【新刊速递】《国际事务》(IA), Vol.97, No.5, September 2021

期刊简介

《国际事务》(International Affairs)是国际关系领域的一流学术期刊，也是多学科综合性学术期刊。本刊于1992年由伦敦皇家国际事务研究所查塔姆学院(Chatham House)创立，内容来源广泛，力图囊括业内专家、学术新秀对重点、热点问题的最新思考。2020年期刊影响因子为7.910，在95个国际关系类刊物中位列第1名。

本期目录

1、全球化、去全球化与自由主义国际秩序

Globalization, deglobalization and the liberal international order

2、全球化、去全球化与大国政治

Globalization, deglobalization and Great Power politics

3、挑战自由秩序：作为修正主义力量的美国霸权

Challenging the liberal order: the US hegemon as a revisionist power

4、非洲和中国将如何打造自由国际秩序之外的联合国维和行动

How Africa and China may shape UN peacekeeping beyond the liberal international order

5、以“自己的自由主义形象塑造世界”如何使西方不再自由？

How 'making the world in its own liberal image’ made the West less liberal

6、新兴中等国家和自由国际秩序

Emerging middle powers and the liberal international order

7、两个新兴的国际秩序？中国和美国

Two emerging international orders? China and the United States

8、全球化、去全球化与人类安全——以缅甸为例

Globalization, deglobalization and human security: the case of Myanmar

9、全球卫生：一个努力跟上全球化步伐的秩序

Global health: an order struggling to keep up with globalization

10、能力转移时代的自由主义国际贸易秩序

The liberal international trading order (LITO) in an era of shifting capabilities

全球化、去全球化与自由主义国际秩序

题目：Globalization, deglobalization and the liberal international order

作者：Markus Kornprobst，奥地利维也纳外交学院(Diplomatische Akademie Wien)国际关系教授，国际关系系主任；T. V. Paul，加拿大麦吉尔大学(McGill University)詹姆斯·麦吉尔国际关系教授，曾任国际研究学会(International Studies Association)主席。

摘要：几十年来，全球化与自由主义国际秩序共同演化。然而，近来，去全球化势力不断抬头，自由主义国际秩序陷入困境。本次特刊去“全球化？自由主义国际秩序的未来”分别考察了全球化与去全球化进程的相互联系与自由主义国际秩序的演进轨迹。本文的导言部分为全文提供了一个概念性框架。文章讨论了全球化与去全球化的进程，比较了二者在过去与现在如何与自由主义国际秩序交织在一起，并探讨二者差异将如何影响世界政治的未来。本次特刊做出了以下三个重要贡献：首先，本刊系统地考察了全球化与去全球化的进程。第二，本刊在有关未来国际秩序方面的研究开辟了新的领域。第三，本刊对划时代的变革提出了新的见解。

For decades, globalization and the liberal international order evolved side by side. Recently, however, deglobalizing forces have been on the rise and the liberal international order has come to be increasingly beleaguered. The special issue 'Deglobalization? The future of the liberal international order’ examines the interconnectedness of globalization and deglobalization processes on the one hand and the trajectory of the liberal international order on the other. This introduction provides a conceptual frame for the articles to follow. It discusses globalization and deglobalization processes, compares how they have been intertwined with the liberal international order in the past and presently, and explores how these differences are likely to affect the future of world politics. The special issue makes three important contributions. First, we examine globalization and deglobalization processes systematically. Second, we break new ground in studying the future of international order. Third, we generate novel insights into epochal change.

全球化、去全球化与大国政治

题目：Globalization, deglobalization and Great Power politics

作者：Norrin M Ripsman，美国里海大学(Lehigh University)国际关系系门罗·拉斯邦杰出教授(Monroe J. Rathbone Distinguished Professor)，宾夕法尼亚大学(University of Pennsylvania)博士。

摘要：商业自由主义认为尽管全球化有利于大国合作（或至少适度的大国竞争），但是去全球化可能会引发大国之间更激烈的竞争。然而，实际情况要复杂很多。首先，1990年代和2000年代的激烈全球化并不是缓和大国紧张局势的原因。相反，它本身就是冷战结束后安全局势的产物。此外，虽然全球化确实有助于加强美国与崛起挑战者之间的合作，例如试图利用全球化的经济收益加速其崛起的中国，但它也造成或加剧了导致大国之间加剧紧张关系的“断层线”。最后，虽然我们正在目睹美国与中俄之间日益加剧的紧张局势，但去全球化似乎并不是主要原因。因此，地缘经济条件并不会促成安全关系；相反，被大国政治影响的地缘经济环境可能会影响大国竞争的性质及强度的中介因素，但并不能起决定作用。

Commercial liberalism would suggest that whereas globalization was conducive to great power cooperation—or at least moderated competition—deglobalization is likely to ignite greater competition amongst the Great Powers. In reality, however, the picture is much more complex. To begin with, the intense globalization of the 1990s and 2000s is not responsible for moderating Great Power tensions; instead, it is itself a product of the security situation resulting from the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, while globalization did serve to reinforce cooperation between the United States and rising challengers, such as China, which sought to harness the economic gains of globalization to accelerate their rise, it also created or intensified fault-lines that have led to heightening tensions between the Great Powers. Finally, while we are currently witnessing increasing tensions between the US and both China and Russia, deglobalization does not appear to be the primary cause. Thus, geoeconomic conditions do not drive security relations; instead, the geoeconomic environment, which is itself influenced by Great Power politics, is better understood as a medium of Great Power competition, which may affect the character of Great Power competition and its intensity, but does not determine it.

挑战自由秩序：作为修正主义力量的美国霸权

题目：Challenging the liberal order: the US hegemon as a revisionist power

作者：Steve Chan（陈思德），美国科罗拉多大学博尔德分校(the University of Colorado Boulder)教授。

摘要：现有国际关系话语总是将国际秩序和国家间的权力分配混为一谈，许多研究既未澄清国际秩序的概念，也不能提供系统的实证分析来比较国家在该秩序中的行为。普遍的趋势反而是依靠修辞上的断言或玩弄定义，将修正主义和维持现状的动机归于不同国家。例如，权力转移理论声称，崛起国是典型的修正主义国家，而守成国家则致力于维持现状。本文提出了一个相反的观点，即认为主导国家或守成国家可以是一个修正主义者，它并不是永远投身于国际秩序的规则和机制，哪怕它在其培育过程中起到了决定作用。而一个崛起中的国家也并非不可避免地要挑战这一使其得以崛起的秩序。因此，修正主义并不是崛起国家所独有的；此外，它也不像当前文献中所描述的那样，注定要成为国际秩序的挑战者和体系战争的煽动者。我在中国和美国最近的行为背景下提出了这些主张，并认为随着时间的推移，中国的修正主义性质将表现得越来越弱（哪怕它的力量在不断增加），美国却会变得越发具有修正主义的特征，特别是在特朗普政府任期内。挑战自由国际秩序的主要动力更多来自西方国家的内部，而不是中国。

Current discourse on International Relations conflates international order and the interstate distribution of power. Many studies fail to clarify the concept of international order or to provide systematic empirical analysis that compares states' conduct in relation to this order. The prevailing tendency relies instead on rhetorical assertion or definitional fiat to attribute revisionist and status-quo motivations to different countries. For example, power-transition theory claims that rising states are typically revisionist, whereas established states are committed to the status quo. This article presents a contrarian view, arguing that the dominant or established state can be a revisionist. This state is not forever committed to those rules and institutions of international order that it has played a decisive role in fostering. Conversely, a rising state is not inevitably bent on challenging the order that has enabled its ascendance. Revisionism is thus not unique to a rising power; moreover, this state is not destined to be a challenger to international order and an instigator of systemic war as typically depicted in the current literature. I advance these propositions in the context of recent conduct by China and the US, suggesting that whereas China has become less revisionist over time (even while its power has increased), the US has become more so especially during the Trump administration. The major impetus challenging the liberal international order has come more from domestic sources in the West than from China.

非洲和中国将如何打造自由国际秩序之外的联合国维和行动

题目：How Africa and China may shape UN peacekeeping beyond the liberal international order

作者：Katharina P Coleman, 英属哥伦比亚大学(University of British Columbia)副教授；Brian L Job，英属哥伦比亚大学教授。

摘要：后冷战时代的自由国际秩序以全球化、自由规范和西方主导为特征，联合国维和行动是其中的标志性活动。西方国家对维和行动的支持却在减少，使这一机制日益受到挑战。但是，只有当一个强大的国家集团凝聚在联合国维和行动的替代模式之下，国际秩序才有可能发生重大改变。本文强调，非洲国家和中国完全有能力在这样的国家集团中发挥关键作用。非洲国家是联合国特派团的主要东道国，并提供了近半的联合国武装维和人员；它们支持联合国维和行动的全球化，但相对没那么支持最具自由主义特征的和平建设原则，并倡导要由非洲自身主导大陆危机的解决。中国的影响力体现在其五常地位、对联合国维和行动的财政和人员贡献以及与区域行为体（特别是在非洲）的接触上。中国期待全球领导权和“世界新秩序”，赞成全球化的联合国维和行动，但提出了一个非自由主义（和非西方主导）的“发展和平”概念来指导维和行动。非洲和中国优先目标的互补性可能为自由国际秩序下的维和行动带来深刻的挑战。然而，这一挑战并非预示着去全球化，而是阐明后自由国际秩序下国际机制的特点可能是去自由主义和去西方的。

UN peacekeeping became a flagship activity of the liberal international order (LIO) in the post-Cold War era, characterized by globalization, liberal norms and western leadership. Western states' diminished support for LIO UN peacekeeping has left it increasingly open to challenge, but significant changes are only likely if a strong group of states coalesces around an alternative model of UN peacekeeping. This article highlights African actors and China as well positioned to play pivotal roles in such a coalition. African states, who host the preponderance of UN missions and furnish almost half of the UN's uniformed peacekeepers, support globalized UN peacekeeping, show relatively weak support for the most liberal peace-building principles and assert the need for African-led solutions to continental crises. China's influence reflects its P5 status, financial and personnel contributions to UN peacekeeping and engagement with regional actors, notably in Africa. Aspiring to global leadership and a 'new world order’, China endorses globalized UN peacekeeping but proposes a non-liberal (and non-western led) notion of 'developmental peace’ to guide it. The complementarities between African and Chinese priorities raise the possibility of a profound challenge to LIO peacekeeping. Rather than heralding de-globalization, however, this challenge illustrates that post-LIO international institutions may instead be characterized by de-liberalization and de-westernization.

以“自己的自由主义形象塑造世界”如何使西方不再自由？

题目：How 'making the world in its own liberal image’ made the West less liberal

作者：Benjamin Miller，以色列海法大学(University of Haifa)政治学院国际关系专业教授，国家安全中心负责人。

摘要：西方试图让世界更自由的尝试最终如何让西方反而更不自由？冷战结束后，美国试图在世界各地推广自由主义。这种推广是在相信自由主义普遍性的前提下进行的。其中有一些尝试是成功的，最引人注目的是中国融入全球经济。其他许多自由化的努力则失败了，特别是在中国、俄罗斯和中东地区的民主推广。然而，无论是成功还是失败，这些尝试都导致了西方非自由主义的崛起，这在英国脱欧和特朗普主义中有所体现。文章展示了这些无论是成功还是失败的自由化尝试如何催生了民粹主义力量。中国经济的成功至少有一部分是由于美国主导推动中国融入了国际秩序，然而，这种成功在西方国家产生了不利的经济影响，这导致了经济民粹主义的崛起。而美国在中东的自由主义干预则促成了恐怖主义的崛起和穆斯林向西方移民。这些事态发展推动了文化民粹主义在西方的兴起，以及西方对外国人、移民和少数群体的怨恨。

How did the attempt to make the world more liberal end up making the West less liberal? Following the end of the Cold War the US tried to promote liberalism in various parts of the world. This promotion took place under the liberal belief in its universality. A few of these attempts succeeded, most notably the integration of China into the global economy. Many other liberalizing endeavours failed, notably democracy-promotion in China, Russia and the Middle East. Yet, both the successes and the failures resulted in the rise of illiberal elements in the West as reflected in Brexit and Trumpism. The article shows how the outcomes of the attempts at liberalization—both the failures and the successes—generated these populist forces. The Chinese economic success took place at least partly because of the US-led integration of China into the international order. Yet, this success produced adverse economic effects in the West. Such outcomes led to the rise of economic populism. The American liberal interventions in the Middle East affected the rise of terrorism and of Muslim migration to the West. These developments influenced the rise of cultural populism in the West, which advances resentment of foreigners, migrants and minorities.

新兴中等国家和自由国际秩序

题目：Emerging middle powers and the liberal international order

作者：Umut Aydin，智利天主教大学(Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile)政治学研究所副教授。

摘要：在后冷战时代，由于国内改革和经济、政治全球化的有利国际环境，一些中等国家逐步崛起。这些国家开始奉行中等国家的外交政策，在国际组织中积极工作，参与冲突调解、人道主义援助和改善人权等领域，并帮助在其周边地区传播民主和市场改革。通过这种方式，中等国家为冷战后的自由国际秩序的稳定和扩展做出了贡献。尽管如此，这些中等国家最近在民主和经济方面的倒退引起了人们的关注。本文以土耳其和墨西哥为例，探讨民主和市场改革的倒退如何影响了新兴中等国家的外交政策并削弱了这些国家对自由国际秩序的潜在贡献，而最近的去全球化趋势又加剧了改革的倒退。作者认为，虽然中等国家的崛起有助于加强和扩大自由国际秩序，但新兴中等国家的非自由化转向可能会对这一秩序产生不稳定的影响。

In the post-Cold War era, a number of middle powers rose to prominence thanks to domestic reforms and a favourable international environment of economic and political globalization. These countries began to pursue middle power foreign policies, working actively in international organizations, engaging in areas such as conflict mediation, humanitarian assistance and the promotion of human rights, and helping to diffuse democracy and market reforms in their neighbourhoods. In this way, they contributed to the stability and expansion of the liberal international order in the post-Cold War period. Nonetheless, recent democratic and economic backsliding in these middle powers raises concerns. Focusing on the cases of Turkey and Mexico, this article explores how reversals in democratic and market reforms, exacerbated by recent trends towards deglobalization, influence emerging middle powers' foreign policies and their potential contributions to the liberal international order. I argue that whereas their rise had helped reinforce and expand the liberal international order, emerging middle powers' illiberal turn may have a destabilizing effect on this order.

两个新兴的国际秩序？中国和美国

题目：Two emerging international orders? China and the United States

作者：John M Owen，弗吉尼亚大学政治系教授，他是文化高级研究所和米勒公共事务中心的高级研究员。

摘要：如果去全球化持续发展，它将导致的可能不是各自孤立的，而是出现两个重叠的国际秩序——一个是以美国为首的自由主义秩序(LIO)，另一个是以中国为首的威权-资本主义秩序(ACIO)。之所以可能出现这一均衡状态，是因为国际秩序的核心目的是维护其主导大国的国内制度。美国和中国拥有完全不同的国内制度，因此，随着中国国家实力和国际影响力的持续增长，关于国际秩序的紧张局势应该会加剧。作者从达尔文进化论中借用了“生态位构建”的概念——正如有机体通过操纵其所处的自然环境来改变表型选择一样，国家也可以通过塑造其所处的国际环境来改变其对国内制度的“选择”。“国际生态位构建模式”包括外国政权促进模式、相互依存模式、跨国互动模式和多边制度模式。美国及其盟国在第二次世界大战后建立的自由民主“生态位”使民主保持了数十年。今天，中国正试图通过各种方式建立一个“国际生态位”，以消除国际制度中的自由主义偏见，并维护自己的市场列宁主义政权。由此产生的ACIO将选择独裁专制，并因此与选择自由民主的LIO分离。

If it continues, deglobalization may lead not to atomization but two overlapping international orders: a liberal one (LIO) led by the United States, and an authoritarian–capitalist one (ACIO) led by China. This equilibrium could emerge because a central purpose of international orders is to preserve the domestic regimes of their Great Power sponsors. The United States and China have markedly different domestic regimes, and so as China continues to grow in power and influence, tension over the content of international order should continue to grow. I borrow from Darwinian evolution the notion of 'niche construction’: just as organisms alter phenotype selection by manipulating their natural environments, states can alter the 'selection’ of domestic regimes by shaping their international environments. Modes of international niche construction include foreign regime promotion, interdependence, transnational interaction and multilateral institutions. The liberal democratic niche constructed by the United States and its allies after the Second World War preserved democracy for many decades. Today, China is attempting through various means to build a niche that will eliminate the liberal bias in international institutions and safeguard its own Market-Leninist regime. The resulting ACIO would select for autocracy and hence be partially separate from the LIO, which selects for liberal democracy.

全球化、去全球化与人类安全——以缅甸为例

题目：Globalization, deglobalization and human security: the case of Myanmar

作者：Jarrod Hayes，马萨诸塞大学洛厄尔分校(University of Massachusetts, Lowell)国际关系副教授；Katja Weber，佐治亚理工学院(Georgia Tech)国际事务教授。

摘要：民族主义抬头，保护主义加剧，国际社会一些成员逐渐背离以规则为基础的国际秩序，对全球弱势群体来说都不是好兆头。人类安全受到一系列非传统安全挑战的威胁，这些挑战是由物质技术的发展催生的，需要各种行为体采取多方面的应对措施。其中，许多行为体期望从建立在全球化自由秩序的社会规范（即本文所称的“社会技术”）的基础上的跨国网络寻求保护。去全球化的相互关联性日益减弱，可能会进一步导致政府腐败，并牺牲弱势群体的利益。这是由各个国家和国际机制捍卫人类安全的意愿下降所致。无论是缅甸军政府时期受迫害的公民困境，印度尼西亚沿海渔业中的奴隶现象，还是棕榈油种植园的农民被驱逐的情况，如果没有社会技术来抵消物质技术的负面影响，国际社会就会缺乏援助弱势群体的政治能力（如制裁、武器禁运、旅行限制等）。归根结底，去全球化对人类安全的影响将在很大程度上取决于社会技术与物质技术进步一起发展的轨迹。

Increased nationalism, greater protectionism and a gradual move away from a rules-based international order by some members of the international community do not bode well for vulnerable populations around the globe. Human security is threatened by a host of non-traditional security challenges catalysed by the growth of physical technologies and require multifaceted responses from a variety of actors. Many of those actors look to transnational networks built on globalized liberal order's social norms—what we call social technologies—for protection. The dwindling interconnectedness of deglobalization is likely to further empower corrupt governments at the expense of vulnerable citizens. This results from a decreased willingness by states and international institutions to defend human security. Whether one looks at the plight of persecuted citizens during Burma's military junta, human slaves in the fisheries off the coast of Indonesia, or farmers uprooted from their land by palm oil plantations, without social technologies to counterbalance the negative implications of physical technology the international community will lack the political capacity (sanctions, arms embargoes, travel restrictions, etc.), to aid those most in need. Ultimately, the effects of deglobalization on human security will depend largely on the trajectory of social technology developing alongside advances in physical technology.

全球卫生：一个努力跟上全球化步伐的秩序

题目：Global health: an order struggling to keep up with globalization

作者：Markus Kornprobst，维也纳国际研究学院政治学和国际关系系主任，主要研究方向为国际和平与安全、国际关系理论、治理与外交等；Stephanie Strobl，美因茨约翰内斯古滕贝格大学普通病理学研究所医学博士。

摘要：全球卫生制度是否跟上了全球化的步伐？本文认为它们严重落后了。虽然医学知识在显示疾病如何在全球范围传播方面变得越来越精细，但旨在解决这一问题的政治秩序几乎不是全球性的。就其在宣言乃至具有法律约束力的文件中所作的承诺而言，它是全球性的（制度前景），但是许多根深蒂固的互动中的政治实践并没有遵守这些承诺（制度背景）。作者用一种传统外交的“博弈感”的主导地位来解释这一现象，在这种外交“博弈感”中，通常被狭隘定义的国家利益、国家间的定位竞争以及全球卫生在国际安全和经济考虑下的从属地位占上风。基于这一判断，作者讨论了全球卫生秩序进一步演变的三种情景：（1）当前制度的持续性，（2）制度前景的修正和制度背景的持续性，以及（3）对两者都进行修正的质的飞跃。尽管新冠肺炎（COVID-19）危机为第三种，甚至第二种情景提供了机会，但当前自由主义一系列秩序的剧变使得第一种情景最有可能出现。

Do global health institutions keep up with globalization forces? We contend that they seriously lag behind. While medical knowledge becomes more and more refined in showing how diseases spread globally, the political order meant to address this problem is barely global. It is global in terms of the promises it makes in declarations and even legally binding instruments (institutional foreground). But many entrenched political practices of interaction do not keep these promises (institutional background). We explain this with the dominance of a traditional diplomatic 'feel of the game’ in which often narrowly defined national interests, positioning battles among states, and a subordination of global health under considerations of international security and economics prevail. Based on this diagnosis, we discuss three scenarios for the further evolution of the global health order: (1) the persistence of current institutions, (2) revisions of the institutional foreground and persistence of the background, and (3) a qualitative break that makes amendments to both. While the COVID-19 crisis provides openings for the third and, even more so, the second one, the current upheavals in the liberal constellation of orders makes the first scenario the most likely one.

能力转移时代的自由主义国际贸易秩序

题目：The liberal international trading order (LITO) in an era of shifting capabilities

作者：Steven E. Lobell，犹他大学政治学教授，主要研究方向为国际关系、国际安全与军备控制、新古典现实主义等；Jordan Ernstsen，犹他大学博士，主要研究方向为联盟、大战略、美国外交政策等。

摘要：关于自由主义国际秩序即将崩溃的问题有很多争论。这是由新兴对等的或接近对等的竞争对手在物质和军事能力方面的变动所引起的，其中一些竞争对手并未参与最初的“大交易”，而其他竞争对手则处于更有利的地位而能重新谈判这一“交易”。作为自由主义国际秩序的一个关键要素，作者提出如下问题：在权力转移时期，自由主义国际贸易秩序(LITO)是否持久且具有弹性？LITO何时以及为什么会崩溃？仅靠霸权的相对衰落能解释这些结果吗？基于“颠倒的第二意象+”(second-image reversed plus)的论点，作者强调了对等和接近对等的竞争者的对外贸易导向的性质的转变如何改变两个相互竞争以“俘获国家”(capture the state)的广泛且互相捧场(logrolled)的联盟的国内均势，从而影响前任领导人选择是否捍卫、重新谈判或者放弃其创建的贸易秩序。为了更好地理解这些力量，作者考察了两个典型案例：20世纪30年代的英国和21世纪初的美国。

There is much debate about the impending collapse of the liberal international order. It is provoked by the shifts in material and military capabilities from emerging peer and near-peer competitors, some of whom were not part of the original grand bargain and others that are in a stronger position to renegotiate the bargain. As one critical element of the liberal international order, we ask, during power shifts: is the liberal international trading order (LITO) durable and resilient? When and why will the LITO collapse? Does the relative decline of the hegemon alone explain these outcomes? In advancing a second-image reversed plus argument, we highlight how a shift in the nature of the foreign commercial orientation of peer and near-peer contenders can alter the domestic balance of power of two broad and logrolled coalitions competing to capture the state and thus affect whether the erstwhile leader defends, renegotiates, or abandons the trading order it created. To better understand these forces, we examine two paradigmatic cases: Britain in the 1930s and the United States in the 2000s.

编译 | 曾庆鸣杨佳霖董黛胡富钦陈思涵

审校 | 赖永祯何伊楠

排版 | 云琪布日方引弓

【新刊速递】《国际事务》(IA), Vol.97, No.5, September 2021 | 国政学人

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