撇子在一个右撇子的世界里奋斗。当我发现上帝至少是微弱的左撇子，我说是的。康德实际上是首批使用这个器官的失协性，偏手性的概念。而这样做将这一命题再进一步。如果不是空间的纯粹直观，我们甚至无法理解诸如此类的事情，没有理性演绎这一要点提醒所有人，请遵循这一方法。
God is weakly left-handed,as regards the asymmetry of the cosmos. 1958 was the year I earned my bachelor's degree, a life-long left-hander,doing battle with a right-handed world. When I discovered that God was at least weakly left-handed I said 'yes'. Kant is among the first actually to employ this concept of incongruity of parts-chirality. And to do so, in further of this proposition that absent the pure intuition of space，we couldn't even make sense of things like that. The point being no rational deductive procedure would tell anyone,follow this please.
如果你给莱布尼茨者的只是这只手，莱布尼茨者需要通过诸如理性分析、充分理由律、矛盾律，弄清楚你不能在这只手上戴上左手套，或者这只手的镜像只不过构成某种不一致。
If all you gave the Leibnitzian was this hand and the Leibnitzian was required by way of some sort of rational analysis，principal of sufficient reason,law of contradiction to know that you can't put left-hand glove on this hand or that the mirror image of this hand nonetheless constitutes an incongruity of some sort.
理性能力范畴内没有什么能让你那样去做。所以经验主义者根本不会认为它具有重要性,理性主义者很可能会跑上大街，像爱德华·蒙克在其作品《尖叫》中所表现的那样。
There isn't anything with the ambit of reason's powers that would get you to do that.So the empiricist can't count for it at all.The rationalist might very well just go running down the street like Edvard Munch's Scream.
现在先验阐释旨在说明，空间不仅是纯粹直观，而是它必须是这样而作为例证，他选择了几何学。“一门综合地然而也是先天的决定空间属性的科学。”他在简介中这样写道，他是这样赞美泰利斯。他说或者无论是谁说的，但是传统上就我们所了解的认为，他首先构建了等腰三角形，就拿毕达哥拉斯定理来说吧，你不会是真心认为毕达哥拉斯会跑来跑去地计算直角三角形吧。
Now the transcendental exposition is designed to show,not only that space is a pure intuition,but that it must be.And for his principle example,he chooses geometry. 'A science which determines the properties of space synthetically,and yet,a priori'. He has this in his introduction,he has this praise of Thales.He says,or whoever it was,but tradition gives us Thales as the first we know about him,who constructed the isosceles triangle. Take the Pythagorean Theorem. You don't honestly think that Pythagoras ran around measuring right angle triangles.
而最终开心地得出结论，你正好可以利用这样一个公式a2+b2=c2。即使你足够幸运首次得出一个直角三角形，即三个边分别为3、4、5的直角三角形。对于纯粹的数学来说，这种情形是非寻常的。我们所知道的几何学都是数学家们所构建的。泰利斯构建了一个等腰三角形，推演出公理和定理，使几何学成为一门科学，并在事实上将其映射到客观世界当中。他们能这样做是因为拥有的空间表象能力。不是他们走出外部世界，发现了欧几里德几何学，而是他们本身特殊的表象方式是并且必然是欧几里德几何学。这才是它们用于构建几何学的，那就有了最终的结果。一些与客观世界相符的事物，被科学所理解的世界。
And came to the happy conclusion that there a formula,that you could use that turned out to be a version of a2+b2=c2.Even if you were lucky enough with the first right-angled triangle that be a 3,4,5 tight angled triangle. The sheer math of doing it for triangles that are odd,would be beyong his resources.The geometry we have is something mathematicians constructed. Thales makes an isosceles triangle. He develops geometrizes will develop the axioms and theorems that provides a science of geometry which then,in fact,can be mapped onto the objective world. The way they do this is by having the capacity for special representations, it's not something about the external world that they go out and discover is Euclidian. It's that their own special mode of representation is itself and of necessarily Euclidian，and that's what they bring to bear in the construction of the science of geometry and that's what turns out to be. Something that lines up with the objective world,the world as understood by science.
所以，这些论点的得出，不仅源自对于时间与空间纯粹直观的支持，也源自它们的必要性以及实际上它们与客观世界相匹配的能力。因为我们对客观世界的参与，借助这些资源成为可能。这就是我们引入场景中的东西。
So these arguments are produced in support of not only the fact of the pure intuitions of time and space, but their necessity,and, in fact their ability to match up with the objective world. Because our engagement of the objective world becomes possible by virtue of these very resources.It's what we bring to the situation.
所以毫无疑问，当我们在我们的知识库中，恢复我们的感性与认识资源。而最终，有三种经验类比，对于康德的传统经验主义批判是至关重要的。他说“一个经验类比将会因此而仅仅成为一个规则。据此，规则经验的统一产生于知觉而非知觉本身。”这些将成为规则。就是这些规则决定了知觉的结果。如何上升到经验的水平？而其决定方式不是主观的，也不是相对的，而是由规则自身的绝对属性决定的必要性。
So no surprise when we recover,when we recover our own aesthetic and cognitive resources in our knowledge base. Now finally there are three analogies of experience that are central to Kant's critique of traditional empiricism. He says 'an analogy of experience will therefore be only a rule in accordance with which unity of experience is to arise from perceptions and not as perception itself.' These are going to be rules. These are rules that determine how perceptual outcomes. Actually rise to the level of experience in a manner that is not subjective,not relative,but necessitated by the very absolute nature of the rules themselves.
我认为康德选择“类比”可能是受洛克启发。你可能会查阅《洛克论文集》，洛克这样说：“关于自然的作品，大部分的运作方式，尽管我们其中看到感觉的影响，但是其原因尚未知晓。而我们并非以它们所产生的方式方法来感知。唯一有助于我们的就是这些事件的类比。正是仅仅从这些类比当中，我们推导出我们关于盖然性的理据。”
I think Kant chooses the term 'analogy perhaps after Locke',you might want to consult Locke's essay, Locke says:' Concerning the manner of operation in most parts of the works of nature,where in though we see the sensible effects yet their causes are unknown and we perceive,not the ways and manner how they are produced.Analogy in these matters is the only help we have.And it is from these analogies alone that we draw all our grounds of probality.'
所以例如牛顿的世界，就观察的水平而言，通过一种叫做引力的其本身，不可观察的东西变成可以解释的。但是以这一通过推拉产生的力的概念，类推我们知道的事情，并且作为确实事物原因的方式，但我们并不能看见原因本身。注意，牛顿从未如此声称。他曾经声称过并纠正自己，称地心引力是事物的原因。他说万有引力定律是原因运作的规律。
So,for example,the Newtonian world at the level of observation, becomes explicable by way of something called a gravitational force that itself is not observable. But that idea of a force as something that pushes and pulls is analogizing to things we do know about and as a way of establishing the cause of things where we cannot see the cause itself. Mind you, Newton never claimed. Well, he claimed once,and corrected himself that gravity was the cause of things. He said that the gravitation laws are the rules by which the cause operates.
我们不能进入到原因当中，为什么一切事物放手之后会向下坠落？他说我们是无法解释的。康德就以这种方式建立类比。第一个类比就是“在表象的所有变化中，物质是永恒的。它的量在本质上既未增加也没减少。”
We do not have access to the cause, why anything released goes down is something he says we can't explain. Kant sets up the analogies this way. The first analogy is that 'in all change of apprearances,substance is permanent. Its quantum in nature is neither increased nor diminished.'
现在你明白，没有这个，就没有方法来确定“某物”发生改变。我们所能得出的结论就是它消失了并被不同的物质所取代。所以康德第一个经验类比是，我们经历某些作为物质的实体，在其中我们认知其中的改变，在某个自身永恒不变的事物上发生的改变。与在不同事物中彻底的变化相对立。一次彻底的蜕变。
Now you understand that absent that，there would be no means by which to establish that a 'something' is undergoing alteration. All we would conclude is that it disappeared and is replaced by a different thing. So the first analogy of experience is that we experience certain entities as substances in that we recognize alterations in them as alterations in something that is itself permanent，versus an utter change in things. An utter matamorphosis.
第二个类比是回答休谟的关键部分。每一个新出现的事物，都假设存在某个先于它的事物，而前者遵照规则跟随后者来，或者如同康德在第二版中所表述的，引述“所有的改变都是按照因果关系律发生的。”
The second analogy,which is a key part of the answer to Hume. Everything that happens, that is begins to be presupposes something upon which it follows according to be the rule. Or as Kant expressed it in the second edition，quote'all alterations take place in accordance with the law of connecetion of cause and effect.'
休谟的因果关系理论是什么？他对因果律是如何阐述的？恒常连接。引述“每当两个事件在经验中持续地依次出现，根据理智的习惯，一个事件被认为是另一个的原因。”雷德对此兴高采烈，接下来引用雷德的原文：“在人类的经验中，没有哪两个事件像白昼与黑夜一样持续地依次出现。然而多年来没有人会认为，白昼是黑夜的原因，或者黑夜是白昼的原因。”
What is Hume's theory of the causality? What is his account of the concept of causality? Constant conjunction. Quote 'whenever two events are constantly conjoined in experience,it is in virtue of the habit of the mind that one comes to be regarded as the cause of the other.' Reid had a field day with that one, this is a quote from Reid: 'no two events have been as constantly conjoined in human experience as day and night. And yet no man come of years regards day as the cause of night, or night the cause of day.'
换句话说，一个人不必一直朝杰克射击，然后得出结论说，确实是你造成了他的死亡。通常一枪就够了。这只是证明，有个基本原则，你在学校学到的是相关的东西，并不意味着因果关系。所以恒常连结只是忽略了，我们因果归因的本质特征。并非A与B同时发生，而是已知A，你必定得到B。
Put another way, one does not have to keep shooting Jack before reaching the conclusion that you indeed are the cause of his dying. Generally one shot will do. It just turns out that there is a fundamental. You learned in school that correlation does not imply causality. So constant conjunction simply misses the essential feature of our causal attributions.Not that A and B happen together,but that given A,you must get B.
必要的关系并非是康德想要证明的，在某些方面上，从经验出发是可观察到的，是经验的本质使得规则指导我们感知，在时间上相连接的事件。它是一种本性。因为如果你不具备这个，真的就没有建立因果关系的理由。
Now that necessary relation is not something that Kant wants to argue is in some way Empirically observable. It is in the nature of experience that that rule guides our perception of temporally associated events. It is a feature. Because if you didn't have that there really would be no grounds on which to establish causality.
所以第三个类比主张，引述原文“一切物质只要能被看做在空间上是共存，那么它们就是完全的相互作用。”康德对此证明如下：“我可以先看看月亮再看看地球”，或者相反，“先看看地球再看看月亮。知觉可以这样彼此相互跟随，正是在此基础上，他们是共存的。此类共存即同一时间，多种存在归于一处。”
So the third analogy asserts that quote 'all substances, in so far as they can be perceived to coexist in space are in thoroughgoing reciprocity.' Kant's proof of this is as follows:'I can look first at the Moon,and then the Earth' ，Or conversely 'first at the Earth,then the Moon.Perception can thus follow each other reciprocally. It's on this basis they are said to be coexisted. Such coexistence is the existence of the manifold at one in the same time.'
现在除非你有它作为经验的先天模式，没有可以区分因果的顺序，与仅仅是同时共存的顺序的办法，我得说，我要看看窗外，现在我要看看你。然后我得出结论：我向窗外看产生了你。除非有一个先天的手段，借此建立共存来反对因果合法的关系，这又是一个先验的论证。
Now,unless you had that as an apriori mode of experience, there'd be no way of distinguishing between sequences, that are causal and sequences that are merely coexistent,I'll go and looke out the window,now I'm going to look at you.And I'd reach the conclusion that my looking out the window causes you. Unless there were an a apriori means by which to establish coexistences, over and against causal,lawful relationships, then, again, is a transcendental argument.
你建立了X是如此的必要条件，已经假定X是这样，那么什么是如此的必要条件？康德《未来形而上学导论》中的言论，康德将全部工作都与他所认为的大卫·休谟的问题相联系。康德说，“对于休谟而言，问题不在于原因的概念是否正确、是否有用，甚至于对于我们对自然的认知是否不可或缺，对此休谟从来不曾怀疑过，而在于概念是否能够被先天的理性所思考以及由此而来的是否拥有一个独立于所有经验之外的内在真实性。”
You establish the conditions necessary for X to be the case, already having granted that X is the case,so what's necessary for it to be the case? Kant makes in the Prolegomena : Kant ties his entire project to what he takes to be David Hume's problem.Kant says,' For Hume,the question was not whether the concept of cause was right,useful, and even indispensable for our knowledge of nature,for this Hume had never doubted, but whether that concept could be thought by reason a priori and consequently whether it possessed an inner truth,independent of all experience.'
现在我认为会有严肃的休谟学者对此主张提出质疑，认为实际上休谟对于有原因并不怀疑。我的观点是，休谟对于存在原因并非完全怀疑，他也没有试图提供关于因果关系的解释。我认为休谟很显然是试图想说明因果关系的概念，而他是通过心智联想体系来说明这一概念的。
Now I think there's serious Hume scholarship that might contest the claim that Hume actually was not skeptical about there being causes. For what little it's with my view is that Hume was not at all skeptical about there being causes，nor was he trying to provide an account of causality. I believe Hume,quite clearly was attempting to account for the concept of causality. And he accounts for that concept by way of a kind of mental associative scheming.
康德说，使休谟放弃争论的是，不能用纯粹理性分析，来建立因果的合法性。第二个类比是对休谟那个问题的回答。“只有通过表象及知觉的必要联系，经验才能可能。没有知觉的必要联系，经验是根本不可能的。因此，在某种程度上，经验主义将知识限制在经验范围，它只有通过接受经验，自身的基础才可以做到。”这也是康德在第二个类比中所提到的理由。
Kant is saying that what Hume threw his hands up over was the inability of the purely rational analysis to establish the causal lawfulness. The second analogy is an answer to that question of Hume's.'Experience is possible only through the representation and the necessary connection of perceptions. Absent the necessary connection among perceptions,the experience is simply not possible. Thus to the extent that empiricism would restrict knowledge to experience,it can succeed only by accepting the very grounding of experience itself.' Which is the grounding Kant provides in the second analogy.
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